Opinion
NO. 2012 KA 0915
02-22-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOSEPH A. RAY
Walter P. Reed District Attorney Covington, Louisiana and Kathryn Landry Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee State of Louisiana Prentice L. White Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Joseph A, Ray
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Judgment Rendered:
On Appeal from the
Twenty-Second Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana
Docket No. 506668; Div. "C"
The Honorable Richard A. Swartz, Judge Presiding
Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
and Kathryn Landry
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Prentice L. White
Louisiana Appellate Project
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Joseph A, Ray
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND KLINE, JJ.
Hon. William F. Kline, Jr., retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
KLINE , J.
The defendant, Joseph A. Ray, was charged by bill of information with aggravated flight from an officer, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated § 14:108.1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The state subsequently filed a multiple offender bill of information. The defendant was adjudicated a fourth-felony habitual offender and sentenced to twenty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, designating one assignment of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
We note that the sentencing minute entry indicates that the defendant's sentence was imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; however, according to the sentencing transcript, parole was not restricted. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So. 2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).
FACTS
On April 22, 2011, around 2:30 a.m., Officer Kevin Rawls with the Pearl River Police Department was traveling southbound on La. Highway 41, when he saw a vehicle fail to dim its lights and cross over into Officer Rawls's lane of travel. Officer Rawls was driving a marked police unit with "Pearl River Police" on the side doors. The officer turned his vehicle around and activated his overhead emergency lights and his siren. The other vehicle did not stop and proceeded to travel northbound at speeds up to eighty miles per hour. According to Officer Rawls, he chased the vehicle for approximately seven or eight miles. The posted speed limits for that stretch of Highway 41 do not exceed fifty-five miles per hour. The stretch of highway has two lanes of travel, one for each direction. During the chase, the fleeing vehicle swerved several times into the opposite lane of travel, causing other vehicles to pull over to the shoulder. The fleeing vehicle began to slow down and eventually stopped on the side of the road. Officer Rawls exited his vehicle and drew his weapon. According to Officer Rawls, the defendant exited the vehicle from the driver's side front door, and no one else exited the vehicle after it was stopped. Once he determined that the defendant did not have any weapons, Officer Rawls placed the defendant in handcuffs. The defendant told Officer Rawls that the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, and he was having car trouble.
Officer Rawls's father, Officer Ray Rawls, was also in the police vehicle but did not testify at trial.
The defendant testified that his girlfriend, Amy Smith, was driving the vehicle, and she refused to stop when the officer directed her to do so. He stated that, when Smith finally stopped the vehicle, she ran into the woods. The defendant testified that he was in the passenger seat, but could not have exited the vehicle from the passenger's side front door because he would have gotten stuck in the mud. On cross-examination, when asked whether he told Officer Rawls he did not stop the vehicle because it was overheating, the defendant replied, "Yeah." On redirect, he insisted his response was not an acknowledgment that he had been driving the vehicle, but he meant that Amy Smith did not stop the vehicle because it was overheating.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted him. The defendant does not contest the elements of the offense, only his identity as the driver. In support of his argument, the defendant claims that there was a reasonable probability that someone else was driving the vehicle. However, at trial, the only theory put forward by the defense was that the defendant's girlfriend, Amy Smith, was driving the vehicle.
The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime charged and defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 596 So. 2d 1360, 1369 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 598 So. 2d 373 (La. 1992). The Jackson standard of review is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated § 15:438 provides that, in order to convict, the trier of fact must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Graham, 02-1492 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So. 2d 416, 420.
At the time of the instant offense, Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated § 14:108.1 provided, in pertinent part:
Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated § 14:108.1 was subsequently amended by 2011 La. Acts 264, § 1.
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C. Aggravated flight from an officer is the intentional refusal of a driver to bring a vehicle to a stop or of an operator to bring a watercraft to a stop, under circumstances wherein human life is endangered, knowing that he has been given a visual and audible signal to stop by a police officer when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the driver or operator has committed an offense. The signal shall be given by an emergency light and a siren on a vehicle marked as a police vehicle or marked police watercraft.
D. Circumstances wherein human life is endangered shall be any situation where the operator of the fleeing vehicle or watercraft commits at least two of the following acts:
(1) Leaves the roadway or forces another vehicle to leave the roadway.
(2) Collides with another vehicle or watercraft.
(3) Exceeds the posted speed limit by at least twenty-five miles per hour.
(4) Travels against the flow of traffic ....
* * *
The only element of the offense that the defendant argues the state failed to prove was his identity as the driver of the vehicle. The evidence presented at trial clearly showed that the defendant was in the vehicle during the chase and exited the vehicle from the driver's side front door. Officer Rawls testified that no one else exited the vehicle; however, the defendant claims that his girlfriend was driving and exited the vehicle before running into the woods.
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given to the evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So. 2d 929, 932.
The jury's verdict reflected the reasonable conclusion that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle. In finding the defendant guilty, the jury clearly rejected the defendant's theory that his girlfriend was driving the vehicle. We cannot say that the jury's determination is irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So. 2d 654, 662. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty, unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. 1984). Furthermore, an appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09) 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam).
CONCLUSION
After a thorough review of the record we are convinced that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of the defendant's hypothesis of innocence, that he was guilty of aggravated flight from an officer. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.