Opinion
No. 63659-6-I.
March 1, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 09-8-00235-7, Ronald Kessler, J., entered May 15, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Schindler, C.J., concurred in by Dwyer and Leach, JJ.
Based on stipulated facts, the juvenile court found R.T. guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle. The court imposed a deferred disposition and ordered restitution for the cost the owner incurred in towing the car from West Seattle to Renton. R.T. challenges the order of restitution, contending there is no causal connection between the offense and the towing fee. We disagree, and affirm.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. Anthony White owns a 1993 Honda Civic and lives in Renton. White's car was stolen on February 11, 2009.
At around 1:00 a.m. on February 15, Seattle Police Officer Whicker was patrolling a city park in West Seattle, Hamilton View Point. The park has clearly posted signs stating the park is closed from 11:30 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. Officer Whicker verified that a car parked in the parking lot was White's stolen car. R.T. was in the driver's seat of the car and A.B. was in the front passenger seat. The steering column was visibly torn apart. Officer Whicker also saw the damaged ignition switch and a crowbar on the floorboard underneath the front passenger seat. Officer Whicker arrested R.T. and A.B.
The owner of the stolen car paid $164.88 to tow the car from West Seattle back to Renton. A.B. later gave a written statement to police, admitting that he stole the car in Renton.
The State charged R.T. with possession of a stolen vehicle in violation of RCW 9A.56.068. R.T. requested a deferred disposition and stipulated to the facts in the certification for probable cause. R.T. agreed that "[t]he judge will read the police report or the Certification for Determination of Probable Cause and, based upon that evidence, the judge will decide if I am guilty of the crime(s) of possession of a stolen vehicle."
The court found R.T. guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle and entered a deferred disposition. At the restitution hearing, the State requested that R.T. pay the towing fee of $164.88. Because A.B. admitted stealing the car, R.T. argued there was no causal connection between the offense and the cost to tow the car. The court rejected R.T.'s argument. The court ruled that "the towing fee is a foreseeable consequence of possessing a stolen vehicle" and ordered R.T. to pay restitution for the towing fee in the amount of $164.88. The obligation to pay the restitution was joint and several with A.B.
DECISION
R.T. contends the court lacked the authority to order her to pay the restitution because there was no causal connection between the crime of possession and the cost of towing the stolen car. R.T. argues that because A.B. admitted stealing the car, A.B. is solely responsible for the towing charges paid by the victim.
We review the court's order of restitution for abuse of discretion. State v. S.T., 139 Wn. App. 915, 918, 163 P.3d 796 (2007). The court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679-80, 974 P.2d 828 (1999).
A court's authority to impose restitution is derived from statute. State v. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d 560, 563, 115 P.3d 274 (2005). Under RCW 13.40.127(5), a juvenile court is required to order restitution whenever the court enters a deferred disposition. RCW 13.40.127(5) provides in pertinent part:
Any juvenile granted a deferral of disposition under this section shall be placed under community supervision. The court may impose any conditions of supervision that it deems appropriate including posting a probation bond. Payment of restitution under RCW 13.40.190 shall be a condition of community supervision under this section.
The juvenile restitution statute requires the court to order restitution for any loss resulting from the offense, and all participants must be jointly and severally responsible for paying the restitution. RCW 13.40.190(1) states in pertinent part:
In its dispositional order, the court shall require the respondent to make restitution to any persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of the offense committed by the respondent. . . . If the respondent participated in the crime with another person or other persons, all such participants shall be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution. . . .
The court has authority to impose restitution if there is a causal connection between the offense and the victim's loss. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 565. The legislature intended restitution to be "widely available to the victims of crimes, at least when their injuries were a foreseeable consequence." Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 564. Accordingly, the court looks to the underlying facts of the charged offense rather than just the generally defined elements of the crime. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 565.
Knowledge that a vehicle is stolen is an element of the crime of possession of a stolen vehicle. RCW 9A.56.140; 11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 77.21, at 177 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC). Here, R.T. agreed to the facts set forth in the certification for probable cause. Unchallenged facts are verities on appeal. State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).
The unchallenged facts establish a causal connection between R.T. and the cost incurred by the owner in towing the car back to his residence in Renton. The facts show that R.T. knew that A.B. stole the car in Renton, and that R.T. was in the driver's seat of the stolen car at the park in West Seattle. There is also no dispute that the steering column was torn apart and the ignition switch damaged.
R.T.'s reliance on State v. Tetters, 81 Wn. App. 478, 914 P.2d 784 (1996), and State v. Woods, 90 Wn. App. 904, 953 P.2d 834 (1998), is misplaced. In Tetters, we held there was no causal connection between the order of restitution for the property that disappeared from the stolen vehicle where the charged crime was possession of stolen property. Tetters's mere possession of the vehicle is neither "sufficiently, nor necessarily, related to the lost property. He can not [sic] be obligated to pay restitution for those items" because "the loss undeniably occurred before the criminal act for which the defendant was convicted." Tetters, 81 Wn. App. at 481. Similarly, in Woods we concluded that the trial court could not order restitution for personal items taken from the truck weeks before the charged offense. Woods, 90 Wn. App. at 911. Here, unlike in Tetters and Woods, the possession of the stolen vehicle in West Seattle is sufficiently and necessarily related to the cost incurred by the victim in towing the car back to Renton.
Because the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering R.T. to pay restitution for the towing fee, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: