Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0105-PR
07-31-2018
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. ANTONIO JULIO SANCHEZ, Petitioner.
COUNSEL William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney By Catherine Leisch, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix Counsel for Respondent DuMond & Doran PLLC, Phoenix By Samantha K. DuMond Counsel for Petitioner
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2001090891
The Honorable Christopher Coury, Judge
REVIEW DENIED
COUNSEL William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney
By Catherine Leisch, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix
Counsel for Respondent DuMond & Doran PLLC, Phoenix
By Samantha K. DuMond
Counsel for Petitioner
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Eppich concurred. ESPINOSA, Judge:
¶1 Antonio Sanchez seeks review of the trial court's order summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We deny review.
¶2 In 2001, Sanchez and an accomplice were indicted for three counts of sexual assault and two counts of surreptitious recording involving two victims. Available evidence included a video recording the defendants had made of their encounters with the victims, for which the audio portion was apparently unintelligible despite the state's efforts to enhance it. Sanchez pled guilty to attempted sexual assault and kidnapping.
The indictment was apparently amended to include the kidnapping charge. --------
¶3 Sanchez absconded before sentencing and was not returned to custody until 2013. He then sought to withdraw from his guilty plea based on what he described as newly discovered evidence, namely that, by using techniques unavailable in 2001, intelligible audio had been extracted from the recordings. He asserted that audio showed his sexual encounters with the victims had been consensual. The trial court denied his motion to withdraw and sentenced him to a five-year term for kidnapping, suspended the imposition of sentence for attempted sexual assault, and imposed lifetime probation for that offense.
¶4 Sanchez sought post-conviction relief raising several claims, including that had the enhanced audio been available to him, he would not have pled guilty and that his trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to seek special action relief from the denial of a motion to remand to the grand jury and in misadvising him about the potential punishment if he accepted or rejected the plea. He also asserted his signed plea was not "enforceable" because it had not been properly filed until 2015, the indictment had been improperly amended to include the kidnapping charge, the sentence imposed by the court was "unconscionable," and the presentence report contained "numerous errors." In a detailed ruling, the trial court denied relief, and also incorporated by reference its sealed order explaining its reasons for denying Sanchez's motion to withdraw from the guilty plea based on its assessment of the video recording with enhanced audio. This petition for review followed.
¶5 In his petition for review, Sanchez asks that we "review . . . specific key rulings" of the trial court, and asserts he was "denied a fair and impartial hearing on the Rule 32 Petition due to [the court]'s bias." He complains primarily about the court's interpretation of the enhanced video and its incorporation of the sealed order, but does not claim that order was withheld from him. We ordinarily review a trial court's ruling on newly discovered evidence for an abuse of discretion, deferring to its assessment of that evidence. See State v. Hess, 231 Ariz. 80, ¶ 1 (App. 2012) (denial of Rule 32 petition asserting newly discovered evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4 (App. 2007) ("[W]e generally defer to a trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous.").
¶6 Here, however, not only has Sanchez demonstrated no such abuse, he cites no legal authority whatsoever and makes no cognizable legal argument in support of his petition as required by Rule 32.9. His failure to do so justifies our summary refusal to grant review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(B)(iv) (petition for review must contain "reasons why the appellate court should grant the petition, including citations to supporting legal authority, if known"), (f) (appellate review under Rule 32.9 discretionary); see also State v. Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, ¶ 16 (App. 2013) (insufficient argument waives claim on review); State v. French, 198 Ariz. 119, ¶ 9 (App. 2000) (summarily rejecting claims not complying with rules governing form and content of petitions for review), disapproved on other grounds by Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, ¶ 10 (2002).
¶7 Review is denied.