Opinion
C. A. PC-2023-02652
11-21-2024
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, PETER F. NERONHA, in his capacity as Attorney General of the STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; and DR. UTPALA BANDY, in her capacity as Interim Director, RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Plaintiffs, v. PIONEER INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., and ANURAG SUREKA, Defendants.
For Plaintiff: Riley M. O'Brien, Esq. Leonard Giarrano, IV, Esq. Jordan Mickman, Esq. Stephen N. Provazza, Esq. Keith Hoffmann, Esq. For Defendant: John A. Caletri, Esq. Erik C. Edson, Esq. Kenneth Kando, Esq. For Interested Party: Michael J. Lepizzera, Jr., Esq. Robert A. D'Alfonso, III, Esq. Stephen J. Angell, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Riley M. O'Brien, Esq. Leonard Giarrano, IV, Esq. Jordan Mickman, Esq. Stephen N. Provazza, Esq. Keith Hoffmann, Esq.
For Defendant: John A. Caletri, Esq. Erik C. Edson, Esq. Kenneth Kando, Esq.
For Interested Party: Michael J. Lepizzera, Jr., Esq. Robert A. D'Alfonso, III, Esq. Stephen J. Angell, Esq.
DECISION
TAFT-CARTER, J.
Before this Court for decision are (1) Defendants Pioneer Investments, L.L.C. and Anurag Sureka's (Defendants) Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts III, VII, and VIII; (2) Plaintiffs State of Rhode Island, Peter F. Neronha, in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, and Dr. Jerome Larkin's, in his official capacity as Director of the Rhode Island Department of Health (RIDOH) (collectively, the State), Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, and V of the Defendants' Counterclaims; and (3) Defendants' Motion for Sanctions. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-13 and 8-2-14 and Rules 12, 56, and 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, and the State filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively, the Court converted both motions to those for summary judgment. See Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and (c), 56(c).
At the time this action was filed, Dr. Utpala Bandy was the Interim Director of the Rhode Island Department of Health (RIDOH). Dr. Larkin has now assumed the role of Director of the RIDOH. See Super. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).
I
Facts and Travel
On June 6, 2023, the State filed this action for injunctive relief against Defendants for their alleged failure to comply with multiple state rental, lead hazard, and consumer protection laws. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Pioneer Investments, L.L.C., is a Rhode Island limited liability company that owns and operates rental units within the State of Rhode Island. (Am. Compl. ¶ 68; Defs.' Ans. to Am. Compl. (Defs.' Ans.) ¶ 68.) Anurag Sureka is the president of Pioneer Investments, L.L.C. and is authorized to act on behalf of the company. (Am. Compl. ¶ 69; Defs.' Ans. ¶ 69.) The State alleges that Defendants own and operate more than 175 residential rental units across the State of Rhode Island and routinely have ignored lead hazard laws so that the units "consistently fail to conform to Rhode Island state law and municipal codes." (Am. Compl. ¶ 2).
The initial Complaint included six counts: public nuisance (Count I); violations of the Lead Hazard Mitigation Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 128.1 of title 42, (Count II); violations of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act, 216 RICR 50-15-3.2 (hereinafter LPPA), (Count III); violations of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, G.L. 1956 § 34-18-22(a)(1)-(2), (Count IV); violations of the Rhode Island State Building Code, G.L. 1956 § 23-27.3-109.1(a)-(c), 510 RICR 00-00-6.1, (Count V); and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 13.1 of title 6, (Count VI). See Compl. On October 11, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all but the claim under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Counts I, II, IV, and VII of State's Compl.) While that motion was pending, on February 20, 2024, the State filed an Amended Complaint to add two additional counts for violations of the Lead Safe Work Practices Rule, 216 RICR 50-15-12, Lead Hazard Mitigation Rule, 860 RICR 00-00-2, and Lead Poisoning Prevention Rule, 216 RICR 50-15-3 (Count VII); and violations of the State Lead Disclosure Rule, 216 RICR 50-15-3.5 (Count VIII). See Am. Compl ¶¶ 253, 258.
The State seeks an order from the Court compelling Defendants "to provide code-compliant, lead-safe housing, cease unsafe work practices that endanger tenants and workers, and provide complete, truthful lead disclosures to their consumer-tenants," an order requiring Defendants to "inspect every rental unit and remediate all dangerous conditions immediately and in a lawful, lead-safe manner," and an order requiring Defendants to "follow all applicable lead safety laws in undertaking renovation, repair, and painting work, and communicate lead hazards to consumer-tenants in full compliance with state laws." Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.
Defendants have advanced five counterclaims against the State: Defamation (Count I), Malicious Prosecution (Count II), Abuse of Process (Count III), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count IV), and Selective Enforcement (Count V). See Defs.' Ans./Countercls. ¶¶ 6, 11, 16, 21, 26. On November 7, 2023, the State moved to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. See State's Mot. to Dismiss Countercls. (State's Mot. to Dismiss.) On March 26, 2024, the Court granted Defendants' October 11, 2023 Motion to Dismiss the State's Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI. (Order Mar. 26, 2024.) In addition, the Court denied the State's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' counterclaims. Id. What remains before the Court are the State's Counts III, VII, and VIII, and Defendants' Counterclaims Counts I, II, III, IV, and V.
On May 24, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss the State's remaining claims. See Defs.' Mem. of Law Supp. Mot. to Dismiss and for Summ. J. (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J.) The State objected to the motion on June 27, 2024. See State's Obj. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss and/or for Summ. J. (State's Obj.) Defendants filed a Reply to the State's Objection on July 10, 2024. See Defs.' Reply to Obj. to Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. (Defs.' Reply to State's Obj.)
The State filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims on July 10, 2024. See State's Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and Summ. J. on Defs.' Countercls. (State's Mot. for Summ. J.) On August 9, 2024, Defendants objected to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings regarding the Counterclaims. See Defs.' Obj. to State's Mot. for Summ. J. and J. on the Pleadings on Defs.' Countercls. (Defs.' Obj.) The State replied in support of the Motion on August 19, 2024. See State's Reply in Supp. of its Mot. for J. on Pleadings and Summ. J. on Defs.' Countercls. Subsequently, Defendants moved for sanctions on August 19, 2024, to which the State objected on August 26, 2024.
The Court heard oral arguments on August 30, 2024 on (1) the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment on Defendants' counterclaims; (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment on the State's remaining claims; and (3) Defendants' Motion for Sanctions. At the hearing, the Court converted the motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings to motions for summary judgment under Rule 56(f). See Hr'g Tr. 3:11-21, Aug. 30, 2024; see also Mokwenyei v. Rhode Island Hospital, 198 A.3d 17, 22 (R.I. 2018).
The Court now renders its decisions.
II
Standard of Review
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously." Andrade v. Westlo Management LLC, 276 A.3d 393, 399 (R.I. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). When considering a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c), the Court considers the competent evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and may only grant the motion if the evidence "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Andrade, 276 A.3d at 399-400 (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 350 (R.I. 2018)). "A party opposing a motion for summary judgment 'bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions.'" Andrade, 276 A.3d at 400 (quoting Cancel, 187 A.3d at 350).
"'[C]ompetent evidence' . . . is generally presented on summary judgment in the form of 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, . . . admissions on file, . . . [and] affidavits.'" Flynn v. Nickerson Community Center, 177 A.3d 468, 476 (R.I. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). "Our Supreme Court permits a motion justice to rule on motions for summary judgment when faced with pure questions of law and statutory interpretation." Alves v. Cintas Corporation No. 2, No. PC-2009-2412, 2013 WL 3722200, at *7 (R.I. Super. July 8, 2013) (citing DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co., 882 A.2d 561, 564 n.9 (R.I. 2005)).
III
Analysis
A
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts III, VII, and VIII
Defendants argue that it is procedurally improper for the Attorney General to file suit in Superior Court without pending compliance orders issued by the RIDOH. (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 3.) Therefore, Defendants argue, any alleged violations of the LPPA, at this stage, are irrelevant to the present motion because the action is procedurally defective. See Defs.' Reply to State's Obj. 13. It follows, then, that the issue of the statutory interpretation of the LPPA's enforcement and compliance section is a threshold matter.
1
Authority of Lead Poisoning Prevention Act and Administrative Regulations
The remaining claims allege violations of the Legislature's "Lead Poisoning Prevention Act," G.L. 1956 chapter 24.6 of title 23, and regulations promulgated under the LPPA by the RIDOH and the Housing Resources Commission (HRC). Because the LPPA provides authority for the RIDOH and HRC to issue regulations, the State must demonstrate its authority in the LPPA to support any action taken under the LPPA, or the agency regulations promulgated under its authority. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 627 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 1993) ("It is a well-established principle of administrative law that agencies are a product of the enabling legislation that creates them. Agency action is only valid, therefore, when the agency acts within the parameters of the statutes that define their powers.") (citing F. Ronci Co. v. Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management District Commission, 561 A.2d 874, 879 (R.I. 1989)).
The State alleges violations of 216 RICR 50-15-12; 50-15-3; 50-15-3.5; 50-15-3.5.6(G); and 50-15-3.5.2(A)(3). In addition to the LPPA, The RIDOH regulations derive authority from the General Assembly via the Lead Hazard Mitigation Act (LHMA) and from Congress via the federal regulation governing "Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention in Certain Residential Structures," 40 C.F.R. 745. See 216 RICR 50-15-3.1.1(A).
The State alleges violations of the Lead Hazard Mitigation Rule, 860 RICR 00-00-2.
In its written objection, the State cites § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) of the LPPA-the compliance and enforcement section-as authorization to file the action at bar. See State's Obj. 8-9. Section 23-24.6-23(c)(1) provides:
"(c) The attorney general shall maintain an office of lead advocate, which office shall have, in addition to any other powers that the attorney general may assign to it, the power:
"(1) To investigate any alleged failures to comply with the lead hazard reduction, to initiate either a civil or criminal cause of action, or both, to compel compliance via injunctive relief, and/or impose penalties and fines, as appropriate[.]" Section 23-24.6-23(c)(1).
Here, the State characterizes § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) as an express authorization for the Attorney General "to seek fines, penalties, and injunctive relief [from the Superior Court], regardless of whether the Department of Health or any other agency has taken any action such as issuing a notice of violation." See State's Obj. 8. It further argues that "[t]he LPPA and Lead Poisoning Prevention Rule do not obligate RIDOH or the Attorney General to follow any rigid procedure, but instead empower them to utilize the full range of powers available to the state to prevent childhood lead poisoning." Id. Defendants, however, posit that the Attorney General's authority under § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) is narrow. See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 21. "Under [23-24.6-23(c)(1)]," Defendants explain, "the office's power to initiate civil actions against suspected violators is limited to enforcing 'lead hazard reduction' which . . . is a defined term meaning work that is required to be done to remediate lead hazards after a child has been lead-poisoned." Id. (citing to § 23-24.6-4(20)). They argue that "[a] failure to implement 'lead hazard reduction' is but one type of LPPA violation." Id. Other violations, they explain, must be remediated through the RIDOH agency process. Id. at 21-22.
The "Lead Poisoning Prevention Rule" referenced by the State is codified in the R.I. Code of Regulations, 216 RICR 50-15-3.1, and, therefore, its remedial breadth cannot extend beyond what is authorized by the LPPA.
The Court's task here is to determine whether § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) authorizes the Attorney General to initiate litigation-independent from agency action taken by the RIDOH-to compel compliance with any violation of the LPPA, or if the authorization extends only to compel compliance with alleged violations of "lead hazard reduction."
i
Interpretation of the LPPA
When interpreting a statute, the Court's "'ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.'" Sosa v. City of Woonsocket, 297 A.3d 120, 124 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Epic Enterprises LLC v. Bard Group, LLC, 186 A.3d 587, 589 (R.I. 2018)). "It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, [the] Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "Ambiguity exists only when a word or phrase in a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning." Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island, 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011) (citing Unistrut Corporation v. State Department of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d 93, 100 (R.I. 2007)).
However, "[i]t is an equally fundamental maxim of statutory construction that statutory language should not be viewed in isolation." Sosa, 297 A.3d at 124. Indeed, the "'plain meaning approach . . . is not the equivalent of myopic literalism, and it is entirely proper for [the Court] to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.'" Freepoint Solar LLC v. Richmond Zoning Board of Review, 274 A.3d 1, 7-8 (R.I. 2022) (quoting 5750 Post Road Medical Offices, LLC v. East Greenwich Fire District, 138 A.3d 163, 167 (R.I. 2016)). Therefore, when interpreting a statute, the Court must "consider the entire statute as a whole; [and] individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections." Sorenson v. Colibri Corporation, 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I. 1994) (internal citations omitted). "Moreover, '[i]f a mechanical application of a statutory definition produces an absurd result or defeats legislative intent, [the] court will look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act.'" Id. at 129 (internal quotation omitted).
The scope of the LPPA is expansive. See generally chapter 24.6 of title 23. It includes a vast selection of lead inspection schemes, including comprehensive environmental lead inspections, § 23-24.6-12; policies for state inspectors, § 23-24.6-13; inspection of childcare facilities, § 23-24.6-14; and inspections of rental properties, § 23-24.6-15. Further, it directs the RIDOH to certify training programs for individuals engaging in environmental lead-hazard reduction, § 23-24.6-20(a), and authorizes the director of RIDOH to adopt, modify, repeal, and promulgate regulations in accordance with the LPPA, § 23-24.6-26.
Out of the entire text of the LPPA, which spans across twenty-eight sections, the State points only to one clause to support its position on authority delegated to the Attorney General. See Hr'g Tr. 49:7-11, Aug. 30, 2024. Further, the clause at issue, located in § 23-24.6-23(c)(1), requires a reading of at least two additional sections to grasp the State's preferred reading of the text. To understand the reference to "lead hazard reduction" in § 23-24.6-23(c)(1), a reading of the definition of the term "lead hazard reduction" in § 23-24.6-4(20) is required. There, "lead hazard reduction" is defined as certain activities taking place in any "dwelling unit, where a child under the age of six (6) years, with environmental intervention blood lead level or greater resides, or on any premises." Section 23-24.6-4(20) (emphasis added). However, "premises," is defined in § 23-24.6-4(28),as "a platted lot or part thereof . . . occupied by a dwelling . . ." Section 23-24.6-4(28). Finally, "dwelling," as referenced in § 23-24.6-4(28), is defined in § 23-24.6-4(7). The Legislature, in that section, provides a broad definition of "dwelling," meaning "any enclosed space that is wholly or partly used or intended to be used for living or sleeping by human occupants." Section 23-24.6-4(7).
The relevant portion of the August 30, 2024 hearing is the following:
"The Court: Attorney General . . . you're claiming has the authority to bring [this action] under subsection (c), the Attorney General, that's your authority, 23-24.6-23(c)? "[Mr. Mickman]: That's right, Your Honor." (Hr'g Tr. 49:7-11, Aug. 30, 2024).
Section 23-24.6-4(28) in its entirety reads:
"'Premises' means a platted lot or part thereof or unplatted lot or parcel of land, or plot of land, occupied by a dwelling or structure and includes any building, accessory structure, or other structure thereon that is or will be frequently used by children under the age of six (6) years." Section 23-24.6-4 (28).
While the State references the multiple sections as authority to bring this action, a plain reading of § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) indicates that "lead hazard reduction" applies only to actions taken to reduce lead poisoning risk at dwellings where a child under the age of six, with environmental intervention blood level, resides. (Defs.' Reply to State's Obj. 8.) Given that a statute is ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, and here, the parties have reached different-though reasonable meanings of the statute-this Court finds it to be ambiguous and therefore considers the statute's legislative intent. Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc, 31 A.3d at 1269 (citing Unistrut Corporation, 922 A.2d at 100).
ii
Legislative Intent
The stated intent of the LPPA is to "protect the public health and public interest by establishing a comprehensive program to reduce exposure to environmental lead and prevent childhood lead poisoning . . . ." Section 23-24.6-3. The LPPA designates RIDOH as the "lead state agency" charged with:
"(i) defining lead poisoning, (ii) establishing programs for screening persons, especially children under the age of six (6) years, who are at risk of lead poisoning, (iii) setting standards for eliminating and reducing lead hazards in buildings and premises, including dwellings where a child under the age of six (6) years who has been lead poisoned resides, (iv) providing information to the public and segments thereof about the risks of lead poisoning, and (v) initiating
enforcement actions against persons who violate the provisions of this chapter or regulations promulgated pursuant to this chapter." Id. (emphasis added).
Clearly, the Legislature intended for RIDOH to be the primary agency tasked with enforcing the provisions of the LPPA. Id. Further, § 23-24.6-23, "compliance and enforcement," states that "[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, the inspection, enforcement, and penalties for violations of the provisions of this chapter shall be in accordance with the provisions and procedures set forth in [G.L. 1956] §§ 23-1-19 - 23-1-25." Section 23-24.6-23(a) (emphasis added). Sections 23-1-19 to 23-1-25 are codified in G.L. 1956 chapter 1 of title 23, "Department of Health." The Legislature's mandate that enforcement of the LPPA comply with the Department of Health's enforcement provisions evinces a clear legislative intent for the RIDOH to initiate and lead enforcement actions under the LPPA.
The RIDOH's enforcement provisions, codified in §§ 23-1-19 to 23-1-25, lay out an administrative process that begins with an inspection of alleged violations, then escalates to a notice of violation, an opportunity to cure, an opportunity for administrative hearing, and ultimately culminates with proceedings in superior court to enforce an effective compliance order, if need be. See §§ 23-1-19 - 23-1-25.
Defendants, relying on the LPPA and the incorporated provisions of the RIDOH Procedures and Regulations, argue that,
"to penalize someone for any violations of the LPPA, the State must first provide suspected violators with a notice (or notices) of violation ("NOV"), time to cure the alleged violation, and an opportunity for a hearing, all at the administrative level, before any additional action such as judicial enforcement may be pursued." (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 12.)
The State disagrees, arguing that Defendants' interpretation of § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) does not support their reading, and, in any event, such a reading "would eviscerate the broad remedial intent of the statute." (Pls.' Obj. 12.) The crux of the disagreement between the parties revolves around the LPPA's definition of "lead hazard reduction," as referenced in § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) and defined in § 23-24.6-4(20).
Section 23-24.6-4(20) states:
"'Lead hazard reduction' means any action or actions designed to reduce exposure to toxic levels of lead that impose an unacceptable risk of exposure in any dwelling or dwelling unit, where a child under the age of six (6) years, with environmental intervention blood lead level or greater resides, or on any premises and may include, but is not limited to: repair, enclosure, encapsulation, or removal of lead based paint and/or lead contaminated dust, soil, or drinking water . . ."
Defendants argue that "§ 23-24.6-23(c)(1) does not give the [Attorney General] a free pass to file suit to enforce any and all acts of noncompliance under the LPPA." (Defs.' Reply to State's Obj. 8.) "Rather, it only authorizes him or her to file suit to compel compliance with 'lead hazard reduction,'; i.e., the failure to take appropriate action to abate lead hazards at a dwelling or dwelling unit where a lead-poisoned child under six lives, or . . . will frequently use." Id. "Lead hazard reduction," according to Defendants, excludes issues with certificates of lead conformance (CLCs), lead disclosures, or remediation work-practices at dwellings where children under the age of six years with environmental intervention blood levels neither live nor frequently use. See id. at 9. The State maintains a more expansive definition of "lead hazard reduction," focusing on the fourth clause in § 23-24.6-4(20), which states "or on any premises." (Pls.' Obj. 9.) The State's definition of "lead hazard reduction" therefore includes "activity taking place in 'any premises' and not just units where a child resides when lead poisoned." (Pls.' Obj. 12.) However, such an expansive reading of § 23-24.6-4(20) does not square with the compliance and enforcement procedures laid out in the LPPA in its entirety.
To allow the Attorney General to independently determine that a violation of the LPPA has taken place, circumvent the administrative process set forth and incorporated by reference throughout the LPPA's compliance and enforcement section, and file an action in the Superior Court without pending RIDOH action would be inconsistent with the LPPA's legislative intent and would lead to absurd results. Such an outcome not only would require a convoluted reading of § 23-24.6-23(c)(1), see discussion of ambiguity supra, it also would ignore the Legislature's intention for the RIDOH to be the primary enforcement agency of the LPPA, see § 23-24.6-3, and it would result in a system where similarly situated entities are treated differently under the law. As Defendants point out, under the State's reading of the statute, some individuals will be "afforded their statutory and regulatory rights," while others will not. (Defs.' Reply to State's Obj. 4.) Further, authorizing the Attorney General to avoid the administrative procedures to enforce LPPA violations would be a great deviation from their office's own history of enforcing the LPPA. Indeed, during the August 30, 2024 hearing, the State admitted that the present action is "the first action that the State has brought where there have been no NOVs against a particular defendant." See Hr'g Tr. 41:3-12, Aug. 30, 2024.
In addition to significantly departing from the Attorney General's Office's own history of enforcement, such an outcome would lead to inconsistent and potentially arbitrary results, given that no portion of the LPPA provides an evidentiary standard that the Attorney General must meet prior to filing an action. See generally chapter 24.6 of title 23. In fact, the Court raised this very issue during the August 30, 2024 hearing. See Hr'g Tr. 45:18-46:7, Aug. 30, 2024. There, the Court explicitly asked what evidentiary standard the Attorney General would need to satisfy prior to filing an action in Superior Court, to which counsel for the Attorney General responded, "[t]he statute is the standard, and the statute states that the Office of the Attorney General can investigate any alleged failures to comply." Id. at 46:5-7. This answer clearly did not respond to the Court's concerns.
Given the potential for arbitrary enforcement, even if the statute is not ambiguous, the Court finds that, when the context of the LPPA is considered as a whole, reading § 23-24.6-23(c)(1) to authorize the Attorney General to file suit in Superior Court, without pending compliance orders or NOVs by RIDOH, would lead to an absurd result. "'[U]nder no circumstances will [the] Court construe a statute to reach an absurd result.'" Olsen v. DeMayo, 210 A.3d 431, 435 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I. 2012)).
2
Administrative Procedures Act
Although determining that the LPPA does not authorize the Attorney General to initiate this action is sufficient to end the analysis, the Court will nevertheless address Defendants' contentions regarding additional administrative safeguards found in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
In addition to the arguments above, Defendants further aver that the LPPA is explicitly subject to the APA, G.L. 1956 §§ 42-35-1 to 42-35-18, which requires notice and an administrative hearing before judicial intervention in this action. (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 16.) The State disagrees, arguing that "[c]ontrary to Defendants' assertion, RIDOH is exempt from the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act." (State's Obj. 15.) The State bases this assertion on § 23-1-27, which states "[t]he provisions of §§ 42-35-9 through 42-35-18 [the APA] shall not apply to this chapter." Section 23-1-27.
However, that exemption language is codified in § 23-1-27, "Department of Health." Section 23-1-27. Although the LPPA incorporates the RIDOH's enforcement procedures by reference, the LPPA is codified in chapter 24.6, not chapter 1 of title 23. See chapter 24.6 of title 23. Because the APA exemption found in § 23-1-27 applies only to "this chapter," and the LPPA is not codified in that chapter, the exemption cannot be said to apply to the LPPA.
Under the APA, parties are entitled to notice and a hearing in any contested case. Section 42-35-9. A "contested case" is one "in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a specific party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." Section 42-35-1(5).
Here, the State seeks expansive equitable relief in the form of declaratory relief and injunctive orders. The Court finds that this case necessarily implicates the legal rights and duties of Defendants and is therefore a "contested case" within the meaning of the APA. Because the issues presented in this action constitute a contested case, and the LPPA is subject to the APA, the State is not permitted to bypass the protocols of the APA.
3
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Given that the State failed to comply with the regulatory procedures of the LPPA and the APA, Defendants argue that this Court is bereft of jurisdiction over the action. See Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 29.
"Subject-matter jurisdiction is the very essence of the court's power to hear and decide a case." Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 1079 (R.I. 2009). Unless the Legislature has conferred jurisdiction upon another tribunal, the Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction over suits and proceedings of an equitable character. See § 8-2-13. Our courts have held that "a party's failure to meet the statutory requirements to obtain judicial review of agency actions is not a condition precedent for subject-matter jurisdiction in the Superior Court, a court of equity." Banki v. Fine, 224 A.3d 88, 95 (R.I. 2020).
Here, Defendants argue that because the State "failed to exhaust [its] administrative remedies before filing suit, this Court should dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . ." See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 13. The State contends that if the RIDOH had brought the present action, the proper court would have been the state District Court or the municipality court; however, because "the action was originally part of a larger lawsuit, which had other claims which were appropriate for Superior Court," this Court may hear the action via supplemental jurisdiction. See Hr'g Tr. 48:15-49:5, Aug. 30, 2024.
The issue that this Court must resolve is whether the State's failure to exhaust administrative remedies divests this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the action or simply diminishes the Court's authority to hear the issue. Importantly, our Supreme Court "has drawn a distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and the authority of the court to proceed." Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions, 182 A.3d 1137, 1142 (R.I. 2018) (internal citations omitted). In Hartt v. Hartt, 121 R.I. 220, 397 A.2d 518 (1979), the Court distinguished the terms in the following way:
"'[I]f a probate court, invested only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public offences, jurisdiction over the subject of offences (would be) entirely wanting in the court . . . But if on the other hand a judge of a criminal court, invested with general criminal jurisdiction over offences committed within a certain district, should hold a particular act to be a public offence, which is not by law made an offence, and proceed to the arrest and trial of a party charged with such act, . . . those acts would be in excess of his jurisdiction . . . (and) these are particulars for his judicial consideration, whenever his general jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invoked.'" Hartt, 121 R.I. at 228-29, 397 A.2d at 522-23 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872)).
If this action had originated at the administrative level and proceeded to a final compliance order via the RIDOH, this Court clearly would have jurisdiction and authority to hear this case. See § 23-1-23. Similarly, had a party simply "fail[ed] to satisfy one of the conditions precedent to bringing [the] action," the Court would not be deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rock Ridge Ltd. v. Assessor of Taxes, 667 A.2d 778, 779 (R.I. 1995); rather, it would retain jurisdiction over the matter, but would need to determine the manner and extent to exercise it. Id. at 780. Therefore, the remaining question is whether the State's failure to exhaust administrative remedies in this case is an issue of jurisdiction or authority.
Our Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue in Jacob v. Burke, 110 R.I. 661, 296 A.2d 456 (1972), in which it likewise considered whether the failure to exhaust administrative remedies divested the Superior Court of jurisdiction over a matter. Jacob, 110 R.I. at 667, 296 A.2d at 459. There, the Court explained that "when a litigant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies the trial justice, may, in his discretion, dismiss an entire complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction," however, "[t]his does not mean . . . that in every such case the entire action need be dismissed." Id. at 673, 296 A.2d at 463; see also Banki, 224 A.3d at 95 (holding that, when administrative proceedings were ongoing, the question for the court is "whether judicial intervention was proper, and not whether the Superior Court was vested with subject-matter jurisdiction"); Davis III v. Town of Exeter, No. WC-2019-0228, 2021 WL 194323, *5 (R.I. Super. Jan. 13, 2021) (affirming that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction despite a party's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but declining to exercise that jurisdiction because it would be improper).
Here, like in Jacob, the Court may use its discretion to determine whether to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction-or it may retain subject-matter jurisdiction and decide to what extent the Court should exercise its jurisdiction and authority to hear the issues. Given that the State has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court finds that although it is vested with subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, it would be in error and in excess of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the State's claims stemming from the LPPA and the regulations promulgated under it. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the State's Counts III, VII, and VIII is granted.
B
State's Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims
Defendants advance five counterclaims against the State. These claims fall into two major categories-prosecution claims and tort claims. The "prosecution claims" consist of malicious prosecution (Count II), abuse of process (Count III), and selective enforcement (Count V). The "tort claims" are defamation (Count I) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV).
Defendants bring Counts I, II, III, and IV against Peter F. Neronha, in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island. They bring Count V against both Peter F. Neronha, in his official capacity, and against Dr. Utpala Bandy, in her capacity as Interim Director of the RIDOH.
Although the Court generally prefers to address counts in the order that the parties present them; for clarity, the Court here will address the prosecutorial counts first, then the tort claims.
Regarding the prosecution claims, Defendants assert that the present action constitutes malicious prosecution because it "was instituted maliciously and without probable cause . . . [and,] [a]s a result of the action, the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs have sustained damages." (Defs.' Countercl. ¶¶ 9, 10.) Next, they argue the action is an abuse of process because "[t]he action was instituted for an ulterior or wrongful purpose that the proceedings were not designed to accomplish[,]" resulting in damages. Id. ¶ 14. Further, Defendants argue that they were "selectively treated" when compared to "others similarly situated," and that "selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, and/or malicious and/or bad faith intent to injure the Defendants[.]" Id. ¶¶ 24, 25. The State asserts that none of the prosecution claims have "any basis in fact or law," and maintain that "the State is absolutely immune from each of these claims." (State's Mot. for Summ. J. 1.)
At oral argument, counsel for Defendants argued that summary judgment on the counterclaims would be inappropriate because the State has not requested discovery on the claims. (Hr'g Tr. 13:21-14:15, Aug. 30, 2024.) Despite Defendants' contention, as the plaintiffs-in-counterclaim and the party opposing summary judgment, the burden is on Defendants to show that the case should go forward because there are disputed material facts. See Davis v. Town of Exeter, 285 A.3d 15, 19 (R.I. 2022) (explaining that "to avoid summary judgment the burden is on the nonmoving party to produce competent evidence that 'prove[s] the existence of a disputed issue of material fact[.]'") (internal quotation omitted); Borgo v. Narragansett Electric Company, 275 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2022) ("[s]ummary judgment should enter against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case."(internal quotation omitted)).
1
Prosecutorial Immunity
The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed this issue clearly: "[A] state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution" enjoys absolute immunity from civil redress under federal law. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410, 428 (1976). In Rhode Island too, "[o]ur case law clearly indicates that the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity remains 'alive and well'" Diorio v. Hines Road, LLC, 226 A.3d 138, 146 (R.I. 2020) (citing Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 595 (R.I. 1998); see also Richardson v. City of Providence by and through Lombardi, No. 18-253, 2018 WL 5619719, *2 (D.R.I. Oct. 30, 2018) (where the court, in interpreting Rhode Island law, explained that "the Rhode Island Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, 'squarely determined' that absolute prosecutorial immunity protects the Attorney General from having to litigate claims of malicious prosecution that arise under the state Constitution and common law"). "'The baseline rule [as to prosecutorial immunity] is that a state official who performs prosecutorial functions . . . is absolutely immune from damages actions.'" Diorio, 226 A.3d at 145 (quoting Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2013)). Further, our Supreme Court has held that "[i]n determining whether an individual is entitled to prosecutorial immunity we look to the 'nature of the function performed' by the official at issue," rather than simply the identity of the official actor. Id.
Our Supreme Court has established that: "The attorney general . . . performs the duties of a public prosecutor in this state." Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 58, 199 A.2d 722, 723 (1964).
In Diorio, our Supreme Court drew heavily from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's analysis in Goldstein v. Galvin in its discussion of prosecutorial and judicial immunity. Id. In Goldstein, the First Circuit considered the question of absolute prosecutorial immunity and judicial functions at length. Goldstein, 719 F.3d at 22. There, the plaintiff alleged that the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had (1) induced the enforcement section of the Massachusetts Securities Division to "deviate from normal investigatory practices and charging standards," (2) induced the enforcement section to file an administrative complaint against the plaintiff, and (3) "gone out of his way to announce, on his website, that 'Secretary Galvin Charges Phillip Goldstein and Bulldog Investors for unregistered securities offerings" in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. There, the court held that "[a]bsolute immunity applies to . . . 'prosecutors performing acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,' . . ." Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted). Expanding on the scope of immunity, the court explained that "'[t]he duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.'" Id. at 27 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). Taken together, "standard judicial immunity applies to [an] official's judicial functions and standard prosecutorial immunity applies to [an] official's prosecutorial functions." Id. Ultimately, the First Circuit determined that the Secretary's actions were subject to judicial and prosecutorial immunity, id., and our Supreme Court subsequently has treated this analysis favorably. See Diorio, 226 A.3d at 145.
The Court will now consider whether the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity applies to each of the claims levied against Peter F. Neronha, in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island. In doing so, the Court will consider the nature of the underlying act giving rise to the cause of action for the prosecution claims.
i
Malicious Prosecution
As a threshold matter, in Rhode Island, "actions for malicious prosecution have been disfavored because such claims may tend to deter prosecution of criminal offenses." Hill v. Rhode Island State Employees' Retirement Board, 935 A.2d 608, 613 (R.I. 2007) (internal citations omitted). "To recover damages for malicious prosecution, a party must 'prove that (1) defendants initiated a prior criminal proceeding against him, (2) they did not have probable cause to initiate such a proceeding, (3) the proceeding was instituted maliciously, and (4) it terminated in [plaintiff's] favor.'" Id. (internal quotations omitted). Because such actions are disfavored, the plaintiff "must establish 'clear proof' of malice and lack of probable cause." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Defendants cite to the State's decision to file the present action as the triggering act for the count of malicious prosecution. (Defs.' Countercl. ¶ 8.) There can be no doubt that the decision to file an action is a prosecutorial function and must be protected by the immunity. This inquiry does not require delving into the subjective motivations of the Attorney General's decision to file. See Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 61, 199 A.2d 722, 724 (1964) (stating that "where a judicial act is within the general authority of a public officer the motive underlying its performance cannot be made the subject of inquiry in a private suit against him" and "extend[ing] the immunity to actions taken within the jurisdiction of the attorney general"). Therefore, the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II is granted.
Further, even if immunity did not apply, the claim for malicious prosecution must fail on the merits. Here, Defendants have proffered no evidence showing that the State initiated a prior criminal proceeding or "continued to press a civil claim" which has terminated in favor of Defendants. See, e.g. Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 352 (R.I. 2002) (where the Court acknowledged that a malicious prosecution claim may be predicated on a civil, rather than criminal, action but affirmed that the plaintiff still needs to show a favorable termination). There is no genuine dispute as to whether the State brought a prior action against Defendants that resolved in Defendants favor and, as such, Defendants are unable to make a prima facie showing as to malicious prosecution. As a matter of law, this count fails.
ii
Abuse of Process
To prevail on a claim for abuse of process, a claimant must prove two elements: "(1) the defendant instituted proceedings or process against the plaintiff and (2) the defendant used these proceedings for an ulterior or wrongful purpose that the proceedings were not designed to accomplish." Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 353 (R.I. 2002). Our Supreme Court has noted, however, that the crux of an abuse of process claim is to "obtain an advantage, 'not properly involved in the proceeding itself . . . [E]ven a pure spite motive is not sufficient where process is used only to accomplish the result for which it was created." Id. at 354 (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 121 at 897 (5th ed. 1984)).
Here, Defendants cite to the decision to "file[] the within action against the Defendants" as the trigger giving rise to the abuse of process count. (Defs. Countercl. ¶ 13.) Again, the decision to file an action is a prosecutorial function and must be protected by the immunity. See, e.g. Suitor, 98 R.I. at 61, 199 A.2d at 724. Accordingly, the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III of Defendants' Counterclaim is granted.
Even if the immunity did not apply, Defendants have failed to allege facts sufficient to show a genuine dispute of material fact at this stage of the litigation. The party opposing summary judgment "may not rely 'on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 727 (R.I. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). Here, although Defendants allege that the State filed the present action based on an ulterior or wrongful motive, Defendants do not identify what that motive is. Further, Defendants do not present any facts or evidence to support this bold accusation. Given that Defendants have failed to allege sufficient facts to support their allegations and conclusions, the State's motion must be granted.
iii
Selective Enforcement
"A selective-enforcement claimant must show: '(1) [he or she], compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'" Providence Teachers' Union Local 958, AFL-CIO, AFT v. City Council of City of Providence, 888 A.2d 948, 954 (R.I. 2005) (internal quotation omitted).
Again, Defendants point to the State's decision to file this action as the triggering event for the selective-enforcement claim. (Defs.' Countercl. ¶ 23.) With respect to the Attorney General, as discussed supra, prosecutorial immunity must apply to actions arising from the decision to file, or not file, charges. In addition, Defendants bring this claim against Dr. Utpala Bandy, in her official capacity as Interim Director of the RIDOH, which raises the issue of whether an agency director is immune from litigation arising from official agency action. Id.
The term "quasi-judicial" describes "the action and discretion of public administrative officers, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Suitor, 98 R.I. at 61, 199 A.2d at 724; see also Richardson v. R.I. Department of Education, 947 A.2d 253, 258 (R.I. 2008) (holding that Rhode Island Department of Education (RIDE) hearing officers "enjoy quasi-judicial immunity" and are immune from suit for actions performed "in their official decision-making capacity as hearing officers" and warning that without such immunity, "hearing officers would live in constant fear of litigation from parties disgruntled by an adverse decision"). "[Q]uasi-judicial immunity affords immunity from suit, rather than mere immunity from damages." Id. at 257. Here, the Interim Director of the RIDOH's decision to file this action alleging violations of the LPPA, like the actions of the Attorney General, see id., and the RIDE officers, is quasi-judicial, and therefore also immune from litigation.
Because the decisions to file this action by both the Rhode Island Attorney General and the RIDOH are protected by prosecutorial and quasi-judicial immunity, the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V is granted.
Further, even if the immunities did not apply, the Defendants-as the parties opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment-cannot "rely 'on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Morales, 895 A.2d at 727 (internal quotation omitted). Defendants have not alleged any facts or evidence to show which impermissible characteristic the State relied on for the selective enforcement claim, nor have they met the burden of a "scrupulous" showing of malice or bad faith. See, e.g. Providence Teachers' Union Local 958, AFL-CIO, AFT v. City Council of City of Providence, 888 A.2d 948, 954 (R.I. 2005) ("'where no invidious discrimination or interference with the exercise of other express constitutional rights has occurred, the malice/bad faith standard should be scrupulously met'") (internal quotation omitted). Even though Defendants have shown some evidence of differential treatment afforded to similarly situated entities, (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 15 n.7), failure to satisfy the second element "render[s] discussion of the first unnecessary." Providence Teachers' Union Local 958, AFL-CIO, AFT, 888 A.2d at 954 (internal citations omitted).
iv
Defamation
Next, the Court addresses Defendants' tort claims. The State alleges that "the State is also absolutely immune from Defendants' Press Release counterclaims based on government executive and fair report privileges," and, in any event, Defendants "have not identified any statement that they claim is actually false nor have they identified any evidence to support that assertion." (State's Mot. for Summ. J. 4.) In response, Defendants assert that multiple statements included in the Press Release "are all denied as false by the Defendants." (Defs.' Obj. 11.) Further, Defendants allege that the photos included in the Release "were misleading to the point of constituting false statements . . ." Id. at 12.
The elements of an action for defamation are "'(1) the utterance of a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and (4) damages.'" Shannahan v. Moreau, 202 A.3d 217, 231 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Cullen v. Auclair, 809 A.2d 1107, 1110 (R.I. 2002)). Whether a statement is "'defamatory is a question of law for the court to decide rather than a factual issue for a jury to determine."' Id. (internal quotation omitted). Further, at the summary judgment stage, "'[i]t is clearly the obligation of the party opposing the motion to direct the motion justice's attention to the specific portions of the discovery materials upon which such party relies,"' id. at 232 (quoting Nedder v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 459 A.2d 960, 962 (R.I. 1983), and the party cannot "rely 'on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Morales, 895 A.2d at 727 (internal quotation omitted).
Here, Defendants have not presented specific evidence showing that the challenged statements in the press release are false or defamatory; rather, Defendants rely on mere denials in the pleadings, see Defs.' Obj. 11, and legal conclusions, see Defs.' Countercl. ¶ 6 ("[s]aid press release constitutes defamation"). This showing falls short of what is required of the party opposing summary judgment. Defendants have not presented specific evidence showing that the statements are false, which is a necessary element of the claim for defamation. Because Defendants have not met their burden, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to material fact and grants the State's Motion for Summary Judgment.
v
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
Anurag Sureka brings the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the State alone; accordingly, references to "Defendant" in section "v" will be singular as they do not refer to Pioneer Investments, L.L.C.
To make out a prima facie showing of IIED, a plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct meets four elements: "'(1) the conduct must be intentional or in reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress in question must be severe."' Shannahan, 202 A.3d at 230 (quoting Gross v. Pare, 185 A.3d 1242, 1245-46 (R.I. 2018)). Further, in Rhode Island, our courts have "'required at least some proof of medically established physical symptomatology for both intentional and negligent infliction of mental distress.'" Id. (quoting Gross, 185 A.3d at 1246). Here, Defendant has not proffered any competent medical testimony showing that Mr. Sureka has suffered physical symptoms from the alleged emotional distress. Although this Court is satisfied that summary judgment in favor of the State is appropriate because Defendant has failed to "put forth any evidence of physical symptomatology" caused by the State's statements, the Court will briefly address the content of the challenged statements. See Shannahan, 202 A.3d at 230 (affirming summary judgment on IIED claim where the plaintiffs failed to show evidence of physical symptomatology).
The Restatement (Second) Torts, as adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, is instructive on the standard for "extreme and outrageous." Gross, 185 A.3d at 1246. Section 46, of the Restatement (Second) Torts provides:
"It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 'malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 46 cmt.d (1965)).
Here, Defendant asserts that it is "extreme and outrageous" for the Rhode Island Attorney General to state that Defendant routinely ignores lead safety laws, is placing "profits" "over basic human dignity," and has caused at least five children to be lead-poisoned. (Defs.' Obj. 10-11.) Even if Defendant disagrees with these characterizations, or finds such accusations distressing, the statements fall short of what is necessary to amount to "extreme and outrageous." See, e.g. Shannahan, 202 A.3d at 230 (where the Court found that taking the chief of the Central Falls Police Department's city-issued car and replacing it with "a rusted old car" and ordering "a raid" on a public library without a valid basis did not rise to the level of IIED); Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 863 (R.I. 1998) (where "repeatedly photographing and maintaining a log of what appeared to [defendant] to be ongoing business activities occurring outside of [the] plaintiff's home" was not extreme and outrageous); Jalowy v. Friendly Home, Inc., 818 A.2d 698, 707 (R.I. 2003) (where not allowing a son to visit his mother in a nursing home for six weeks may have been "stress-inducing," "unnecessary," and "heavy-handed," it did not rise to the level required for IIED).
Despite Defendant's assertion to the contrary, see Defs.' Obj. Ex. A, at 11 ("the issue as to whether or not the Press Release was extreme or outrageous requires a factual determination"), in Rhode Island, "[w]hether conduct 'may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery' for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a matter of law to be decided by a court[.]" Jalowy, 818 A.2d at 707 (internal quotation omitted). Given that Defendant has not shown that the statements made are so extreme and outrageous that they must be considered intolerable in a civilized community and has not shown that Defendant Sureka suffered any documented medical symptoms because of the statements, the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V is granted.
C
Defendants' Motion for Sanctions
In addition to the Motions for Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is before the Court. Defendants moved for sanctions under Rule 11 on August 19, 2024, alleging that the State's July 10, 2024 motion was frivolous. (Defs.' Mot. Sanctions 1.) The State filed the disputed July 10, 2024 motion as a "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims," and at the August 30, 2024 hearing, the Court proceeded with the Motion for Summary Judgment alone. (Hr'g Tr. 3:18-21, Aug. 30, 2024.)
Defendants argue that the State's motion was not actually a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, but instead "a motion for reconsideration, without them saying it." Id. at 13:10-11. Defendants further argue that "after the motion to dismiss the counterclaims was denied, the [State] simply refiled the same motion - just with a different name." (Defs.' Mot. Sanctions 2.) Such an action, Defendants aver, "constitutes a frivolous filing which warrants sanctions by this Court." Id. at 2-3. The State opposes the Motion for Sanctions, arguing that its legal position is well-grounded and that the July 10, 2024 motion simply presents "a second legal basis for ruling in its favor." (State's Obj. to Defs.' Mot. Sanctions 2-3.)
"Rule 11 'provides trial courts with broad authority to impose sanctions against attorneys for advancing claims without proper foundation. . . .'" Huntley v. State, 109 A.3d 869, 873 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Michalopoulos v. C & D Restaurant Inc., 847 A.2d 294, 300 (R.I. 2004)). "In fashioning an appropriate sanction, a trial justice 'must do so in accordance with the articulated purpose of the rule: to deter repetition of the harm, and to remedy the harm caused.'" Id. (quoting Pleasant Management LLC v. Carrasco, 918 A.2d 213, 217 (R.I. 2007)).
Here, Defendants argue-without evidence-that "[i]t seems more likely that [the State's] motion was brought for an improper purpose, such as harassment or to increase the litigation costs to the Defendants," and "[t]his Court should not have to expend any of its resources in reviewing and ruling upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings when it already ruled upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." (Defs.' Mot. for Sanctions 2-3.) However, Defendants' argument ignores the fact that the State's motion likewise sought summary judgment.
In Rhode Island, courts employ a notice-pleading standard when reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under a motion to dismiss. See Rhode Island Mobile Sportfishermen, Inc. v. Nope's Island Conservation Association, Inc., 59 A.3d 112, 119 (R.I. 2013). The complaint, or-as is the case here-the counterclaim, "'need not include the ultimate facts that must be proven in order to succeed on the complaint . . . [or] to set out the precise legal theory upon which his or her claim is based.'" Id. (quoting Gardner v. Baird, 871 A.2d 949, 953 (R.I. 2005)). However, at the summary judgment stage, the Court looks beyond the pleadings to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact-not merely whether the defending party is on notice of the action. See Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 391 (R.I. 2008). Therefore, a court may find that a complaint puts the opposing party on notice of the type of action at the motion to dismiss stage, but nonetheless is legally and factually deficient at the summary judgment stage.
Given the different types of inquiries, it cannot be said that the State's July 10, 2024 motion is an unwarranted waste of judicial resources. In any event, Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted when a trial justice simply "disagree[s] with" a party's legal position. Burns v. Moorland Farm Condominium Association, 86 A.3d 354, 361 (R.I. 2014). This is true "even if the information contained in the report did not pass muster as newly discovered evidence" but nonetheless has a "factual foundation." Id.; see also Paolino v. Ferreira, 153 A.3d 505, 529 (R.I. 2017) (holding that when reasonable minds can disagree, a party's interpretation that is "within the bounds of reasonableness" cannot be grounds for sanctions). For these reasons, Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is denied.
IV
Conclusion
For these reasons, (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the State's Counts III, VII, and VIII is GRANTED; (2) the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims Counts I, II, III, IV, and V is GRANTED; and (3) Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. Counsel shall submit the appropriate order for entry.