Opinion
ID No. 0107011363, CR. A. No. IN01-07-2086-R1, 2087-R1, 2088-R1.
Date Submitted: December 20, 2004.
Date Decided: March 11, 2005.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.ORDER
This 11th day of March, 2005, upon consideration of the Motion for Postconviction Relief brought by Defendant, Braheem Poteat, it appears to the Court that:
1. Mr. Poteat was convicted by a jury of Trafficking in Cocaine and Resisting Arrest. He was sentenced to four years incarceration at Level 5, to be suspended after serving three years for the balance to be served on probation. Mr. Poteat filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware. Mr. Poteat's counsel on appeal filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Delaware Supreme Court Rule 26(c) claiming that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there were no arguably appealable issues. The Supreme Court found that Mr. Poteat's appeal was "wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue" and affirmed the conviction and sentence. Mr. Poteat now brings his first motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61").
Mr. Poteat was also convicted of Possession of Cocaine, a lesser-included offense of Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine. Because the possession conviction merged into the trafficking conviction, Mr. Poteat was not separately sentenced for possession. Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 910 (Del. 2003). He was also found not guilty of Loitering.
DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 26 (2004) ("Appeals without merit. If the trial attorney, after a conscientious examination of the record and the law, concludes that an appeal is wholly without merit, the attorneys may file a motion to withdraw.").
D.I. 49.
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61 (2004).
2. Mr. Poteat raises three grounds for postconviction relief. First, he contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing the State to present evidence which, in his opinion, should have been suppressed. Mr. Poteat's remaining two grounds for relief allege ineffective assistance of counsel. He first argues that counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained by police. He next argues that counsel failed to object to Mr. Poteat wearing his prison clothes during the trial.
3. Before addressing the merits of any postconviction relief claim, the Court first must determine whether the claims pass through the procedural filters of Rule 61. To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court will not address the substantive aspects of the claims if Defendant's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: 1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final order of conviction; 2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; 3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and 4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. Under Rule 61(i)(5), a defendant may avoid the first three of these procedural imperatives if the claim is jurisdictional or is a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation." Rule 61(d)(4) further provides that any claim may be summarily dismissed if "it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior postconviction proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief. . . ."
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) ("It is well-settled that the Superior Court and this Court must address the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of this motion.").
Id.
A. The Abuse of Discretion Claim
4. Mr. Poteat first contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing the State to present evidence which should have been suppressed. He further claims that the trial judge sua sponte should have granted him a suppression hearing. As an initial matter, the Court is compelled to observe that Mr. Poteat fails to address how the trial judge could abuse his discretion by allowing evidence that Mr. Poteat alleges should have been suppressed when Mr. Poteat did not file a suppression motion or otherwise object to the admission of the evidence. The Court will not convene a suppression hearing sua sponte. A request to suppress evidence must be made in accordance with Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 41. Additionally, Mr. Poteat has failed to show that, absent a clear constitutional violation, the Court can abuse its discretion by failing to grant a defendant a suppression hearing when such a hearing has not been requested. Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that Mr. Poteat has articulated a basis for relief with these allegations, the Court finds that his claim is procedurally barred. Mr. Poteat filed an appeal, and the conviction and sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware. Any claim alleging abuse of discretion by the trial judge should have been raised on direct appeal. As such, Mr. Poteat's failure to raise this claim on appeal must result in its Summary Dismissal under Rule 61(i)(3).
See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 41 (2004).
See Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21, 23 (Del. 1991) ("Claims of error implicating basic constitutional rights of a defendant have been accorded review by [the Delaware Supreme] Court notwithstanding their non-assertion at trial.").
D.I. 49.
The Court notes that Mr. Poteat was given every opportunity to raise issues on appeal under the procedure outlined in Supreme Court Rule 26. He declined to do so.
B. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
5. Mr. Poteat's remaining claims for postconviction relief are based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He first argues that counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained by police. He next argues that counsel failed to object to him wearing his prison clothes during the trial.
6. When a defendant raises a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the procedural bars of Rule 61(i) are inapplicable because there may be "a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceeding." In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the United States Supreme Court held in Strickland v. Washington, that a defendant must show both: (1) "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." There is a strong presumption that the legal representation was professionally reasonable. And the failure to prove either the cause or the prejudice prong will render the claim unsuccessful. In such instances, the court need not address the other prong. Initially, the accused bears the burden of showing that counsel's inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial. If this is shown, the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that the outcome was not tainted. If the accused fails to meet his initial burden, the claim fails.
See Rule 61(i)(5). See also State v. St. Louis, 2004 WL 2153645, at *3 (Del.Super.) ("Since the Supreme Court generally will not hear a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the procedural default rules do not bar those assertions of errors premised on ineffective assistance of counsel.").
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753-54 (Del. 1990) (citations omitted).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Id.
Stevenson v. State, 469 A.2d 797, 799 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted).
Id.
7. Mr. Poteat argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained by police at Mr. Poteat's request. He alleges that the stop, pat-down, arrest, and subsequent seizure of evidence by police violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the evidence should have been suppressed. In this case, officers were on routine patrol when they noticed Mr. Poteat and two other men standing on the street corner. One of the officers had previously warned Mr. Poteat not to loiter in the area and decided to issue him a ticket. As the officers approached Mr. Poteat, he attempted to flag down a passing car without success. Mr. Poteat then placed a cup that he was holding on the curb. As the officers patted down the men for weapons, one of the men sat down on the curb and knocked over the cup and several bags of crack cocaine spilled out. Mr. Poteat attempted to flee but was subdued and placed under arrest.
D.I. 49.
8. In evaluating the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court is satisfied that an attorney reasonably could conclude that the Court would find that reasonable suspicion existed to stop and pat-down Mr. Poteat, that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Poteat, that Mr. Poteat had abandoned the cup containing the crack cocaine, and that the officers properly seized the crack cocaine after detecting it in plain view on a public street. Thus, defense counsel's decision not to file a motion to suppress was reasonable and within the acceptable standards for professional performance set by Strickland. Mr. Poteat's first ineffective assistance of counsel claim is denied.
See State v. Brooks, 2002 WL 31814820, at *5 (Del.Super.) ("The concept of abandonment, in the search context, focuses on whether the defendant has forfeited or relinquished his expectation of privacy in the dwelling, vehicle or item to be searched."); State v. Dixon, 2001 WL 209907, at *4 (Del.Super.) ("When determining whether property has been abandoned in the context of search and seizure analysis, the Court must administer an objective test: did 'the words and acts of [the defendant] show relinquishment of privacy. . . .'").
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ("[C]ounsel must have made an error so serious as to fail to meet the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 'counsel' and thereby deprived the defendant of a fair trial.").
9. Mr. Poteat's final ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based upon counsel's purported failure to object to Mr. Poteat wearing his prison clothes during the trial. In support of this claim, Mr. Poteat relies upon Estelle v. Williams. In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court held that the State cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes. The record in this case, however, does not demonstrate that Mr. Poteat was compelled by the State to go to trial in prison clothing. Nor has Mr. Poteat shown that he requested counsel to make a motion in order to allow him to wear civilian clothing during the trial, or that his request was ignored. Moreover, Mr. Poteat's claim falls short on the prejudice prong of Strickland. Specifically, he has not demonstrated that his appearance in prison clothes tainted the jury so that the presumption of innocence was impaired. Indeed, the jury's not guilty verdict on the loitering charge, and finding of guilt on a lesser-included offense, suggest that Mr. Poteat's jury honored its oath to follow the law, including the presumption of innocence and the applicable burden of proof. Mr. Poteat's second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is denied.
425 U.S. 501 (1976).
Id. at 512.
10. Based on the foregoing, Mr. Poteat's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.