Opinion
No. 51119-0-I c/w 51767-8-I
Filed: August 18, 2003 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County Docket No: 02-1-01313-5 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 08/26/2002
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, Cobb Building, 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.
Sharon Jean Blackford, WA Appellate Project, Cobb Bldg, 1305 4th Ave Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101-2402.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Prosecuting Atty King County, King County Prosecutor/appellate Unit, 1850 Key Tower, 700 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Tami A. Perdue, C/O King Co Pros Ofc, 401 4th Ave N, Kent, WA 98032-4429.
Appellant Matthew Rhinehart argues that the sentencing court violated the separation of powers doctrine when it declined to impose a Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) after Rhinehart pleaded guilty to several crimes, including manufacturing methamphetamine. Finding no error, we affirm.
Rhinehart pleaded guilty to one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, one count of taking a motor vehicle, and two counts of possession of methamphetamine. In exchange, the State dismissed multiple charges of possession of methamphetamine, second degree possession of stolen property, forgery, and taking a motor vehicle.
At sentencing, Rhinehart requested imposition of a DOSA sentence on the manufacturing methamphetamine charge. The deputy prosecutor stated that the State opposed a DOSA:
Because the Defendant was manufacturing methamphetamine, we do not recommend DOSA. Even separately, given this huge crime spree, it would seem the State could benefit, the State of Washington could benefit from Mr. Rhinehart going to prison for 72 months and being free of his presence in the community. So for all of those reasons, we recommend this prison sentence.
Report of Proceedings (August 23, 2002), at 14-15. Rhinehart addressed the court and asked for help, acknowledging that he had a drug problem and that he had tried to straighten out his life, but had failed. Rhinehart's father stated that Rhinehart had been `in and out of that drug stuff' for 15 years and that if drug treatment `sinks in and goes home with him, that's great.' RP, at 17.
After considering the parties' arguments, the sentencing court commented :
My take on the application by the defense for a DOSA sentence would mean that the sentence would be one half of the mid-point of the standard range, which is 84 divided by two, which is 42. If you get a third off for good time, he does 28 months. And he's got a real facts pattern here of not only a serious manufacturing charge plus taking and riding plus VUCSAs, but there's a series of dismissed causes as well which represent in essence a crime spree.
And I'm also satisfied that manufacturing methamphetamine is not only dangerous to the people who consume the methamphetamine, but it's dangerous to everybody else. The police that have to go in and clean the mess up and those who are potentially exposed to the chemicals. We have all kinds of problems in this community, including exposure of children to these chemicals that are extremely toxic.
I do not think that a DOSA sentence would produce any kind of incarceration that's consistent with the nature of the seriousness of these offenses. I will not impose a DOSA.
RP, at 17-18. The court then imposed a standard-range sentence of 72 months on the manufacturing methamphetamine charge.
On appeal, Rhinehart contends that the sentencing court rejected a DOSA sentence because the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine was too serious to warrant an alternative sentence and because he participated in a Scrime spree.' Rhinehart maintains that because the Legislature has not precluded DOSA sentences on these grounds, the sentencing court encroached upon the fundamental legislative function of establishing criminal penalties and therefore violated the separation of powers doctrine. See generally State v. Bramme, 115 Wn. App. 844, 850, 64 P.3d 60 (2003).
Generally, a court's decision not to impose a DOSA sentence, which is an alternate form of standard-range sentence, is not reviewable. State v. Conners, 90 Wn. App. 48, 53, 950 P.2d 519 (1998). But a party may challenge a standard-range sentence on constitutional grounds and to correct legal errors in the determination of which sentencing provision applies. See State v. Bramme, 115 Wn. App. at 850 (defendant could challenge court's refusal to impose DOSA as an alleged violation of the separation of powers doctrine); State v. Williams, 149 Wn.2d 143, 65 P.3d 1214 (2003) (State could appeal court's determination of defendant's eligibility for DOSA).
The sentencing court has discretion to impose a DOSA if certain eligibility requirements are met and the court determines `that the offender and the community will benefit from the use of the alternative.' RCW 9.94A.660(2). But even if a defendant is eligible, the decision to impose a DOSA rests solely in the sentencing court's discretion. State v. Conners, 90 Wn. App. at 53.
Relying on a portion of the sentencing court's oral ruling, Rhinehart asserts that the court failed to consider the specific circumstances of his case and made a general policy decision that a DOSA should not be given if a defendant is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine or participates in a `crime spree.' But a review of the court's decision in context does not support this characterization.
In reaching its decision, the sentencing court considered comments from the deputy prosecutor, who stated that given the seriousness of Rhinehart's offenses, incarceration under a DOSA sentence would not benefit the community, and from defense counsel, Rhinehart's father and Rhinehart, who all acknowledged the seriousness of Rhinehart's drug problems. The court then expressly considered the length of incarceration that Rhinehart faced under DOSA and the serious nature of Rhinehart's offenses, concluding that `I do not think that a DOSA sentence would produce any kind of incarceration that's consistent with the nature of the seriousness of these offenses.'
When viewed in context, including the parties' arguments, the sentencing court's decision reflects a determination that a DOSA would not benefit either Rhinehart or the community. The decision therefore fell within the discretion accorded the court under RCW 9.94A.660(2). Moreover, the court's exercise of discretion was based not on a `blanket-rule' exclusion of manufacturing methamphetamine, but rather on the specific circumstances of Rhinehart's offenses. Consequently, the court's decision not to impose a DOSA did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Affirmed.
KENNEDY and BECKER, JJ., concur.