Opinion
Cr. I.D. No. 93005924DI.
Submitted: October 15, 2007.
Decided: November 7, 2007.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S FIRST PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DENIED.
This 7th day of November, 2007, it appears to the Court that:
1. On October 24, 1994, a jury found Harry L. Samuel ("Samuel") guilty of one count of assault in the first degree, one count of assault in the second degree, two counts of assault in a detention facility, and four counts of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony ("PDWDCF"). On January 6, 1995, the Court sentenced Samuel to 125 years at Level V. On April 10, 1996, after filing an appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court (1) reversed Samuel's convictions for one count of assault in the first degree and for one count of assault in the second degree, merging them with the two counts of assault in a detention facility; (2) reversed his sentence of 125 years; (3) affirmed his convictions and sentence for the multiple weapons offenses; and (4) remanded Samuel's case to the Superior Court for resentencing.
Samuel v. State, 676 A.2d 906 (Del. 1996) (Table) [hereinafter Samuel I].
2. Upon remand, the Superior Court resentenced Samuel to 98 years of incarceration, comprised of (1) a twenty-year sentence for one charge of assault in a detention facility; (2) an eight-year sentence for the other charge of assault in a detention facility; (3) two twenty-year terms for two of the weapons offenses; and (4) two fifteen-year terms for the remaining two weapons offenses. Samuel then filed a second appeal, in which the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment finding that Samuel's new sentence was appropriate and not based on impermissible factors; and that the convictions for Samuel's weapons offenses were appropriate, even though the underlying assault offenses were merged with the assault in a detention facility charges, because the jury had found Samuel guilty of the underlying assaults.
Samuel v. State, 694 A.2d 48 (Del. 1997) (Table) [hereinafter Samuel II].
3. Samuel filed his first pro se motion for postconviction relief on February 24, 2006. This Court denied Samuel's postconviction motion in a letter opinion dated March 29, 2006, in which this Court held (1) that the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Priest v. State would not be applied retroactively; and (2) that Samuel's motion was time barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) because the Delaware Supreme Court had formerly adjudicated his claim that the sentences for his weapons offenses were proper. On November 9, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed Samuel's appeal as moot. Samuel then filed this, his second pro se motion for postconviction relief, on October 15, 2007. He also filed a motion for appointment of counsel on October 15, 2007.
879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005).
Samuel v. State, 911 A.2d 804 (Del. Nov. 9, 2006) (Table).
4. In this motion, Samuel raises numerous grounds for postconviction relief. Specifically, Samuel argues: (1) that, under Priest v. State, this Court should vacate two of his PDWDCF sentences because he claims the underlying felonies for these charges were overturned on appeal; (2) that this Court should vacate four of his PDWDCF sentences because he was found guilty in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (3) that the PDWDCF charges had an improper impact on his assault in a detention facility charges that, he claims, were subsequently vacated; (4) that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to vacate all of his PDWDCF charges; (5) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making statements referring to "stabbing" and "deep stab wounds"; (6) that the Court imposed an excessive sentence based on demonstrably false information in the presentence report and other impermissible facts, such as the presentence officer's statement that he had "no doubt" that Samuel tried to kill the victim; (7) that the prosecutor committed further misconduct by stating the false information that the injury he inflicted on a victim who intervened was stabbed in the hand; (8) that there was no DNA or other forensic evidence linking his use of the weapons to the scene of the crime to prove his innocence; and (9) that one of the officers who subdued Samuel in the detention facility used excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment by kicking Samuel in the head after he was handcuffed on the ground. As a result of these errors, Samuel asks this Court for any and all proper relief.
5. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, in order to protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim. In that case, the Court may summarily dismiss the defendant's claim "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief[.]"
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
6. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules unless the movant shows prejudice to his rights or cause for relief; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. The bars to relief under (1), (2), and (3), however, do not apply "to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." Moreover, the procedural bars of (2) and (4) may be overcome if "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice."
If the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, the motion must be filed within three years. If the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005, however, the motion must be filed within one year. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (July 1, 2005) (amending Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (May 1, 1996)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Id. R. 61(i)(4).
7. In this case, all of Samuel's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61(i)(1) applies because Samuel filed this motion more than three years after his final order of conviction. Moreover, Rules 61(i)(2) and (3) prevent this Court from considering many of his claims because he failed to raise these grounds in his previous motions, and did not raise them at trial or on direct appeal. Finally, Rule 61(i)(4) precludes this Court's consideration of Samuel's argument that the sentences related to his PDWDCF must be vacated, because the Supreme Court formerly adjudicated this claim. Further, the Supreme Court did not vacate the underlying felony charges, as in Priest, but rather explicitly affirmed the jury's finding that Samuel was guilty of the underlying assaults associated with the PDWDCF charges. The Delaware Supreme Court also expressly rejected defendant's claim that his new sentence was based on impermissible factors. Since Samuel's claims are procedurally barred, Samuel must meet one of the exceptions to overcome the bars to relief.
Because a final order of Samuel's conviction occurred on April 16, 1997, and his conviction became final 90 days later on July 15, 1997, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Samuel had three years to file a motion for postconviction relief. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (July 1, 2005) (amending Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (May 1, 1996)). This second motion was filed over ten years after the conviction became final on October 15, 2007.
Priest, 879 A.2d at 583.
Samuel II at *1.
8. In this case, Samuel has failed to overcome any of the procedural bars by showing a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice" or that "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." The "miscarriage of justice" exception is a "narrow one and has been applied only in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after a direct appeal." Although Samuel argues that the PDWDCF charges had an improper impact on his assault in a detention facility charges, he incorrectly notes that these charges were subsequently vacated. As explained at length both by this Court and the Delaware Supreme Court, the jury's finding that Samuel committed the assaults underlying the PDWDCF charges were affirmed, not vacated. As a result, the charges and sentences related to the PDWDCF were valid and did not improperly affect the assault charges. Moreover, as explained by the Delaware Supreme Court, Samuel's sentencing did not violate his due process rights. Similarly, although a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not procedurally barred in the first instance, Samuel failed to raise this claim in his first postconviction motion, and this second motion makes only a conclusory claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, without any evidence or explanation whatsoever.
Younger, 580 A.2d at 555 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989)).
Samuel I at *2.
State v. Morla, 2007 WL 2566012, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Aug. 30, 2007).
9. Furthermore, Samuel's claim that there was no DNA or other forensic evidence linking him to the assaults is irrelevant. There is no requirement that DNA or other forensic evidence be presented for a finding of guilt. Samuel's final claim, that his constitutional rights were violated when he was detained in the detention facility is unavailing. The Court will not address these contentions because (1) the guards' alleged use of excessive force was never raised at trial, on appeal, or in his first postconviction motion; and (2) any use of force, excessive or otherwise, that the guards may have used to detain Samuel did not "undermine the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." As a result, this Court will not address these claims.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (emphasis added).
See State v. Jordan, 1994 WL 637299, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Jun. 23, 1994) ("This Court need not address Postconviction Relief claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated."); Zimmerman v. State, 1991 WL 190298, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 17, 1991) (citations omitted) ("This Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated."); State v. Canon, 1999 WL 1441997, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 9, 1999) (finding Defendant's claim "repetitive, vague, and entirely conclusory, warranting summary dismissal"); State v. Brown, 1998 WL 735880, at *3 (Del. Super Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) ("Conclusory claims raised in a defendant's motion for postconviction relief are insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel and will not be addressed."); State v. Dividu, 1992 WL 52348, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Feb. 12, 1992) ("[M]ovant has failed to provide any factual support for his perfunctory allegations. He does not state, for example, in what regard his counsel failed to prepare for trial[.] As Rule 61(b)(2) obviously contemplated, without this information I am unable to effectively evaluate the merit of movant's claims."); State v. Morgan, 2004 WL 1732282, at *2 n. 1 (Del.Super.Ct. July 27, 2004) ("Defendant makes an assertion in ground five concerning a motion for postconviction relief which is unintelligible and consequently, ignored."); State v. Maldonado, 2004 WL 2735463, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov. 5, 2004) ("Defendant makes an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, which frankly, is nonsensical.").
10. Samuel requests that this Court appoint him counsel to assist him with his postconviction relief because doing so would serve the best interests of justice. Samuel specifically argues that he is unskilled at law and that he has limited access to legal library at his detention center.
10. "[T]here is no constitutional right to counsel in a collateral proceeding." Rule 61(e)(1), however, permits the Court to appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant in a postconviction proceeding "only in the exercise of discretion and for good cause shown, but not otherwise." Samuel has not shown good cause why the Court should appoint counsel on his behalf. As the voluminous record indicates, Samuel has had ample opportunity to raise any claims he may have had regarding his convictions and sentences. Moreover, though he may be unskilled at law, Samuel has filed numerous pro se motions, including this second motion for postconviction relief. In those motions, he has discussed federal and state case law and has been able to conjure varying bases for relief, without the benefit of counsel.
Walker v. State, ___ A.2d ___, 2007 WL 2949145, at *1 (Del. Oct. 11, 2007) (Table).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1).
In addition to the trial, two appeals, two sentencing hearings, and one prior motion for postconviction relief, Samuel also filed a claim for relief in federal court and appealed that to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Samuel has offered nine different bases of relief in this motion alone.
11. For all of the foregoing reasons, Samuel's motion for postconviction relief is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Original to Prothonotary