Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0265-PR
08-29-2014
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. NATHAN CARLOS RAWLS, Petitioner.
COUNSEL Nathan Rawls, Florence In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR1999010164
The Honorable Hugh Hegyi, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Nathan Rawls, Florence
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Presiding Judge Miller concurred.
ESPINOSA, Judge:
¶1 Nathan Rawls petitions this court for review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his notice of post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court clearly has abused its discretion. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Rawls has not met his burden of demonstrating such abuse here.
¶2 Rawls pled guilty in 2000 to sexual conduct with a minor and attempted sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court imposed a twenty-year prison term for the first count and suspended the imposition of sentence for the second, placing Rawls on lifetime probation. Before beginning the current proceeding, Rawls sought post-conviction relief on at least nine occasions and has been denied relief each time, most recently in December 2011. In May 2013, he filed yet another notice of post-conviction relief, claiming he is "actually innocent" of the charged crimes because the statutes defining those crimes are unconstitutional due to a lack of "enacting clauses and titles." The trial court dismissed the notice, concluding the claim could not be raised in an untimely post-conviction proceeding.
¶3 On review, Rawls seems to suggest the trial court erred in dismissing his notice because of his claim of actual innocence pursuant to Rule 32.1(h). Such a claim may be raised in a successive, untimely notice of post-conviction relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). But Rawls's argument cannot reasonably be so construed. To obtain relief under Rule 32.1(h), the defendant must "demonstrate[] by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no
reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt." That subsection does not encompass the constitutional claims that Rawls raises—such claims are instead governed by Rule 32.1(a), and may not be raised in an untimely proceeding. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Thus, summary dismissal of his notice was required. Id.
¶4 Moreover, even if Rawls's argument could reasonably be construed as a claim under Rule 32.1(h), his notice does not "set forth the substance of the specific exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition or in a timely manner" as required by Rule 32.2(b). A notice that does not comply with Rule 32.2(b) must be summarily dismissed. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b).
¶5 Although review is granted, relief is denied.