Opinion
No. 35509-4-II.
January 15, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 06-1-03321-5, Brian M. Tollefson, J., entered September 29, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Houghton, C.J., concurred in by Armstrong and Van Deren, JJ.
Michael Scott Runyon appeals his second degree burglary conviction, arguing that insufficient evidence supported it because the State did not establish that he entered or remained unlawfully in a "building" as defined by RCW 9A.04.110(5). We affirm.
FACTS
We derive the facts from trial evidence taken in the light most favorable to the State.
On July 18, 2006, at approximately 11:15 p.m., Tacoma police officers responded to a report of a burglary at a partially demolished food store. A citizen called the police after noticing an individual inside the fence surrounding the demolition area. He described the individual as "acting very erratically" and throwing shopping carts at the door of the store before entering it. 4 Report of Proceedings at 96.
When the officers arrived at the scene, they noticed that a section of the fence surrounding the demolition site had been pulled apart and a bicycle sat parked inside the fence. They also heard noises coming from inside the food store.
The officers entered through the fence opening, went inside the store, and climbed a stairwell past second floor offices, where they found Runyon. The officers arrested him.
The State charged Runyon with one count of second degree burglary, RCW 9A.52.030(1). A jury heard the matter.
At trial, the superintendent for the demolition company testified that his workers removed materials such as refrigeration equipment, plumbing materials, wiring, and steel because part of the profit earned by his company was from the sale of those goods. He also testified that he kept the site locked at night.
At the close of the State's evidence, the trial court denied Runyon's motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to present a prima facie case. The trial court instructed the jury that to convict, it must find in part that Runyon entered or remained unlawfully in a building and that the term "[b]uilding, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any fenced area or any other structure used mainly for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods." Clerk's Papers at 40. The jury convicted Runyon of one count of second degree burglary and he appeals.
ANALYSIS
Runyon contends that insufficient evidence supported his second degree burglary conviction. He argues that a partially enclosed demolition site containing a partly demolished food store does not meet the statutory definition of a "building."
One commits second degree burglary when, with the intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building. RCW 9A.52.030(1). The term "building" is ordinarily defined as "a constructed edifice designed to stand more or less permanently, covering a space of land, usu. covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a . . . storehouse . . . or other useful structure." Webster's Third New Intern'l Dictionary 292 (2002). RCW 9A.04.110(5) by its own language also encompasses any type of "structure" used for carrying on business or for the use, sale, or deposit of goods. The term "structure" means "something constructed or built." Webster's, supra, at 2267. The term "goods" is defined as "tangible movable personal property" or "chattels, wares, merchandise." Webster's, supra, at 978.
We review the meaning of a statute de novo as a matter of law. State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003). Once we determine the proper meaning of the statute, we review the factual question of whether the evidence at trial meets that definition under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. State v. Johnson, 132 Wn. App. 400, 406, 132 P.3d 737 (2006), review denied, 153 P.3d 196 (2007).
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the State's favor and interpret them most strongly against the defendant. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
Here, the jury heard testimony from two officers that they entered the food store, traveled up a staircase to the second floor, entered a landing containing office spaces, spotted Runyon through another doorway, and traversed across the rooftop to an adjoining rooftop. The jury also saw photographs depicting the structure as it stood on July 18.
The jury also heard testimony from the demolition superintendent. He told the jury that salvageable materials would be sold by his company and would comprise part of the profit derived from the demolition. Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that this salvageable material, housed within the structure, comprised goods for sale under the meaning of the burglary statute.
Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have found that the partially demolished food store met the definition of "building" under RCW 9A.04.110(5). See, e.g., Johnson, 132 Wn. App. at 408-09. Substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict.
Runyon also raises arguments based on whether the fenced area surrounding the partly demolished food store was a "fenced area" under RCW 9A.04.110(5). Because we hold that the food store structure was a building, we do not further address these arguments.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
ARMSTRONG, J., VAN DEREN, J., concur.