Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0388
10-02-2018
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. WILLIAM GLENN PARKS III, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel By Jana Zinman, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Appellee Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100CR201502827
The Honorable Boyd T. Johnson, Judge
AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Jana Zinman, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellee Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Eppich concurred. ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶1 After a jury trial, appellant William Parks III was convicted of assault, disorderly conduct, and witness tampering. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms on the disorderly conduct and tampering charges, the longer of which was two years. The court suspended the imposition of sentence on the assault charge, placing Parks on a two-year term of probation. Parks contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for disorderly conduct and witness tampering. Finding no error, we affirm his convictions and sentences as corrected.
The trial court's minute entry states that Parks was convicted of aggravated assault and terms the conviction a class three felony. As the court acknowledged at sentencing, Parks was convicted of misdemeanor assault. The minute entry is ordered corrected to reflect the misdemeanor assault conviction.
¶2 We review de novo whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, and will reverse only if there is no substantial evidence to support it. State v. Allen, 235 Ariz. 72, ¶ 6 (App. 2014). "Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290 (1996). And, "[i]n determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and we resolve all inferences against [the] defendant." Id.
¶3 On appeal Parks first argues the state failed to show he had intended to disturb the victim's peace because she had "initiated a confrontation with [him] and . . . was extremely drunk and disorderly" at the time of the offense. He contends "there was no peace to disturb." Our supreme court, however, overruled a decision in which such a standard was posited. In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JV133051, 184 Ariz. 473 (App. 1995), overruled by State v. Miranda, 200 Ariz. 67 (2001). In so doing it ruled: "[T]he statute defining disorderly conduct does not require that one actually disturb the peace of another through certain acts. Rather, the statute requires the commission of certain acts 'with intent to disturb the peace . . . or with knowledge of doing so.'" Miranda, 200 Ariz. 67, ¶ 5 (quoting A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)).
¶4 In this case, the evidence showed that Parks had thrown a bottle at the victim, which the victim testified had come "straight to [her] face." She put up her hands to protect her face and the bottle deflected off one of her wrists, hitting her car. The victim testified, "[I]t scared the hell out of me" and stated she thought the bottle would "smash" her face. Parks testified the victim had first thrown the bottle at him, and he had thrown it back at her, "trying to . . . scare her off, break the bottle somehow on the vehicle." Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, this evidence was sufficient to establish Parks intended to disturb the victim. See Spears, 184 Ariz. at 290.
¶5 Parks also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for witness tampering. He asserts the witness's testimony was not reliable. But "[e]vidence is not insubstantial merely because testimony is conflicting or reasonable persons may draw different conclusions from the evidence." State v. Sasak, 178 Ariz. 182, 186 (App. 1993). Parks's argument amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence; that we will not do. See State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552 (1981).
To establish the crime of witness tampering, the state must show the defendant "knowingly communicates, directly or indirectly, with a witness in any official proceeding or a person he believes may be called as a witness to," inter alia, "unlawfully withhold any testimony or "[t]estify falsely." A.R.S. § 13-2804(A)(1),(2). --------
¶6 Parks further contends the evidence of witness tampering was insufficient because a court found that he was still eligible for bond after a pretrial hearing pursuant to Simpson v. Owens, 207 Ariz. 261 (App. 2004), during which a lower standard of proof is required. But Parks has not established that the ruling was entitled to any res judicata effect, nor has he otherwise shown that it was relevant to any ruling outside of the matter in which it was conducted, particularly to the final conclusion that he was guilty of the offense. At trial the state presented evidence, inter alia, that Parks had approached the victim and said, "We need to talk about this, father to father," "[w]e need to change the statement [to the police]," and "I'm looking at a lot of trouble." Parks had also asked the victim "to say there was no gun" involved in the incident. Viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, there was sufficient evidence of Parks's guilt. See Spears, 184 Ariz. at 290.
¶7 Parks's convictions and sentences are affirmed as corrected.