Opinion
NO. 2015 KW 0460
06-26-2015
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DYLAN RAMAGOS
In Re: State of Louisiana, applying for supervisory writs, 21st Judicial District Court, Parish of Livingston, Nos. 29933 & 104983. BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
WRIT GRANTED. The trial court's ruling granting the defendant's motion to suppress is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. A search conducted with the subject's consent is a specifically established exception to both the warrant and probable cause requirements. When the state seeks to rely upon consent to justify a warrantless search, it also must demonstrate that the consent was freely and voluntarily given without coercion. The voluntariness of a defendant's consent to search is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court under the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. State v. Gorut, 590 So.2d 1268, 1271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 595 So.2d 653 (La. 1992). An oral consent to search is sufficient; a written consent is not required. State v. Ossey, 446 So.2d 280, 287 n.6 (La.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 916, 105 S.Ct. 293, 83 L.Ed.2d 228 (1984); State v. Parfait, 96-1814 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So.2d 1232, 1240, writ denied, 97-1347 (La. 10/31/97), 703 So.2d 20. An officer does not need any degree of reasonable suspicion, as opposed to intuition or "hunch," to ask for, and receive, consent to search a vehicle. See State v. Strange, 2004-0273 (La. 5/14/04), 876 So.2d 39, 42 (per curiam). In the instant case, the defendant admitted giving the officer consent to search his vehicle, although the defendant claimed his consent was limited. Nonetheless, the officer did not need reasonable suspicion to request consent to search the vehicle.
VGW
PMc
Higginbotham, J., concurs. Pursuant to State v. Cabanas, 552 So.2d 1040, 1046 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So.2d 41 (La. 1990), I would remand the matter for a reopened hearing on the motion to suppress for the sole purpose of specifically addressing relator's claim that he only gave limited consent to search his motorcycle and consideration of the law set forth in Strange that an officer does not need any degree of reasonable suspicion, as opposed to intuition or "hunch," to ask for, and receive, consent to search a vehicle. COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT /s/_________
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
FOR THE COURT