Summary
In State ex rel. Nash v. Reed, Treas., 47 Idaho 131, 272 P. 1008, and State v. Galyon, 154 Okla. 204, 7 P.2d 484, title by sheriff's deed on foreclosure of state mortgages in each case; sustained as against tax lien claims for taxes levied during a previous year. There was no discussion of the questions on which we base our present decision, and the reasoning is inconsistent with the conclusions here reached under our state constitution and statutes.
Summary of this case from STATE v. SALT LAKE COUNTY ET ALOpinion
No. 5197.
December 20, 1928.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, for Blaine County. Hon. H.F. Ensign, Judge.
Action to enjoin issuance of a tax deed. Judgment of dismissal. Reversed.
Frank L. Stephan, Attorney General, and Leon M. Fisk, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant.
The purchaser at a foreclosure sale acquires all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the premises so sold. ( Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 45 Idaho 472, 262 P. 1052; Foorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552, 17 P. 680; Robinson v. Thornton, 102 Cal. 675, 34 P. 120; Duff v. Randall, 116 Cal. 226, 58 Am. St. 158, 48 P. 66; Pollard v. Harlow, 138 Cal. 390, 71 P. 454; Leet v. Armbruster, 143 Cal. 663, 77 P. 653.)
If the judgment debtor has legal title to the property, the same passes to the judgment creditor by the sheriff's certificate. (11 Cal. Jur. 127; Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, supra; Syster v. Hazzard, 39 Idaho 580, 229 P. 1110; Bateman v. Kellogg, 59 Cal.App. 464, 211 P. 46; Colvin v. Weigold (Ariz.), 252 Pac. 633; McQueeney v. Toomey, 36 Mont. 282, 122 Am. St. 358, 13 Ann. Cas. 316, 92 P. 561.)
The sheriff's deed gives no new title but is merely evidence that the title acquired by the certificate has become absolute. (11 Cal. Jur. 125, sec. 68; Leaver v. Smith, 47 Cal.App. 474, 190 P. 1050.)
W.A. Brodhead, for Respondent.
It is the policy of the law that no property, except that specially exempt, shall escape its just proportion of taxation. This court said in Salisbury v. Lane, 7 Idaho 370, 63 P. 383: "All statutes pertaining to revenue are to be construed most strictly in favor of the object of the statute; that is in favor of the purpose of the statute. Statutes of exemption are to be strictly construed against exemption and in favor of revenue."
Upon the authority of Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. 293, 66 L. ed. 573, this court in Leney v. Twin Falls County, 40 Idaho 600, 236 P. 531, held that the interest of a Carey Act entryman was not taxable as long as there remained anything on his part or upon the part of the state to be done. Why cannot the converse of that proposition be applied to this case, viz.: Can the state claim an exemption from the lien of taxes as long as anything remains to be done to vest it with complete title and dominion over the land?
The state held a mortgage on certain real property in Blaine county and became the purchaser thereof on foreclosure. The certificate of sale was issued on November 5, 1921. There was no redemption from the sale, and the state obtained the sheriff's deed to the property one year thereafter. Following the issuance of the certificate of sale, the property was assessed and taxes were levied thereon as of the second Monday of January, 1922. The taxes were not paid, and, on November 21, 1927, this suit was instituted to enjoin the Tax Collector from the issuance of a tax deed. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and the state appeals from a judgment of dismissal.
The state takes the position that by its purchase of the property at foreclosure sale, C. S., sec. 6930, it acquired a title both legal and equitable, thereby rendering the property exempt from taxation; citing Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 45 Idaho 472, 262 P. 1052; Pollard v. Harlow, 138 Cal. 390, 71 Pac. 454, 648; Leet v. Armbruster, 143 Cal. 663, 77 P. 653; Bateman v. Kellogg, 59 Cal.App. 464, 211 P. 46; Leaver v. Smith, 47 Cal.App. 474, 190 P. 1050, other California cases, Colvin v. Weigold, 31 Ariz. 370, 253 P. 633, and McQueeney v. Toomey, 36 Mont. 282, 122 Am. St. 358, 13 Ann. Cas. 316, 92 Pac. 561. Respondent contests this position, contending that the state did not obtain such title as to render the property exempt from taxation until the receipt of the sheriff's deed on foreclosure, relying on North Dakota Horse etc. Co. v. Serumgard, 17 N.D. 466, 138 Am. St. 717, 117 N.W. 453, 29 L.R.A., N.S., 508.
Steinour v. Oakley State Bank is not decisive of the question presented; in fact, it is scarcely in point. A careful consideration of the remaining decisions, supra, as well as the following from California, Montana, Washington and Oregon, discloses that the holding of the courts of those states is not uniform as to the character or extent of title evidenced by a sheriff's certificate of sale on foreclosure. ( McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 70 Am. Dec. 655 (written by Justice Field) and Flanders v. Aumack, 32 Or. 19, 67 Am. St. 504, 51 Pac. 447; Dipple v. Neville, 82 Mont. 280, 267 P. 214; Ford v. Nokomis State Bank, 135 Wn. 37, 237 P. 314; 11 Cal. Jur. 125, sec. 68.)
Whether the state, as the purchaser of the property at the sale on foreclosure, acquired such a title that the property may be said to have then belonged to the state, it is not necessary to now decide; for, on the expiration of the period of redemption, when the state received the sheriff's deed, the property, without doubt, belonged to the state, and was not thereafter subject to be "listed or assessed." (C. S., sec. 3100.) Every reason that requires the exemption of the property of the public from taxes imposed after its acquisition not only justifies but necessitates the holding that, while owned by the state, no proceeding may be taken to enforce the lien of any tax theretofore imposed against it. And the authorities are generally agreed that when the state acquires title to property, subject to the lien of a tax theretofore imposed against it, further proceedings to enforce the lien are without effect. ( State v. Locke, 29 N.M. 148, 30 A.L.R. 407, 219 Pac. 790; Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wn. 444, 100 P. 991, 21 L.R.A., N.S., 68; Smith v. Santa Monica, 162 Cal. 221, 121 Pac. 920; Foster v. Duluth, 120 Minn. 484, 140 N.W. 129, 48 L.R.A., N.S., 707; City of Laurel v. Weems, 100 Miss. 335, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 159, 56 So. 451; Webster v. Board of Regents, 163 Cal. 705, 126 P. 974; Chicago v. People ex rel. Miller, 80 Ill. 384; State v. Burleigh County, 55 N.D. 1, 212 N.W. 217.) Our constitution (art. VII, sec. 4) exempts "The property of . . . . the state from taxation." C. S., sec. 3099 provides that "The following property is exempt from taxation. . . . Property belonging to this state. . . . ." With respect to exemptions from taxation of state property there is, therefore, no distinction between property acquired through the foreclosure of a mortgage and that which may be said to be owned and held for purely governmental purposes. It is our conclusion, therefore, that when the state received the sheriff's deed on foreclosure further proceedings for the enforcement of the prior tax lien were without effect. The state was entitled to the injunction.
Judgment reversed.
Givens and Taylor, JJ., and Brinck, D.J., concur.
Budge, J., dissents.