Opinion
UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET PORTLAND Docket No. CR-16-5565
03-22-2017
STATE OF MAINE v. STEVEN ROBERTS Defendant
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss. ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND MOTION IN LIMINE FOLLOWING EVIDENTIARY HEARING
By Order dated March 2, 2017, the court granted Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and agreed to set this matter for an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's pending suppression and in limine motions. On March 16, 2017, the court heard oral argument from Assistant District Attorney Carlos Diaz, representing the State, and from Attorney Lawrence Winger, representing Defendant, and heard testimony from paramedic Christopher Desjardins, from Deputy Stephen Welsh, and from Defendant. Defendant filed a Post-Hearing Memorandum on March 17, 2017.
With respect to Defendant's Miranda-based challenge, the State must prove the admissibility of Defendant's statements by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. King, 2016 ME 54, ¶ 16. Assuming that the scope of the constitutional protections encompassed within the Miranda rule even apply to statements made to EMTs, Defendant concedes, as he must, that Miranda is not triggered unless Defendant was "in custody" at the time.
The well-established factors for determining whether a defendant was "in custody" are set forth in State v. King:
1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;
2) the party who initiated the contact;
3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant);
4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it);State v. King, 2016 ME 54, ¶ 17 (citing State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23).
7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
8) the number of law enforcement officers present;
9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and
10) the duration and character of the duration.
Application of these factors to the testimony adduced at hearing yields the following: Defendant spoke to the EMTs while in the driveway of his home. Although the contact was not initiated by Defendant, he was not told that he was under arrest, nor was there any discussion about probable cause or any other law enforcement-related issues. The deputy present at the scene was assisting the paramedic. Defendant testified that both the deputy and the paramedic told him he should go to the hospital, he "felt like he had a choice, but the officer was right, he needed to go." Only Deputy Welsh and paramedic Desjardins were on the scene until Defendant was brought to the ambulance, which is approximately when Sargeant David Hall arrived. Although Attorney Winger argued that the facial pressure used by paramedic Desjardins to stanch Defendant's facial bleeding amounted to "physical restraint", the court finds that Defendant was not in fact physically restrained. The entire encounter lasted 25-30 minutes.
Assuming that "in custody" analysis even applies to statements made to an EMT, the court finds that the evidence adduced at hearing shows that Defendant was not "in custody" at the time he made the statements Defendant seeks to suppress. Because Defendant was not "in custody", Miranda warnings were not required. The fact that at the hearing on Defendant's motions the State did not call paramedic Holmquist does not entitle Defendant, as he argues, to suppression of statements made to paramedic Holmquist because the court's finding that Defendant was not "in custody" encompasses the statements made to both paramedics.
With respect to Defendant's "lack of voluntariness" argument, the State bears the burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and "[i]n order to find a statement voluntary, it must first be established that it is the result of defendant's exercise of his own free will and rational intellect." State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 33. Attorney Winger argues that Defendant's physical state ("he was in shock, he was concussed, he had a broken nose and facial lacerations") rendered his statements involuntary as a matter of law. The court finds, first, that whether Defendant "was in shock" and/or "concussed" was not established by the evidence adduced at trial. Moreover, whether or not Defendant was "in shock" and "concussed", the undisputed evidence establishes that at the time he made the statements he was conscious, oriented, and alert. Based on the evidence, the court finds that the State has proven the voluntariness of Defendant's statements beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to Defendant's motion in limine, Defendant argues that paramedics should be encompassed within the privilege set forth in Rule 503 of the Maine Rules of Evidence even though the Rule, by its express terms, is limited to communications with "health care professionals" (defined as licensed physicians, licensed physician's assistants, and licensed nurse practitioners), mental health professionals, and licensed counseling professionals. See M.R. Evid. 503(a) & (b). Finding that due process does not entitle Defendant to an extension of the privilege set forth in Rule 503, the court declines to extend the privilege to include communications made to paramedics.
Having considered counsel's oral and written argument and the evidence adduced at hearing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress Statements and Motion in Limine is DENIED in its entirety. DATED: 22 March 17
/s/_________
Jed J. French
Judge, Unified Criminal Docket