Opinion
2013 KA 1789
09-04-2014
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TERRENCE ROBERSON
Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney Counsel for Appellant State of Louisiana By: Christopher J.M. Casler Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, Louisiana Mark D. Plaisance Assistant Public Defender Thibodaux, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Terrence Roberson
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
No. 11-12-0217
Honorable Donald Johnson, Judge Presiding Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
Counsel for Appellant
State of Louisiana
By: Christopher J.M. Casler
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Mark D. Plaisance
Assistant Public Defender
Thibodaux, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Terrence Roberson
BEFORE: PETTIGREW, McDONALD, AND McCLENDON, JJ.
McCLENDON, J.
The defendant, Terrence Roberson, was charged by grand jury indictment with three counts of armed robbery (violations of LSA-R.S. 14:64), and two counts of attempted second degree murder (violations of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1 and LSA-R.S. 14:27). The defendant pled not guilty on all counts. The defendant filed a motion to quash, claiming the State was barred from bringing the charges in the district court since they were previously filed by petition in juvenile court and dismissed with prejudice. The trial court held a hearing and granted the defendant's motion to quash. The State now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to quash the indictment. For the following reasons, we reverse the granting of the motion to quash and remand for further proceedings.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The State notes that the defendant did not identify any article of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure that provides for the quashing of the indictment in this case. The State contends that the trial court granted the motion to quash on its own grounds as opposed to any grounds asserted by the defendant. While noting that neither the trial court nor the defendant directly asserts that any applicable time limitation expired, the State argues that LSA-Ch.C. art. 305 does not forever prohibit the State from instituting criminal prosecution. The State further argues that LSA-Ch.C. art. 877(C) does not authorize the juvenile court to unilaterally dismiss a petition with prejudice. The State also contends that it had the authority to dismiss a petition and obtain an indictment in the district court after the juvenile court denied its motion for a continuance. Although the State noted that the defendant did not file a motion to dismiss the petition in the juvenile court pursuant to Article 877(C), the State argues that it dismissed the petition to seek transfer to the district court, not to extend the time period for adjudication in juvenile court.
When a trial court rules on a motion to quash, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. See State v. Odom, 02-2698 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 861 So.2d 187, 191, writ denied, 03-2142 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 765. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Smith, 99-0606, 99-2015, 99-2019, 99-2094 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501, 504.
On July 9, 2012, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court raising allegations that form the basis for charges instituted in the instant case. As indicated in the petition, the defendant's date of birth is May 28, 1995, and the offenses took place on May 14, 2012. In his appeal brief and in his memorandum in support of the motion to quash below, the defendant contends that he appeared and entered a denial to the allegations on July 13, 2012. The defendant's appeal brief further notes that the matter was initially assigned for adjudication on September 11, 2012, on which date he was released from custody, and the State was granted thirty additional days for adjudication. On October 12, 2012, more than ninety days after the date of appearance, the juvenile court denied the State's motion for a continuance of the adjudicatory hearing. According to the minute entry in the record, the State moved to "withdraw the motion to transfer for criminal prosecution" and the juvenile court dismissed the matter with prejudice. The grand jury indictment in this case was filed November 8, 2012. The defendant's motion to quash alleges that the State is barred from trying to circumvent the ruling of the juvenile court judge dismissing with prejudice allegations that form the basis of the charges instituted in this case. In his memorandum in support of the motion, the defendant cites LSA-Ch.C. art. 877(C), and State in Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 93-1865 (La. 2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745, 748, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that in the event that a good cause extension is not granted before the expiration of the time limitation for the commencement of an adjudication hearing in accordance with LSA-Ch.C. art. 877, the State may not refile its petition. Accordingly, the defendant argues that herein the State attempted to grant itself a continuance and avoid the time limitations, and cannot dismiss and refile under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 576. In granting the motion to quash, the trial court specifically stated that it did not have the jurisdiction to deny the motion though it disagreed with the juvenile court's characterization of the dismissal.
The record on appeal does not contain a minute entry or transcript to confirm the date of appearance. However, it appears that the State does not contest the alleged date of appearance.
At the outset, we note that while LSA-Ch.C. art. 877(C) mandates the release of a child and dismissal of the petition in juvenile court if the adjudication hearing is not timely commenced, this article does not address or supersede the State's discretion to transfer the case to district court. We further note that State in Interest of R.D.C., Jr. is distinguishable from the instant case in that herein the State did not attempt to refile the petition in juvenile court. In this case the defendant was sixteen years old on the date of the alleged offenses. Thus, as a child he was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court until the indictment charging the instant offenses was returned. LSA-Ch.C. art. 305(B)(1) & (2)(b) & (d). In this regard, subsection (B)(3) of Article 305 specifically states:
The district attorney shall have the discretion to file a petition alleging any of the offenses listed in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph in the juvenile court or, alternatively, to obtain an indictment or file a bill of information. If the child is being held in detention, the district attorney shall make his election and file the indictment, bill of information, or petition in the appropriate court within thirty calendar days after the child's arrest, unless the child waives this right.
If an indictment is returned or a bill of information is filed, the child is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate court exercising criminal jurisdiction for all subsequent procedures. LSA-Ch.C. art. 305(B)(4). After the indictment was returned, the defendant was no longer in the juvenile court's jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction vested in the district court by operation of law, and the district court erred in finding that it did not have the jurisdiction to deny the motion to quash. Thus, the judgment granting the defendants' motion to quash is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. BEFORE: PETTIGREW, McDONALD, AND McCLENDON, JJ. PETTIGREW, J., DISSENTS, AND ASSIGNS REASONS.
Louisiana Children's Code article 877(A) requires that, if the child is charged with a crime of violence and is continued into custody, "the adjudication hearing shall commence within sixty days of the appearance to answer the petition." Louisiana Children's Code article 877(B) requires that, if the child is not continued in custody, the adjudication hearing shall commence within ninety, days of the appearance to answer the petition. Louisiana Children's Code article 877(C) provides, "[i]f the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon motion of the child, the court shall release a child continued in custody and shall dismiss the petition." The Children's Code builds in a mechanism in La. Ch. Code art. 877(D) for the State to obtain an extension of the time limits to commence the adjudication hearing upon a showing of good cause.
On July 9, 2012, in the juvenile court, the State filed a petition including allegations that form the basis for charges instituted in the instant case. As indicated in the petition, the defendant's date of birth is May 28, 1995, and the offenses took place on May 14, 2012. In his appeal brief and in his memorandum in support of the motion to quash below, the defendant contends that he appeared and entered a denial to the charges on July 13, 2013. The defendant's appeal brief further notes that the matter was initially assigned for adjudication on September 11, 2012, on which date he was released from custody, and the State was granted thirty additional days for adjudication. On October 12, 2012, more than ninety days after the date of appearance, the juvenile court denied the State's motion for a continuance of the adjudicatory hearing. According to the minute entry in the record, the State moved to "withdraw the motion to transfer for criminal prosecution," and the juvenile court dismissed the matter with prejudice. The grand jury indictment in this case was filed November 8, 2012. The defendant's motion to quash alleges that the State is barred from trying to circumvent the ruling of the juvenile court judge dismissing with prejudice allegations that form the basis of the charges instituted in this case. In his memorandum in support of the motion, the defendant cites State in Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 93-1865 (La. 2/28/94), 632.So.2d 745, and La. Ch. Code art. 877(C) and argues that the State attempted to grant itself a continuance and avoid the time limitations, and cannot refile under La. Code Crim. P, art. 576. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to quash.
The record does not contain a minute entry or transcript for the date of appearance. However, it appears that the State does not contest the alleged date of appearance.
In State in Interest of R.D.C., Jr., the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the time limitation provided in La. Ch. Code art. 877 is mandatory and that "it is incumbent on the [S]tate to make a showing of good cause and obtain an extension before the period has run. In the event that a good cause extension is not granted and the period runs out, the [S]tate may not refile its petition." State in Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 632 So.2d at 748. As noted by the State, La. Ch. Code art. 305(B)(3) does not prohibit the State from filing a bill of information more than thirty days after the child's arrest if the child is not in custody. Further, La. Ch. Code art. 305(B)(3) does not set forth the remedy for failure to timely file a bill of information. However, La. Ch. Code art. 877(B) does set forth a time limitation for the commencement of adjudication when the child is not in custody. Further, the article specifies that the failure to timely commence the adjudication hearing shall result in dismissal of the petition against the child. See also State v. Davis, 95-1455 (La. App. 3d Or. 5/8/96), 677 So.2d 511, 515, writ denied, 96-1215 (La. 11/1/96), 681 So.2d 1257.
When a trial court rules on a motion to quash, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. See State v. Odom, 2002-2698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/03), 861 So.2d 187, 191, writ denied, 2003-2142 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 765. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Smith, 99-0606, 99-2015, 99-2019, 99-2094 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501, 504.
Herein, the trial court concluded that it was incumbent on the State to transfer the case before the time limitation in La. Ch. Code art. 877(B) expired. It appears that the State failed to commence the adjudication hearing within ninety days of the appearance to answer the petition and obtained the grand jury indictment in adult court in an attempt to circumvent the mandatory time limitation in juvenile court. To allow the State to refile the same charges in district court would render meaningless in this case the good cause requirement of La. Ch. Code art. 877(D).
Considering the foregoing, I find that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the motion to quash in this case.