Opinion
No. 32582-9-II
Filed: May 10, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Cowlitz County. Docket No: 03-2-00523-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 10/04/2004. Judge signing: Hon. James E Warme.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Mike Khoa Anh Nguyen, Prosecuting Attorney Office, 312 SW 1st Ave, Kelso, WA 98626.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Megan Ellavsky, Attorney at Law, 1402 Broadway St, Longview, WA 98632-3714.
Mark M Qandil (Appearing Pro Se), 1513 SE 171st Place, Vancouver, WA 98683.
The State appeals the Cowlitz County Superior Court's dismissal of Mark M. Qandil's traffic infraction, based on the superior court's ruling that the district court and the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The State argues that Washington State district courts have jurisdiction to preside over contested traffic infraction cases and that it was error for the superior court to dismiss Qandil's appeal from his district court infraction adjudication. Mark M. Qandil concedes these errors. We accept Qandil's concession, reverse, and remand to the superior court for consideration of Qandil's appeal.
FACTS
Trooper Frank Black observed a black BMW traveling `well over' the posted speed limit and driving erratically. After following it for approximately thirteen miles, he pulled the vehicle over. The driver was Mark M. Qandil. Black cited Qandil for second degree negligent driving.
Qandil requested a hearing to contest his traffic infraction. After conducting a contested traffic infraction hearing without the presence of a prosecutor, the Cowlitz County District Court found that Qandil had committed second degree negligent driving and imposed a fine.
Qandil appealed to Cowlitz County Superior Court. Ruling that the district court did not have jurisdiction to preside over contested traffic infraction hearings, the superior court dismissed Qandil's traffic infraction case.
The State appeals the superior court's dismissal. Qandil concedes error.
ANALYSIS
The State argues that the district court had authority to hear Qandil's traffic infraction. Qandil concedes the superior court erred in ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction. We accept Qandil's concession of error.
The law is well settled that the district court has jurisdiction to hear contested traffic infraction cases. The Washington State Constitution requires the Legislature to prescribe the jurisdiction and powers of inferior courts. Wash. Const. art. IV, sec. 12. Our Legislature has established limited jurisdiction district courts to hear and to determine violations of law designated as traffic infractions. RCW 46.63.040(1).
District courts are courts of limited jurisdiction organized under Title 3 RCW and, therefore, qualify as courts with authority to hear traffic infraction cases. IRLJ 1.2(d). Title 3 of the Revised Code of Washington outlines the powers of district courts as courts of limited jurisdiction. Ch. 3.02 RCW.
The Legislature has defined `traffic infractions' to include failures to perform any act required or the performance of any act prohibited by statute, or equivalent regulation or local law, relating to traffic. RCW 46.63.020. Qandil's alleged infraction falls within the definition of traffic infraction because it involved performance of a prohibited act (speeding) relating to traffic (driving on the roads). And our Supreme Court has held that district courts may preside over traffic infraction hearings without a prosecutor's presence. City of Bellevue v. Hellenthal, 144 Wn.2d 425, 434-35, 28 P.3d 744 (2001).
Moreover, the superior court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final judgments of the district courts. State v. McLendon, 131 Wn.2d 853, 858, 935 P.2d 1334 (1997). The Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction `establish the procedure, called appeal, for review by the superior court of a final decision' of the district court. RALJ 1.1(a).
We hold that (1) the Cowlitz County District Court had authority to preside over Qandil's traffic infraction hearing, (2) the superior court had authority to review on appeal, and (3) therefore, the superior court erred in dismissing Qandil's traffic infraction appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded to the superior court for consideration of Qandil's appeal.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, P.J. and BRIDGEWATER, J., concur.