Opinion
Case No. 20020326-CA.
Filed February 20, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department The Honorable Lynn W. Davis.
Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant, Spencer Rucker, appeals his conviction of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1996). Defendant argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his conviction and that this issue was properly raised during his trial. Defendant further argues that if his sufficiency claim was not preserved for appeal, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly raise it in the trial court. We affirm.
"[I]n order to prevail on a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict, `the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 22, 69 P.3d 1278 (citation omitted). The verdict will be reversed "`only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). In this case, while it appears that Defendant has fulfilled the marshaling requirement, he has not demonstrated that the evidence against him was "`sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt'" that he committed the crime for which he was convicted. Id. (citation omitted).
In support of his claim, Defendant argues that "the evidence presented at trial can only be described as inconsistent." He points out that there was "no sort of physical or medical evidence linking [him] to the cause of the abrasion or cut" on the victim's genital area and that "the only somewhat corroborating evidence presented by the State . . . proving [he] was involved in this alleged incident, [came] from an inmate that was in jail with [him]."
While it is true that there was no physical or medical evidence linking Defendant directly to the victim's injuries, it is clear from the record that the State presented sufficient evidence "from which a reasonable jury could find the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ¶ 19, 42 P.3d 1248 (quotations and citation omitted). The victim's mother testified that the victim told her, shortly after she picked the victim up from Defendant's home, that Defendant had touched the victim's genital area during the middle of the night. The victim's mother immediately took the victim to a hospital where a medical examination revealed injuries consistent with sexual abuse. The doctor who performed the examination testified that the victim had told her that somebody had "put their finger inside her." The victim testified that while she was sleeping at Defendant's house, she was awakened by Defendant, who removed her panties and touched her in a way that made her feel uncomfortable. Moreover, the victim was able to point to Defendant and say his name when the prosecutor asked her who was responsible for touching her. While there may have been some minor inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, the jury could easily have concluded that this was the result of her age (she was five years old when she testified) or her fear of Defendant. Finally, Defendant's cellmate testified that Defendant had confessed to him that he had abused a young girl who was staying in his home. Although Defendant called another witness to impeach the cellmate's testimony, it was up to the jury to assess the credibility of these witnesses. See id. ("When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence." (quotations and citation omitted)).
Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the evidence presented by the State was "`sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt'" about whether Defendant committed the crime for which he was convicted. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we reject Defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
Defendant also noted that during his sentencing hearing the trial judge stated that had the same evidence been presented to him, he may have found that reasonable doubt existed. However, the Utah Supreme Court has observed that
even if a judge subjectively concludes, following the presentation of the prosecution's case, that there is reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the judge is nevertheless obligated to submit the case to the jury if the evidence is sufficient that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d 300 (footnote omitted).
Because we conclude that Defendant's sufficiency claim fails, we need not decide whether this issue was properly preserved for appeal. Moreover, our determination makes it unnecessary to consider Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Judge and Gregory K. Orme, Judge.