Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0850-13T2
03-05-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PAUL SCHUKIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jane Deaterly Plaisted, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Haas and Higbee. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 80-0156. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jane Deaterly Plaisted, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant, Paul Schukis, appeals from a June 12, 2013 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Michael L. Ravin, in his well-reasoned, written opinion issued with the order.
On August 2, 1980, defendant was originally charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, which was then amended to second-degree sexual assault. On March 23, 1981, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant, who was then represented by private counsel, pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual contact. On May 1, 1981, he was sentenced to a two-year probationary term. His co-defendant went to trial and was found not guilty by a jury.
Defendant did not appeal his conviction. Instead, he filed this (PCR) petition over thirty-one (31) years later, on April 12, 2012. He claims he was not aware of his right to file for relief. He was motivated to file this PCR because his parole status, for an unrelated conviction in Texas, was negatively affected by this conviction. Initially, he filed this petition pro se. Counsel was later appointed to assist him, who argued that defendant's petition was not procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-12, since excusable neglect existed, and the interest of justice warranted a relaxation of the time bar.
After carefully considering the arguments of counsel, Judge Ravin denied defendant's PCR petition as time-barred, under Rule 3:22-12. Judge Ravin found defendant had not provided any evidence showing that the delay in filing his petition "was due to defendant's excusable neglect . . . [or] that there [was] a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual assertions were found to be true, enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice." Judge Ravin also denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing in his comprehensive written opinion filed on June 12, 2013.
Defendant now appeals, raising the following argument:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-12.
Our review of the record convinces us that Judge Ravin acted properly in denying defendant's petition for PCR on procedural grounds without an evidentiary hearing. We find that defendant's arguments were properly addressed in Judge Ravin's opinion and are without sufficient merit to warrant additional discussion here. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION