Opinion
No. 3-532 / 02-1666
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Todd A. Geer, Judge.
Ronnfeldt appeals his conviction and sentences for methamphetamine-related offenses and claims his counsel provided him ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, Appellate Defender and Theresa Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Bradley Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Herman Lee Ronnfeldt appeals his judgment and sentences for various methamphetamine-related crimes. He contends the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine or the receipt or possession of precursor substances. He also contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the jury instruction relating to the conspiracy charge. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
An officer with the LaPorte City police department observed a vehicle committing a traffic violation. He caught up with the car and activated his lights and siren. The driver sped up, with the officer in close pursuit. Items, including a propane tank and a thermos, flew out of the car. The officer also noticed a black duffle bag "rolling from the right to the left" on a lawn the vehicle passed through. Police later retrieved this bag. It contained four cans of ether, glassware, a wooden spoon, and a Tupperware box containing pseudoephedrine. On the same lawn, police found a box containing coffee filters, a porcelain jar containing lithium batteries, a one-gallon can of Coleman fuel and a one-gallon can of camp fuel. When police stopped the car, two individuals got out and began to run. One of them, Ronnfeldt, was apprehended.
The State charged Ronnfeldt with: 1) manufacture of more than 5 grams of methamphetamine, 2) conspiracy to manufacture more than 5 grams of methamphetamine, 3) receipt of precursor drugs (ephedrine and/or pseudoephedrine), 4) possession of ephedrine and/or pseudoephedrine, 5) possession of lithium, 6) possession of ether, 7) possession of anhydrous ammonia, and 8) interference with official acts. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(b)(7), (4); 124B.9; 719.1 (2001). On the day of trial, the State dismissed the manufacturing charge. A jury found Ronnfeldt guilty of the remaining charges and the district court imposed sentences. This appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Our review of rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence is for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as precedent requires, we must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the conviction. See State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000).
A. Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamine
Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) makes it a crime to "conspire with one or more other persons to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. . . . Iowa Code § 124.401(b)(7). The district court instructed the jury that, to prove Ronnfeldt guilty of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, the State would have to establish both of the following elements:
"Conspiracy" is defined in pertinent part as follows:
1. A person commits conspiracy with another if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime which is an aggravated misdemeanor or felony, the person does either of the following:
a. Agrees with another that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct constituting the crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit the crime.
b. Agrees to aid another in the planning or commission of the crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit the crime.
2. It is not necessary for the conspirator to know the identity of each and every conspirator.
3. A person shall not be convicted of a conspiracy unless it is alleged and proven that at least one conspirator committed an overt act evidencing a design to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy by criminal means. . . . Iowa Code § 706.1.
1. On or about the 29th day of April, 2002, the defendant knowingly:
a. entered into a common scheme or design with the other occupant of the vehicle to manufacture methamphetamine, or
b. conspired with the other occupant of the vehicle to manufacture methamphetamine.
2. The defendant:
a. had the specific intent to manufacture methamphetamine, or
b. entered into a common scheme or design with, or conspired with the other occupant of the vehicle while knowing the other's specific intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
In a separate definitional instruction, the court further instructed the jury that a conspiracy required proof that "the defendant and at least one other person came to a mutual understanding to manufacture or attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and that the defendant committed an overt act to promote or facilitate their agreement."
We find substantial evidence to support these elements. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, a juror reasonably could have found that: 1) Ronnfeldt was in a car containing all the ingredients to make methamphetamine; 2) Ronnfeldt and the other individual sped away when they were approached by police and threw items from the car; and 3) Ronnfeldt attempted to flee when police stopped him. The jury also heard testimony from a State criminalist that the persons in the car "had prepared the precursor and assembled necessary starting ingredients" for the manufacture of methamphetamine. This evidence is qualitatively stronger than the evidence our courts have held insufficient to support a conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine. Cf. State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 742-43 (Iowa 2001) (finding insufficient evidence to support conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine based on defendant's presence in garage where methamphetamine lab was located, contamination of his clothes with fumes, and flight upon spying police); State v. Nickens, 644 N.W.2d 38, 42-43 (Iowa Ct.App. 2002) (finding insufficient evidence of conspiracy where defendant merely lived in apartment in which cocaine and firearm were found). We find the evidence sufficient to support the finding of guilt for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
For purposes of this issue, we examine the evidence in light of the instructions as given. See State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1997) (instruction not objected to becomes the law of the case). We preserve for postconviction relief Ronnfeldt's contention that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the conspiracy instruction. See Part III.
B. Receipt of Precursor
Ronnfeldt next contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for receipt or possession of precursor substances. We disagree.
A juror reasonably could have found that the occupants of the car discarded a tupperware container with ephedrine or pseudoephedrine residue, as well as lithium batteries, ether, and a tank containing anhydrous ammonia. While it is true that the officers did not specifically see Ronnfeldt throw out these items, the jury could have inferred from where the items landed that both occupants of the vehicle were involved in the process. Additionally, while there is no direct evidence establishing that Ronnfeldt knew of the items contained in the black duffle bag that was thrown out, a juror could have inferred knowledge from the fact that other precursors were discarded and the bag was found on the path traversed by the car. We accordingly find sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of guilt on the receipt and possession of precursor counts.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ronnfeldt contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the jury instruction on conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance. He maintains the instruction allowed the jury to find him guilty on the basis of the driver's intent, rather than his own, and omitted reference to the requirement of an overt act. We preserve this issue for postconviction relief to allow counsel an opportunity to explain his conduct. See State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 84 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).