Opinion
2012 KA 0657
11-02-2012
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. GREGORY RANSOM
Hillar Moore, D.A. Sony A. Cardia-Porter, Jr. Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman Thibodaux, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Gregory Ransom
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 01-10-0078, SEC. 2, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
HONORABLE RICHARD D. ANDERSON, JUDGE
Hillar Moore, D.A.
Sony A. Cardia-Porter, Jr.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
State of Louisiana
Bertha M. Hillman
Thibodaux, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Gregory Ransom
BEFORE: KUHN, PETTIGREW, AND McDONALD, JJ.
Disposition: CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
KUHN, J.
Defendant, Gregory Ransom, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty. After a trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 13, 2009, at approximately 7:34 a.m., defendant called 911 and reported that he had just shot his wife, Sheryl Brooks Ransom (the victim), at their apartment in Baton Rouge. During the 911 call, defendant indicated that he shot the victim because they "got into if and because the victim attacked him. Corporal Darren Ahmed of the Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) was dispatched to the scene. As Corporal Ahmed approached, defendant flagged him down and identified himself as the shooter, still holding a telephone in his hand. Corporal Ahmed detained defendant and read him his Miranda rights. Defendant informed the officer of the location of the gun that he used in the shooting. Defendant explained that he and his wife had a verbal confrontation after she sat on his feet while he was sleeping. According to defendant, as they argued, she struck him and a physical exchange ensued. As they exchanged blows, defendant reached into his dresser drawer, located within a foot and six inches to two feet from the bed, retrieved his gun, and shot his wife.
Corporal Ahmed testified that defendant was about five feet and ten inches to six feet tall and weighed about two hundred pounds. The victim weighed three hundred and five pounds and her height was six feet and four inches.
When Corporal Ahmed entered the apartment, he observed the victim lying on the floor, her upper torso in the bedroom doorway and her lower torso in the bedroom. Corporal Ahmed seized the firearm, a black semi-automatic pistol, from a barstool within a few feet of the body, where defendant indicated it was located. The gun was loaded, with two bullets remaining in the magazine well, and one in the chamber. The victim suffered three gunshot wounds and blunt force trauma, including a distance-range shot to her head, an intermediate-range shot to her right shoulder in the neck-base area, a distance-range graze of the tip of the third finger on her right hand, and an acute abrasion on her left upper groin/hip area. EMS paramedics declined to transport the victim as she had died prior to their arrival.
According to Dr. Joel Carney, the forensic pathology expert who performed the autopsy, an intermediate-range wound occurs when the firearm muzzle was between six inches and two to four feet from skin surface at the time of the discharge. A distance-range shot is any discharge beyond the intermediate range. The gunshot to the head was the victim's cause of death while the other two were non-life threatening. The shot to her right shoulder in the neck-base area traveled downward through her body. The abrasion on her hip was acute, which generally means it occurred within 36 hours or less.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant asserts that his actions after the shooting indicate that he did not have the specific intent to kill or inflict grave bodily harm and that, therefore, he was entitled to a verdict of manslaughter. He emphasizes that he immediately called 911 after the shooting, remained on the line with the dispatcher, ran to the street to wave down the responding officer, and admitted to the dispatcher and the police that he shot his wife in the midst of a physical confrontation. Defendant emphasizes that a pair of scissors was within the victim's reach at the time of the shooting. He further points out that he was emotional and began crying while in police custody later that morning of the shooting. Thus, defendant maintains that the evidence relative to events leading up to the shooting, as well as his behavior afterward, establishes that he reacted in the heat of blood to the victim's violent behavior and lost self-control and cool reflection, exploding in anger. He insists he used his nearby firearm in an "immediate, unplanned, visceral, and unthinking lashing out at the source of the provocation - his violent wife who woke him up and physically and verbally abused him."
The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. La. C.Cr.P. art. 821. In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, which states in part, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove," every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. State v. Wright , 98-0601 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 486, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157 & 2000-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.
The crime of second degree murder, in pertinent part, "is the killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1 (A)(1). Specific criminal intent is that "state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Thus, specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder. State v. Buchanon , 95-0625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So.2d 663, 665, writ denied, 96-1411 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So.2d 923. Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Delco , 2006-0504 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1143, 1146, writ denied, 2006-2636 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1160.
Manslaughter is a homicide that would be a first or second degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. "Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed." La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). "Sudden passion" or "heat of blood" are not elements of the offense of manslaughter; rather they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which tend to lessen the culpability. Because they are mitigatory factors, a defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in "sudden passion" or "heat of blood" is entitled to a verdict of manslaughter. State v. Rodriguez , 2001-2182 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 121, 134, writ denied, 2002-2049 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 131.
Detective John Dauthier, BRPD homicide investigator, arrived at the scene within approximately thirty minutes of the 911 call, collected evidence, and attended the autopsy. Detective Dauthier noted that it appeared as though the bathroom door (separating the bathroom from the bedroom which leads into the bathroom) had been knocked off the hinges, and blood was on the door. Corporal Adam Cheney of the BRPD crime scene investigation division responded to the scene at approximately 8:30 a.m. and noted there was a busted pipe behind the faucet of the bathtub, causing water to leak on the bathroom floor and beyond. A .380 auto live round was collected from the doorway of the bathroom. Corporal Cheney also noted that the bathroom door was unhinged and on the floor and that there appeared to be blood on the door. He further noted dried blood in the bathroom, running alongside the door. Corporal Cheney concluded that when the door landed on its side on the floor, the blood changed direction and started going back down the door. A live round was recovered from under the victim's body once the coroner's investigator arrived and the body was rolled over. According to DNA analysis expert Amy Winters, the sample of swabs collected from the bathroom wall by the bathroom door (4A) and swabs from the bathroom wall next to a closet (4B) were the victim's blood.
A pair of scissors that was on the bed in the bedroom where the victim's body was found was collected in an abundance of caution, but there was no indication that they had been used as a weapon.
Ronald Fazio, a forensic scientist and expert witness in firearms examination, analyzed the evidence submitted to the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab, including four bullet and bullet fragments, two cartridge cases, and the firearm. He determined that three of the four bullet/bullet fragments were fired from the firearm and one was inconclusive. Fazio noted that the firearm has a single action only trigger pull; thus, when first fired it has to be cocked first by loading the magazine, putting the magazine into the weapon and then chambering one cartridge by moving the slide on top. As the weapon is being fired, subsequently it will extract and eject a cartridge case, cocking the firing mechanism at the same time.
Officer Charles Thompson of the BRPD attended the autopsy and collected bullet fragments removed from the victim's skull. A copper jacketed bullet was recovered from the center of the victim's lower back, upper buttocks area.
Sergeant Pamela Bruner, a BRPD crime scene investigator, responded to police headquarters at approximately 10:00 a.m. on the day of the shooting and took photographs of defendant and collected DNA samples. She noted that she did not observe or notice any injuries to defendant. The defense did not present any witnesses and rested after entering a joint stipulation with the prosecution that on October 13, 2009, while in police custody between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., defendant was very emotional, crying at times while calm at other times.
The jurors were aware that they had the option of returning a responsive verdict of manslaughter. However, the jury's verdict of guilty of second degree murder in this case demonstrates that the jury concluded either: (1) that there was insufficient provocation to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection, or (2) that an average person's blood would have cooled by the time defendant shot the victim. The record contains no evidence that there were any injuries to defendant and there is no indication that the victim was armed. While the victim's body was discovered lying in the bedroom doorway with her upper torso in the walkway leading to the main living room area, the evidence shows that there was a struggle and gunfire in the bathroom area, which was accessed through the bedroom. Before defendant retrieved and/or fired his weapon, he could have exited the bedroom and left the home to end the verbal and physical quarrel. Instead, he inflicted one intermediate and two distance-range gunshot wounds to the victim. A rational trier of fact could have concluded that the mitigatory factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Maddox , 522 So.2d 579, 582 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). Thus, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See State v. Ordodi , 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662.
An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the trier of fact. State v. Calloway , 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). We are convinced that, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the second degree murder of his wife. This assignment of error lacks merit.
We find no merit in defendant's claim on appeal that the autopsy report showed that the victim had been smoking marijuana. On cross-examination, the defense attorney briefly questioned Dr. Carney about allegedly inconclusive toxicology results. Dr. Carney responded that because he did not perform the toxicological analysis, he was unable to offer any testimony in that regard. The autopsy report or toxicology results were not admitted into evidence, and there was no further trial testimony on this point. Because this court considers only evidence introduced in the trial court, see State v. Manning , 2003-1982 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So.2d 1044, 1062, n.5, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 1745, 161 L.Ed.2d 612 (2005), the issue is not properly the subject matter of this appeal.
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DECREE
For these reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of defendant-appellant, Gregory Ransom.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.