Opinion
I.D. No. 30806190DI
Submitted: October 4, 2002
Decided: October 31, 2002
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 31st day of October, 2002, upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and the record in this case, it appears that:
On October 4, 2002, Defendant, Clinton Porter, filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The Court has determined that Defendant's motion is time-barred under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(1), as his conviction became final on July 28, 19 89. Defendant's motion is also procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4), because his grounds for relief have been fully considered in three prior motions for postconviction relief. The Court finds that Defendant's motion fails to satisfy any of the exceptions to the procedural bars set forth above.
See State v. Porter, Del. Super., I.D. No. 30806190DI, Stiftel, J. (June 8, 1990), (Letter Op.), aff'd, Del. Supr., No. 219, 1990, Christie, C. J. (Dec. 14, 1990) (ORDER); State v. Porter, Del. Super., I.D. No. 30806190DI, Goldstein, J. (June 15, 1992) (Mem. Op.), aff'd, Del. Supr., No. 291, 1992, Moore, J. (Sept. 16, 1992) (ORDER); State v. Porter, Del. Super., I.D. No. 30806190DI, Goldstein, J. (June 23, 1994) (ORDER), aff'd, Del. Supr., No. 249, 1994 (Oct. 17, 1994) (ORDER).
Therefore, because the Court finds that it is plain from the Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record in this case that Defendant is not entitled to relief, the motion is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.