Opinion
No. C6-99-811.
Filed January 4, 2000.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 98065607.
Mike Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, and David K. Ross, Carson, (for respondent)
Charles A. Ramsay, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Davies, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Upon learning that revocation of his driver's license was rescinded in implied consent proceedings, appellant moved to withdraw his earlier plea of guilty to a criminal charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. Appellant asserted ineffectiveness of counsel in the DUI proceedings, claiming that counsel did not inform him that his plea would result in revocation of his driver's license — or, more narrowly, that his criminal conviction would prevent the reinstatement of his driver's license in the event he obtained a favorable result in the implied consent proceedings. We affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motion.
FACTS
Appellant pleaded guilty to DUI in September 1998. At the time, he was represented by counsel and was awaiting a ruling in his implied consent hearing. In October 1998, the judge in the implied consent hearing rescinded revocation of appellant's driving privileges, but appellant's driver's license could not be reinstated because of his DUI conviction. The trial court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
DECISION
After sentencing, a criminal defendant may withdraw a guilty plea if he shows that this is necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." Alanis v. State , 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted). When a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary and intelligent, a manifest injustice occurs. Alanis , 583 N.W.2d at 577. In order for a guilty plea to be intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the direct consequences of the guilty plea. Alanis , 583 N.W.2d at 578. The ultimate decision on the withdrawal of a guilty plea "is left to the sound discretion of the trial court," and this court reverses only upon an abuse of discretion. Kim v. State , 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).
Ignorance of a collateral consequence does not entitle a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, Alanis , 583 N.W.2d at 578, and revocation of driving privileges is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. State v. Washburn , 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999). See also Alanis , 583 N.W.2d at 578 (holding deportation collateral consequence of guilty plea); Moore v. Hinton , 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (suspension of driver's license collateral consequence of pleading guilty to driving while intoxicated).
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding his motion flawed because "he did not assert his innocence" to the charge. We first observe that the trial court's reasoning is germane to appellant's contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Such a claim could succeed only on a showing that the error of counsel altered the result of the proceedings. See Alanis , 583 N.W.2d at 577. Moreover, the trial court did not confine its rationale to this observation but also found appellant was fully advised of the consequences of his plea. Because appellant was represented by an attorney, a presumption applies that appellant was fully advised of his rights and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. See State v. Clark , 279 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1979). The record permitted the trial court to find this presumption was not overcome.
Affirmed.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).