Opinion
No. E2002-01307-CCA-R3-CD.
September 17, 2003.
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Anderson County; No. AOCR0373; James B. Scott, Judge.
Reversed.
Nancy C. Meyer, Assistant Public Defender, Clinton, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Payne, Jr.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kathy D. Aslinger, Assistant Attorney General; James N. Ramsey, District Attorney General; and Janice G. Hicks, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Robert W. Wedemeyer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which James Curwood Witt, Jr., J., joined. John Everett Williams, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charges of second degree murder and aggravated arson, reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years of incarceration on both counts and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. In this appeal, the Defendant presents the following reserved question of law: "Was [the] Defendant in custody when he gave an incriminating statement such that said statement should be suppressed for violation of [the] Defendant's constitutional rights under [the] Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?" We hold that the Defendant was in custody at the time he made the statements and, thus, that he was entitled to Miranda warnings. As such, the incriminating statements that he made prior to receiving Miranda warnings must be suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant's conviction.
I. FACTS A. Facts Underlying the Indicted Crimes
Although the certified question of law that we are called upon to review involves a careful review of the facts surrounding the Defendant's interview by police officers following the crimes in this case, we believe that a short summary of the facts surrounding the crimes is helpful to understand the Defendant's subsequent interview. At the Defendant's plea agreement proceeding, the State summarized the facts underlying the Defendant's conviction. We note that the Defendant did not agree with the State's recitation of the facts at the proceeding. However, because the State's recitation of the facts concerning the charges in this case comprises the only facts in the record directly pertaining to the indicted crimes, we include these facts solely to facilitate our analysis of this case. The facts underlying the Defendant's convictions, as summarized by the State at the plea agreement proceeding, are as follows:
The defendant was living with his mother in Oak Ridge in Anderson County in an apartment complex. And she had had many health problems and in fact sometimes used a walker and was not very mobile. On this particular date in the indictment she called him at [the Defendant's] work to come home and take care of her. People who work with him would say that that was not unusual for her to do that. He was the caretaker there and . . . what follows is based on his statement although we have workers at his work who will testify that he did leave work. Based on his statement, he stated that he then went home to take care of his mother; she needed to be cleaned up. He basically lost it; he was somewhat aggravated with her at the time and he began holding her by the neck and her throat and was enraged and upset with her at the time. The autopsy shows that she died as a result of manual strangulation. There was a broken hiatal bone in her throat and the fire did not kill her. [The Defendant] did say that after she was not moving anymore[,] . . . he panicked . . . and he set fire to her bed. This was in an apartment complex; the fire did cause damage to their apartment; however, the other people in the other apartments got out and it did not cause damage to the other people's apartments.
Following this recitation of the facts, the State noted: "What the [S]tate could prove was opportunity and some degree of motive without [the Defendant's] statement [to police], but without his statement . . . [the State] would not have a prima facie case."
B. The Defendant's Interview with Police
On August 30, 2000, the Defendant was asked to come to the Oak Ridge Police Department to discuss the investigation of his mother's death and the fire at the apartment that he shared with her. According to the record, the fire and the death of the Defendant's mother occurred on August 29, 2000. Upon his arrival at approximately 7:00 p.m., the Defendant was escorted by Officers Uher and Boucher into the standard interview room. At some point prior to the interview, a concealed video-camera was activated for the purpose of recording the entire interview. We derive the following recitation of facts from our de novo review of the videotape of the interrogation included in the record: The interview room was comprised of a small table with two chairs and a third chair set away from the table. It does not appear from the videotape of the interview that the room had any windows. Additionally, the door is not visible on the videotape, but it is apparent from the entering and exiting of the officers where the door is located. The Defendant was not handcuffed, frisked, or physically touched in any way. The Defendant was placed in the corner of the room between a table and a wall, with his back to the wall, and the two officers sat closer to the door, but not entirely between the Defendant and the exit. The officers initially told the Defendant that he was free to leave at any time, that he did not have to talk to them if he did not wish to, and that they appreciated his speaking to them. The Defendant was not informed that the interview was being tape-recorded.
The interview began with general background questions from Officer Uher, which the Defendant answered. The Defendant informed the officers of his mother's bed-ridden condition and of his responsibilities in providing for her care. Approximately nineteen minutes into the interview, the Defendant asked if he did "something wrong," to which Officer Uher replied, "I didn't say you did anything wrong." The Defendant then asked, "What's the need for this?" Upon further questioning, the Defendant became visibly agitated, and the officers departed the room.
Upon the officers' return, Officer Uher informed the Defendant that he believed something other than a fire had occurred and that the Defendant knew more about what happened than he had told them. After more discussion, the Defendant admitted that he and his mother had been in an argument on the day of her death. He explained that he occasionally had difficulties with his mother. The Defendant further explained that he was often required to clean his mother and then demonstrated to the officers how he handled her when required to clean her. When asked by the officer if he had touched his mother's neck, the Defendant asserted that he did not touch his mother's neck. The officer continued to refer to the death as an "accident," but later told the Defendant that he could not describe the death as an accident in his police report.
Approximately an hour into the interview, the officer raised his voice and told the Defendant to tell him "everything" because "[the Defendant wouldn't] like what it looks like." The officer implored the Defendant to "tell [him] what happened so it doesn't look like [the Defendant] intentionally killed [his] mother." The Defendant then placed his head in his hands, paused, and admitted setting the fire in the house. He next inquired what would happen to him, to which the officers responded that they would continue to converse with the Defendant after a break.
In the officers' absence, the Defendant paced the room. While the door is not visible on the videotape, it appears from the sounds made that the Defendant may have tried unsuccessfully to open it on three occasions. A few minutes after the Defendant's last attempt to apparently open the door, the officers knocked on the door and entered, commenting that the door needed to be "shaved" again. The questioning began again with a statement from the officer that he knew the Defendant's mother was dead when the Defendant left the residence that night and that the Defendant had set the fire. The Defendant replied that he had just tried to clean his mother. He then stated, "I want to talk to my sister, this is ridiculous." In response, the officer hit his hand against the table and loudly stated, "This isn't ridiculous. Now listen to me." Officer Uher then accused the Defendant of putting his hand around his mother's neck, "baiting" the Defendant by falsely stating the Defendant's fingerprints had been found around his mother's neck. The officer yelled, "You squeezed her neck. . . . I'll know if you're lying. . . . You got frustrated and you put your hand around your mom's neck. . . . Yes you did." The officer commented that he did not think the Defendant was a "mean person" and then asked him what caused him to choke his mother. The Defendant demonstrated how he choked his mother using the officer's hand. He then placed his head on the table and stated, "I want to die."
At this point, the Defendant asked what would happen to him, to which Officer Uher responded that the Defendant would probably go to jail. The officer then told the Defendant that he was "in custody" and that he was no longer free to leave. The Defendant stated that he desired to call his sister and that he knew his rights. In response to this, Officer Uher retrieved his Miranda card and read the Defendant each of the required rights.
II. ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, we must take note that this appeal comes to us as a certified question of law as set forth in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b). Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that:
An appeal lies from any order or judgment in a criminal proceeding where the law provides for such appeal, and from any judgment of conviction . . . [u]pon a plea of guilty . . . if [the] [d]efendant entered into a plea agreement under Rule 11(e) but explicitly reserved with the consent of the state and of the court the right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case. . . .
Tenn. R.Crim.P. 37(b)(2)(i). We have stated that a dispositive issue is one where the appellate court "must either affirm the judgment or reverse and dismiss. A question is never dispositive when [the appellate court] might reverse and remand for trial. . . ." State v. Wilkes, 684 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1984).
The certified question of law, as stated in the judgment of the lower court, is: "Was Defendant in custody when he gave an incriminating statement such that said statement should be suppressed for violation of Defendant's constitutional rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments?" The State conceded at the pretrial hearing on the Motion to Suppress that the only evidence against the Defendant is the oral confession given on the videotape. Therefore, should we hold that the oral statement must be suppressed, the State cannot provide any evidence as to the guilt of the Defendant. Based upon these statements by the State, we find that the certified issue is dispositive.
The Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his oral statements recorded on videotape because Miranda warnings were not given prior to his questioning. The standard of review for a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in a suppression hearing was established in State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). This standard mandates that "a trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise." Id. at 23. The prevailing party in the trial court is "entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." Id. Furthermore, "[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." Id. The rationale behind this deference to the trial court's findings of fact lies in the trial court's unique position to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses in determining the witness' credibility. See State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000). However, "`when a trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility,'" State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 217), such as the videotape in the instant case, "`appellate courts are just as capable to review the evidence and draw their own conclusions.' In such an instance, the standard of review is de novo without a presumption of correctness." Id. (citation omitted).
Implicated in the case at bar is the issue of the constitutional protection against self-incrimination that "is protected by both the federal and the state constitutions." State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tenn. 2000). The Self — Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. Additionally, Article I, section 9, of our state constitution guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9.
In protecting an individual's right against self-incrimination in the criminal process, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). As a part of these safeguards, the Court established four "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id. at 442. The guidelines require that police inform a person interrogated while in custody (1) that they have the right to remain silent, (2) that anything they say may be used against them in a court of law, (3) that they have the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning and (4) that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them prior to questioning if they so desire. See id. at 444. These warnings, commonly referred to as Miranda warnings, are not required every time the police have contact with citizens. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tenn. 2001). Instead, because "[t]he underpinnings of Miranda are to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogations, to prevent coerced self-incrimination, and to prevent relevant defendant ignorance," State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tenn. 1998), the warnings are only necessary when the defendant is subjected to questioning while in custody or its functional equivalent.Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980); Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 82. However, where these underlying concerns are implicated, the Miranda requirements "must be strictly enforced." State v. Goss, 995 S.W.2d 617, 628 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1998) (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990)).
The State contends in the case at hand that the Defendant was not in custody at the time he gave incriminating statements and, thus, that the police were not required to give the Miranda warnings. The Court inMiranda explained that an individual is in custody when placed under formal arrest or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Our supreme court has expanded upon this definition by stating that, in determining whether an individual is in custody, "the relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would consider himself or herself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest." State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tenn. 1996).
The reasonable person test is particularly important because "`it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question.'" Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 n. 35 (1984) (quoting People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (N.Y. 1967)); Anderson, 937 S.W.2d at 854. Instead, in determining if the person was in custody, a court is to consider a non-exclusive list of factors that includes:
[1] the time and location of the interrogation; [2] the duration and character of the questioning; [3] the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; [4] the suspect's method of transportation to the place of questioning; [5] the number of police officers present; [6] any limitation on movement or other form of restraint imposed on the suspect during interrogation; [7] any interactions between the officer and the suspect, including the words spoken by the officer to the suspect, and the suspect's verbal or nonverbal responses; [8] the extent to which the suspect is confronted with the law enforcement officer's suspicions of guilt or evidence of guilt; and finally, [9] the extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will.
Anderson, 937 S.W.2d at 855. It is important to remember that the interrogating officer's suspicions of the guilt or innocence of the person are not relevant to the inquiry unless the officer's views or beliefs are conveyed to the individual under interrogation and would somehow affect how a reasonable person would perceive his or her freedom to leave. Id. at 854. This entire determination is a "very fact specific inquiry." Id. at 855.
When considering the totality of the circumstances, the evidence in this record preponderates against the trial court's finding that the Defendant was not in custody at the time he made incriminating statements to the police officers. The State points to State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. 2001), as factually analogous to the instant case. In Munn, the defendant voluntarily went to the police department at 5:00 p.m., accompanied by his parents and sister, to clear up discrepancies the officers found in his statement. Id. at 499. In the absence of either of his parents, the defendant was questioned "vigorously" and even accused of not telling the truth or at least the whole truth. Id. Additionally, the officers told the defendant's mother in his presence that they knew the defendant had killed his roommate. Id. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged that the evidence created a close question as to the issue of whether the defendant was in custody, but, nonetheless, concluded that the defendant was not in custody at the time he was interviewed by the officers. Id. In concluding that the defendant was not in custody, the court explained that the officers' demeanor was always polite and courteous and that "[t]he defendant was reminded throughout the interview that he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time." Id. At one point, the defendant even responded to a question from his parents by stating that the police were not intimidating him but, rather, were "being nice." Id. at 490. At the end of the interview, the defendant stated he thought he could go home, but was advised by the officers that he would be arrested that night. Id. at 499.
We agree with the State's assertion that many of the facts of Munn are similar to those of the present case. The Defendant in the instant case drove himself to the police department for questioning at the not unreasonable hour of 7:00 p.m. Like the defendant in Munn, he was not restrained, frisked, or touched in any way prior to the interview. Likewise, the officers informed the Defendant at the beginning of the interview that he was not required to be there and that he was not required to talk to police. Finally, the officers questioning the Defendant accused him of not telling the truth or at least the whole truth. We conclude, however, that the similarities end here.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, we have determined that the facts of the case at bar push it beyond the factual line seen inMunn to establish that the Defendant was in custody at the time he made incriminating statements. The Defendant went to the police station unaccompanied, thus lacking the moral support that the defendant in Munn had from his parents who were present at the police station. He was taken to a windowless room, where the door was shut, and two officers questioned him about the death of his mother; thus, he was possibly more subject to coercion than the defendant in Munn, who had killed a roommate and was questioned in a room with a window. Id. at 488-89. The officer stated at the beginning of the interview that the Defendant was not required to be there and was not required to talk to the police, but he did not remind the Defendant of this at any other point. This fact is particularly important because the first hour of the interview was investigatory in nature. The Officer used a calm tone of voice and maintained a respectful demeanor toward the Defendant. It was not until an hour into the questioning that the character of the questioning sharply changed to an accusatory nature. While the officer continually referred to the crime as an "accident," he at one point demanded, "Talk to me now! Tell me everything or I'll tell you what it looks like, and you won't like what it looks like!" In response to this, the Defendant looked down, paused, and then admitted to lighting the fire, but did not admit he had committed the murder.
Rather than providing the Defendant with his rights, the officers departed the room and shut the door behind them. The videotape in the record is not entirely conclusive on the matter, but it appears that the Defendant attempted to open the door, only to find it locked or stuck. The Defendant approached the location of the door, lowered his arm, and pulled on something, at which point noises consistent with one pulling on a locked door are heard. This occurred on three occasions while the officers were gone. Upon the officers' return, they made the comment that the door needed to be "shaved." Again the questioning continued with an officer, at one point, slamming his hand against the table and demanding, "This is ridiculous. . . . I told you. . . . there would be no more nos." The officer then loudly asked if the Defendant grabbed his mother by the neck. He yelled, "You squeezed her neck. . . . I'll know if you're lying. . . . You got frustrated and you put your hand around your mom's neck. . . . Yes you did!" It is shortly after this point that the Defendant stated he was sorry and confessed to killing his mother. Within minutes, the officer read the Defendant his rights and stated that the Defendant would be arrested that night.
While both the State and the trial court take particular notice of the Defendant's failure to state that he would like to leave or that he did not wish to answer further questions, this constitutes only a portion of the totality of the circumstances determination regarding whether an individual is in custody when interrogated. It is difficult for our Court to assume that, where the Defendant has not been advised of hisMiranda rights, including the right to remain silent, he knows of these rights and, thus, that he may effectively assert those rights.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, as contained on the videotape in the record, we find that the evidence in the record preponderates against the lower court's finding that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made incriminating statements. Because we find that the Defendant was in custody, the failure by the police to provide the Defendant his Miranda rights requires that the confession be suppressed. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Accordingly, the judgement of the trial court is REVERSED, and the case is DISMISSED.
After careful consideration of the record in this cause, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The first point of divergence is the issue that the certified question sub judice is dispositive. Our supreme court noted in State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988) "Most reported and unreported cases seeking the limited appellate review pursuant to Tenn. R.Crim.P. 37 have been dismissed because the certified question was not dispositive." The majority accepts the assertion of the district attorney general, the trial court, and defense counsel as relates to the dispositive nature of the defendant's confession. I feel less constrained to accept the assertions that the issue is dispositive.
It is the obligation of an appellate court to independently determine the dispositive nature of the question reserved. See State v. Oliver, 30 S.W.3d 363, 364 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2000). Undoubtedly, the admissibility of the defendant's confession induced the guilty plea. Likewise, it would have greatly aided the State in reaching its burden of proof had it been necessary to prosecute at trial. By the State's own admission, it could, in the absence of the confession, prove opportunity and a degree of motive. The murder victim, the defendant's mother, lived with the defendant. She was quite ill and required much attention. The defendant was the primary caretaker of the victim and the last person to see her alive. The record also states that the defendant's co-workers would confirm the defendant's absence from work at a propitious time relative to the victim's death. Although the record is scant on forensics results, it is evident that the State can establish death of the victim by strangulation prior to the apartment being set on fire. It is unfathomable that even a cursory fire and criminal investigation would not yield any other evidentiary items to aide the prosecution in proving murder and arson.
I have concluded that the admissibility of the defendant's confession is not dispositive of this case and would deny appellate review and dismiss this appeal.
Had I concluded, as did the majority, that the admissibility of the defendant's confession was dispositive, I would also dissent from the majority's conclusion that the entire statement should be suppressed. My dissent is based not on any disagreement with the standard of review or the applicable authorities capably set forth in the majority opinion. It is in the application of these authorities to the instant facts that compels me to reach a different conclusion.
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), established certain procedural safeguards for protecting the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. These warning requirements are necessary only when the defendant is in custody and is subjected to questioning or its functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tenn. 2001).
We are instructed in State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996), that the test for determining custodial interrogation "is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would consider himself or herself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest."Anderson also provides guidance for application of this test by the use of certain non-exclusive factors which are enumerated in the majority opinion.
As stated in Anderson, application of the totality of circumstances test is a "very fact specific inquiry." Id. at 855. Thus, reasonable minds may differ as we apply the law and facts.
The videotape contained in the record covers the entire interrogation and gives us as a reviewing court an equal opportunity with the trial judge to observe the participant's demeanor, behavior, and to glean nuances as made available by the camera. In such cases, we, as the reviewing court, are as capable of observing the evidence and reaching our own conclusions by a de novo standard of review without a presumption of correctness. See State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tenn. 2001).
My review of the video interrogation of the defendant leads me to dissent from the majority's view that the entire statement should be suppressed for failure to administer Miranda warnings. I reach the conclusion on a differing opinion as to when a "reasonable person" would assume he was in custody. That is, by application of the standard enunciated in Anderson supra.
I make no quarrel with the facts, as the video of the interrogation speaks for itself. I do, however, interpret the application of the "reasonable person" test differently enough to reach a contrary conclusion from the majority. The site of the interrogation was a small, bare-walled, windowless room that was accessed by a single door just off camera view. The table, the two officers, and the defendant in their respective chairs left little open space in this confined area. The defendant was told at the outset that he was not required to be there or to talk with the officers. This was not repeated during the remainder of the lengthy interrogating process. The defendant appeared talkative, at times boastful, and willing to give details to the officers. At times during the interview, the defendant asked questions of the officers such as: How did mama die? What caused the fire? Will the life insurance policy pay? After approximately one hour, the questioning did turn accusatorial and demanding in nature. In response to the officer's demands to talk, the defendant admitted setting his mother's blanket on fire with a match. The defendant became emotional and asked of the officers, what was going to happen to him.
At this juncture, the two officers left the room, leaving the defendant alone in the closed room.
From the audio and visual portrayal, it appears that the defendant went to the door on three occasions during this interval and made unsuccessful attempts to open the door. Eventually, the officers returned, and one stated that the door needed to be shaved, an implication that it was merely stuck.
Viewing the scene within the totality of circumstances, I am led to the conclusion that at this point, a reasonable person would feel deprived of their freedom and, thus, in custody. When the interrogation resumed again in a loud, intensive, accusatorial form, the defendant eventually confessed to killing the victim.
Therefore, I would admit that portion of the defendant's interview that preceded his apparent attempt to leave. The remainder I would suppress. The State would be left with a partial confession that would not include the defendant' admission of the killing but would include his admission of setting the blanket on fire, as well as other incriminating statements.