Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 19-0410 PRPC
02-27-2020
STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. MARTIN MANRIQUEZ REYES, Petitioner.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Andrea L. Kever Counsel for Respondent Martin Manriquez Reyes, Florence Petitioner
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2009-006934-001
The Honorable John R. Hannah, Jr., Judge
REVIEW GRANTED AND RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Andrea L. Kever
Counsel for Respondent
Martin Manriquez Reyes, Florence
Petitioner
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.
HOWE, Judge:
¶1 Martin Manriquez Reyes seeks review of the trial court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), filed pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. This is Reyes's second, successive petition.
¶2 In September 2010, Reyes was convicted of 8 counts of molestation of a child, 4 counts of sexual conduct with a minor, 5 counts of sexual abuse, 1 count of public sexual indecency to a minor, and 1 count of aggravated assault. Reyes was sentenced to numerous prison terms, some to be served concurrently and several to be served consecutively. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences but modified his presentence incarceration credit to reflect 595 days. State v. Reyes, No. 1 CA-CR 10-0841, 2012 WL 1057510, at *3 ¶ 13 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2012).
¶3 In September 2012, Reyes filed a PCR notice and was appointed PCR counsel. PCR counsel notified the court that she could not find any colorable claims to raise and moved to extend the deadline for Reyes to file his own pro per petition. Reyes never filed a petition and his PCR proceeding was dismissed.
¶4 In January 2019, Reyes untimely petitioned for PCR arguing that (1) trial counsel was ineffective; (2) direct appeal counsel was ineffective; (3) the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing the State's expert witness to present statistics about the truthfulness of children when reporting sexual abuse allegations; and (4) A.R.S. § 13-1404, A.R.S. § 13-1407(E), and A.R.S. § 13-1410 are unconstitutional. In a separate motion, Reyes argued that his petition for PCR was untimely merely because of a significant change in the law, relying on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 18 (2012) to argue that his PCR counsel was ineffective. The trial court summarily denied his petition because Reyes did not show a substantial change in the law entitling him to relief. Reyes timely petitioned this Court for review.
¶5 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577 ¶ 19 (2012). Reyes bears the burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post-conviction relief. See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538 ¶ 1 (App. 2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review).
¶6 Reyes has not met his burden. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are waived and precluded when they could have been raised in a PCR proceeding. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 566 ¶ 14 (2006). Reyes could have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his first petition for PCR, but he did not file a petition in the allotted time, resulting in the dismissal of his first petition.
¶7 Reyes relies on Martinez to argue that he can raise his claims in a successive petition when his PCR counsel was ineffective. See 566 U.S. at 18. Martinez, however, held only that a defendant can raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding if PCR counsel was ineffective. Id. As a result, Martinez is inapplicable here and Reyes's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived and precluded. See Bennett, 213 Ariz. at 566 ¶ 14.
¶8 Likewise, Reyes's remaining two claims are precluded because he does not offer sufficient reasons why he did not raise them in his previous PCR notice. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). Reyes argues instead that his January 2019 petition is his first post-conviction proceeding. Reyes filed one PCR notice in September 2012, however, and Reyes admitted as much in his January 2019 petition. Therefore, Reyes was required to provide sufficient reasons for why he did not raise these claims in his initial PCR notice. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b).
¶9 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the trial court's order denying the petition for PCR, and the petition for review. We find that Reyes has not established an abuse of discretion.
¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review and deny relief.