Summary
In Porter, we held that because the defendant was represented by counsel, the trial court did not commit an unsustainable exercise of discretion when it refused to consider his pro se motions.
Summary of this case from State v. BeltonOpinion
No. 2000-164
Submitted: March 8, 2002
Decided: April 2, 2002
1. Attorneys — Practice of Law — Pro Se Litigants
Where criminal defendant, who was represented by counsel when his case was remanded for resentencing, sought to vacate his sentence, secure a new trial, dismiss kidnapping indictments, and set aside the jury verdicts through a series of pro se motions, trial court's decision not to rule upon the merits of the pro se motions was a sustainable exercise of its discretion.
Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general ( Stephen D. Fuller, assistant attorney general, on the brief), for the State.
David M. Rothstein, chief appellate defender, of Concord, by brief, for the defendant.
Gary M. Porter, by brief, pro se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The defendant, Gary Porter, appeals orders of the Superior Court ( Perkins, J.) denying his pro se motions. We affirm.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated felonious sexual assault and kidnapping. See RSA 632-A:2, I(a) (1996); RSA 633:1, I (1996). We affirmed his convictions in State v. Porter, 144 N.H. 96 (1999), but remanded to superior court for resentencing. Id. at 97, 102.
On remand, although the defendant was represented by counsel, he sought to vacate his sentence, secure a new trial, dismiss the kidnapping indictments, and set aside the jury verdicts through a series of pro se motions. The trial court declined to address the merits of these pro se motions because the defendant was represented by counsel. The court rejected the motions "without prejudice to the defendant's ability to file such Motions or other posttrial [sic] motions as appropriate through counsel," stating that if the motions were presented by defense counsel, the court would address their merits.
The trial court's decision not to rule upon the merits of the defendant's pro se motions was a sustainable exercise of its discretion. See State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296, (2001). "The New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions guarantee a defendant facing criminal prosecution both the right to counsel and the right to proceed pro se. Yet these entitlements are antithetical, and the exercise of one right nullifies the other." State v. Panzera, 139 N.H. 235, 237-38 (1994) (citations omitted). On remand, the defendant elected to be represented by counsel. Thus, the court's denial of his pro se motions, without prejudice to their being submitted by his counsel, was sustainable on the record.
Having concluded that the trial court's decision was appropriate, we decline to address the merits of the defendant's various pro se motions for the first time on appeal.
Affirmed.
BRODERICK, NADEAU and DALIANIS, JJ., concurred.