State v. Pudlock

99 Citing cases

  1. State v. Adams

    43 Ohio St. 3d 67 (Ohio 1989)   Cited 274 times
    Holding that "when an accused waives the right to a speedy trial as to an initial charge, this waiver is not applicable to additional charges arising from the same set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver."

    See, also, State v. Singer, supra; State v. Tope (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 250, 7 O.O. 3d 408, 374 N.E.2d 152. This court has said that the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial found in the Constitution of Ohio, and thus "are mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the state. * * *" State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 105, 73 O.O. 2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525. For a waiver to be entered into knowingly, it is elementary that the defendant understand the nature of the charges against him, as well as know exactly what is being waived and the extent of the waiver.

  2. Amberley v. Levine

    108 Ohio Misc. 2d 13 (Ohio Misc. 2000)

    The speedy trial requirements are a "rational effort to enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor and shall be strictly enforced by the courts of this state." State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 18 O.O.3d 427, 416 N.E.2d 589, syllabus; State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68, 538 N.E.2d 1025, 1027; State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 105, 73 O.O.2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525. However, these provisions are not to be considered absolute and a certain amount of flexibility is intended.

  3. State v. Huckaby

    91 Ohio Misc. 2d 16 (Ohio Misc. 1997)   Cited 1 times

    See, also, State v. Singer, supra; State v. Tope (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 250, 7 O.O.3d 408, 374 N.E.2d 152. This court has said that the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial found in the Constitution of Ohio, and thus `are mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the state. * * *' State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 105, 73 O.O.2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525. "For a waiver to be entered into knowingly, it is elementary that the defendant understand the nature of the charges against him, as well as know exactly what is being waived and the extent of the waiver.

  4. Willowick Bldg. Dep't v. Indale

    2024 Ohio 5260 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024)

    {¶42} Ferrante's holding, however, is not clear cut. At the time of its release, the Ohio Supreme Court had not yet issued State v. Pudlock, 44 Ohio St.2d 104 (1975), finding that a short delay beyond the speedy trial deadline could be permissible if the trial court first issued a judgment entry continuing the matter and stating the reasons therefor. Thus, Ferrante was dealing with two unique questions.

  5. State v. Terra

    74 Ohio App. 3d 189 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 8 times
    In Terra, the mother discovered the defendant kneeling on the victim's bed with his pants unzipped and his belt buckle unfastened.

    This provision includes any reasonable continuance ordered sua sponte provided it meets the reasonableness test both as to reason and duration. The Ohio Supreme Court has expressly stated in State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 105-106, 73 O.O.2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525, that "[t]he provisions of R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73 * * * are mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the state." (Citations omitted.)

  6. State v. Hughes

    86 Ohio St. 3d 424 (Ohio 1999)   Cited 85 times
    In State v. Hughes (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 424, the Ohio Supreme Court held that where a single indictment contains both misdemeanor and felony charges, the accused must be brought to trial on those misdemeanor charges within the time limits applicable to misdemeanor charges as set forth in R.C. 2945.71(B).

    This court has repeatedly held that Ohio's speedy-trial statutes are mandatory and that the state must strictly comply with their provisions. See, e.g., State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 105, 73 O.O.2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525; State v. Singer (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 105, 4 O.O.3d 237, 238, 362 N.E.2d 1216, 1218; State v. Tope (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 250, 252, 7 O.O.3d 408, 409, 374 N.E.2d 152, 154; State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 18 O.O.3d 427, 416 N.E.2d 589, syllabus; State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68, 538 N.E.2d 1025, 1027. The state, however, relies on dicta in State v. Ladd (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 197, 201, 10 O.O.3d 363, 365, 383 N.E.2d 579, 582, to argue that when legislative goals and judicial autonomy would be frustrated by its enforcement, the speedy-trial statute will not be given effect.

  7. Brecksville v. Cook

    75 Ohio St. 3d 53 (Ohio 1996)   Cited 389 times
    In Brecksville v. Cook (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 661 N.E.2d 706, 709, the court reiterated its prior admonition "to strictly construe the speedy trial statutes against the state."

    He contends that the violence done to the right of the accused by doubling the period specifically chosen by the General Assembly to implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial is far greater than the administrative benefit of giving the mayor's and municipal courts time to accommodate their current docketing systems. Cook, citing State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 106, 73 O.O.2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525, and State v. Wentworth (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 171, 174, 8 O.O.3d 162, 164, 375 N.E.2d 424, 427, expresses concern that the Partlow rule conflicts with what he describes as the dual bedrock principles of speedy trial jurisprudence. The first is the principle that broad interpretation of the R.C. 2945.72 extension statute would frustrate the purpose of the speedy trial protections.

  8. State v. Broughton

    62 Ohio St. 3d 253 (Ohio 1991)   Cited 167 times
    In Broughton, the defendant was indicted on November 17, 1988; and the indictment was dismissed as defective on July 18, 1989.

    In State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 18 O.O.3d 427, 416 N.E.2d 589, syllabus, we observed that R.C. 2945.71 et seq. "* * * constitute a rational effort to enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor and shall be strictly enforced by the courts of this state." Moreover, as was emphasized in State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 106, 73 O.O.2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525, we will not permit the state to engage in "* * * practices which undercut the implementation of the `speedy trial' provisions within R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73 * * *." In reviewing whether a particular practice has undercut the implementation of the speedy-trial provisions, we approve of the language in United States v. Turner (C.A.9, 1991), 926 F.2d 883, 889, which stated:

  9. State v. O'Brien

    34 Ohio St. 3d 7 (Ohio 1987)   Cited 294 times
    Holding that constitutional speedy trial rights may be broader than the speedy trial rights set forth in the statute

    We have determined that "* * * R.C. 2945.71 et seq., constitute a rational effort to enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor and shall be strictly enforced by the courts of this state." State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 18 O.O. 3d 427, 416 N.E.2d 589, syllabus; see, also, State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 73 O.O. 2d 357, 338 N.E.2d 524. Thus, for purposes of bringing an accused to trial, the statutory speedy trial provisions of R.C. 2945.71 et seq. and the constitutional guarantees found in the United States and Ohio Constitutions are coextensive.

  10. Calhoun v. State

    299 Md. 1 (Md. 1984)   Cited 38 times
    Reaffirming the principles set forth in Hicks

    The Supreme Court of Ohio, when faced with facts similar to those in the instant case, reversed the defendant's conviction and discharged the defendant. State v. Pudlock, 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524 (1975). The Court explained ( 44 Ohio St.2d at 106, 338 N.E.2d 524):