Opinion
2016-UP-486
11-23-2016
The State, Respondent, v. Kathy Leonard Revan, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2014-000161
Tara Dawn Shurling, of Law Offices of Tara Dawn Shurling, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood, all for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted November 1, 2016
Appeal From Laurens County Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Tara Dawn Shurling, of Law Offices of Tara Dawn Shurling, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-450(A) (2015) ("A person who uses deadly force as permitted by [the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act)] . . . is justified in using deadly force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of deadly force. . . ."); State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 370, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013) ("A claim of immunity under the Act requires a pretrial determination using a preponderance of the evidence standard, which this court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard of review."); State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166-67 (2007) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support."); State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 316, 768 S.E.2d 232, 237-38 (Ct. App. 2014) ("In other words, the abuse of discretion standard of review does not allow this court to reweigh the evidence or second-guess the trial court's assessment of witness credibility."); Curry, 406 S.C. at 371, 752 S.E.2d at 266 ("Consistent with the Castle Doctrine and the text of the Act, a valid case of self-defense must exist . . . [including] all elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat."); id. at 372, 752 S.E.2d at 267 (finding the defendant's "claim of self-defense present[ed] a quintessential jury question, which, most assuredly, [was] not a situation warranting immunity from prosecution" when the defendant was in a prior altercation with the victim and later retrieved a gun and shot the victim).
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
HUFF and SHORT, JJ., and MOORE, A. J., concur.