State v. Richmond

186 Citing cases

  1. State v. Trostle

    191 Ariz. 4 (Ariz. 1997)   Cited 221 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Discussing and relying on State v. Richmond , 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41, 52–53

    In State v. Richmond, we analyzed the origin of A. R. S. § 13-454(F)(1), currently 13-703(G)(1), and concluded that the legislature intended to exclude character and personality disorders such as sociopathy from consideration under this section. 114 Ariz. 186, 197-98, 560 P.2d 41, 52-53 (1976). Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978), however, we recognized that even if a disorder does not rise to the level of mental disease or defect originally contemplated in (G)(1), the inquiry is not over.

  2. State v. Brewer

    170 Ariz. 486 (Ariz. 1992)   Cited 130 times
    Holding that a capital defendant “may neither circumvent nor restrict the mandatory appeal to this court provided for him pursuant to the state's capital-sentencing procedures”

    The issue here pertains to our review of the mandatory appeal from a death sentence filed on behalf of the defendant pursuant to rule 31.2(b). If anything, we believe, as we did in State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976), that "[t]he legislature charged this court with the duty to correct [death] sentences which are illegal and sentences where we find that the punishment imposed is greater than the circumstances of the case warrant." In Richmond, this view was premised on language from former A.R.S. § 13-1717, now codified at § 13-4037(A), which instructs in part,

  3. Jeffers v. Lewis

    38 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 104 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that when it is evident that all mitigating evidence was considered, trial court is not required to discuss each piece of such evidence

    Id. at 431, 661 P.2d at 1132. The court then stated, "We have carefully reviewed the record as required to determine whether the factors in mitigation outweigh the aggravating circumstances, State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977), and we find they do not." Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 431-32, 661 P.2d at 1132-33.

  4. State v. White

    168 Ariz. 500 (Ariz. 1991)   Cited 73 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that conspiracy continued beyond the death of the victim and included attempts to divert attention and conceal crime because any link between defendant, his lover, and the victim's death would have precluded collection of insurance proceeds

    In cases imposing the death penalty, we conduct a proportionality review to determine "whether the sentences of death are excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977).

  5. State v. Walton

    159 Ariz. 571 (Ariz. 1989)   Cited 172 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding the Arizona death penalty statute constitutional

    We have previously considered and rejected the first seven arguments and see no reason to change our position. See State v. Richmond (Richmond I), 114 Ariz. 186, 194-95, 560 P.2d 41, 49-50 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977) (death penalty is not cruel and unusual); State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 483-84, 715 P.2d 721, 736-37 (1986) (denial of jury sentencing, burden of proving mitigation on the defendant, no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravation outweighs mitigation, and inadequate standards to weigh the factors are not unconstitutional); State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 206, 639 P.2d 1020, 1031 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2259, 72 L.Ed.2d 863 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 57 n. 2, 659 P.2d 1, 16 n. 2, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), ("heinous, cruel, or depraved" factor is not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 536, 703 P.2d 464, 480 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 898, 88 L.Ed.2d 932 (1986) (restricting judge's sentencing discretion is not unconstitutional). We have not previously addressed the defe

  6. State v. Gretzler

    135 Ariz. 42 (Ariz. 1983)   Cited 271 times
    Holding that the “trial court correctly found” the (E) aggravator “based on the defendant's nine prior convictions for first degree murder”

    State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 206, 639 P.2d 1020, 1031 (1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2259, 72 L.Ed.2d 863 (1982). We have also twice pointed out that the United States Supreme Court, in Proffitt v. Florida, supra, has approved of "strikingly similar terms" in another state's capital sentencing statute. State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 543, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1453, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978); State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 197, 560 P.2d 41, 52 (1976), cert. denied 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1976). In Proffitt, the Supreme Court considered Florida's statutory aggravating circumstance of "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel.

  7. Ceja v. Stewart

    97 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996)   Cited 249 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that even a facially vague statute is not constitutionally deficient if the state courts have given it " narrowing construction" that satisfies vagueness concerns

    The Arizona Supreme Court conducted proportionality reviews to insure that the sentence of death was not "disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." State v. Richmond, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (Ariz. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977). Arizona's application of an adequately narrowed aggravating circumstance insured that Ceja's substantive right to be free from a disproportionate sentence was not violated.

  8. Gonzales v. Schriro

    No. CV-99-2016-PHX-SMM (D. Ariz. Jan. 6, 2006)

    In the direct appeal of a death sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court independently examines whether the sentence of death has been imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factors.State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976). Such independent examination encompasses review of aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court to ensure that the capital sentence has been properly imposed.

  9. Richmond v. Rickets

    640 F. Supp. 767 (D. Ariz. 1986)   Cited 7 times

    The two appeals were consolidated by the Arizona Supreme Court. Both the convictions and sentence of death were affirmed by that court, State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1976). The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1976).

  10. Knapp v. Cardwell

    513 F. Supp. 4 (D. Ariz. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    He could not reasonable have foreseen that his conduct in the course of the commission of the offense for which he was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person. Added Laws 1973, Ch. 138, § 5. On December 20, 1976, in State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the mitigating circumstances enumerated in A.R.S. § 13-454(F) were intended to be exclusive and that sentencing courts were powerless to consider other factors such as defendant's age, his prior record, or the extent of his cooperation with the authorities. The court's restrictive interpretation of subsection F was reaffirmed in State v. Bishop, 118 Ariz. 263, 576 P.2d 122 (1978).