Finally, at oral argument, counsel for appellant expanded the issue by maintaining that the phrase "in addition to any of the above" contained in 21-4603d(n) resolves any conflict as to whether consideration of 21-4603d(g) is required. State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 195 P.3d 240 (2008), a case argued on the same docket as this matter, involved the question of whether probationers sentenced under K.S.A. 21-4729 receive the same jail time credits for inpatient treatment as regular probationers. We stated that "[i]f the legislature had intended for S.B. 123 probationers to receive the same jail time credit treatment that regular probationers were then already receiving, there is no reason for the legislature to even mention jail time credit in K.S.A. 21-4603d(n)."
In accordance with the legislative scheme known as Senate Bill 123 (S.B. 123), L.2003, ch. 135, sec. 1, she was also ordered to complete mandatory drug abuse treatment as a nonprison sanction per K.S.A. 21–4729. See State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184–85, 195 P.3d 240 (2008). Two months later Hopkins was sentenced in a different case for convictions of attempted aggravated robbery and obstruction of legal process.
Third, when the Legislature revises an existing law, courts presume the Legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. State v. Preston , 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008). And courts presume the Legislature acts with full knowledge of existing law.
As the State points out, when the legislature revises an existing law, the court presumes that the legislature intended to change the law that existed prior to the amendment. See State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008); Dalton, 41 Kan.App.2d at 795, 207 P.3d 257; see also State v. Keeley, 236 Kan. 555, 560, 694 P.2d 422 (1985) (stating that “old statutes must be read in the light of later legislative enactments; an older statute must be harmonized with a newer one; if a conflict exists, the older statute must be subordinated to the newer one”). But as Snellings notes: “A statute should not be read to add something that is not found in the plain words used by the legislature or delete something that is clearly found within the ordinary language used.”
The problem with that approach is finding a purpose to be served by a parental fitness assessment at that stage of the proceeding. See State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 797, 217 P.3d 15 (2009) (courts presume legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation); see also State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008) (when legislature revises existing law, court presumes legislature intended to change law as it existed prior to amendment). In G.L.V., we recognized the dilemma of finding a purpose for the 2006 amendments when we said that
Finally, any attempt of the Parole Board to read the 1993 version and the 2008 version of K.S.A. 21-4608(e)(2) to have the same meaning runs afoul of the presumption that the legislature does not revise an existing law without intending to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008) (" Moreover, when the legislature revises an existing law, we presume that it intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment." ).
In the absence of such evidence of legislative intent, we presume an alteration to statutory language to effect a substantive change in the law. See State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008). Here, that means that the legislature intended to remove presumptive sentences from the ambit of appellate review.
See Sen. J., April 30, 2008, p. 2023 (message from the Governor vetoing S.B. 389); Sen. J., April 30, 2008, p. 2043 (Senate unable to override veto). Because we presume that a legislative alteration of statutory language makes a substantive change in the law, see State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008), we could make the further assumption that the 2008 legislature believed it necessary to state explicitly that a district attorney could obtain release of KDHE reports in order for the statute to allow it. The counterargument is that courts should avoid reading too much into legislative inaction.
Merryfield does not assert that he is a member of a suspect class for equal protection purposes. See State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 188-89, 195 P.3d 240 (2008). He does not allege, let alone demonstrate, that no legitimate legislative objective is promoted by classifying persons held as sexually violent predators differently than persons civilly confined for other reasons.
The KSC also emphasized that the substance abuse treatment program needed to match the level of treatment to the offender's substance abuse needs. State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 187, 195 P.3d 240 (2008). In testifying in support of Senate Bill 123, Judge Ernest Johnson, chairman of the KSC, " summarized the bill saying the legislature could free up prison beds by requiring drug treatment for the drug possession offender rather than incarceration."