Opinion
No. 35802-6-II.
October 23, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 04-1-01384-6, Lisa R. Worswick, J., entered December 14, 2006.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Hunt, J.
Byron James Parks appeals the trial court's denial of his CrR 7.8 motion, which the trial court determined was time barred under RCW 10.73.090. Parks argues that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for his conviction for unlawful possession of methamphetamine. Because Parks's sentence is facially invalid, the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.090(1) does not apply. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On August 23, 2004, the trial court sentenced Byron James Parks for one count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine. The statutory maximum sentence for a conviction of unlawful possession of methamphetamine is 60 months under RCW 69.50.4013(2) and RCW 9A.20.021(1)(c). The trial court imposed a sentence of 60 months confinement and a community custody term of 9-12 months. Parks's judgment and sentence shows a term of incarceration and community custody of 69-72 months. Parks did not file a direct appeal.
On October 12, 2006, Parks filed a motion to vacate his judgment and sentence under CrR 7.8(b)(4) and (5), arguing his total sentence, including the term of community custody, is unlawful because it potentially exceeds the five-year statutory maximum for the offense. Parks asked the trial court to resentence him consistent with RCW 9.94.A.505(5). The trial court denied Parks's motion because it was untimely under RCW 10.73.090(1) and failed to articulate an applicable exception to the one-year time bar.
Parks appeals.
ANALYSIS
We review a ruling on a CrR 7.8 motion for abuse of discretion. State v. Hardesty, 129 Wn.2d 303, 317, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996). A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises discretion in a manner that is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Neal, 144 Wn.2d 600, 609, 30 P.3d 1255 (2001). Under CrR 7.8(b)(4) and (5) a party can be relieved of a final judgment if the judgment is void, or for "[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Such motions must be made within a "reasonable time." CrR 7.8(b).
A post-judgment motion filed under CrR 7.8(b)(4) and (5) is a collateral attack. RCW 10.73.090(2). RCW 10.73.090(1) forbids collateral attacks more than one year after judgment, if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face. But the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.090(1) does not apply to a judgment and sentence that is "invalid on its face," meaning its invalidity requires no further elaboration. In re Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 866, 50 P.3d 618 (2002).
With certain exceptions that are not relevant here, a trial court may not impose a sentence providing for a term of confinement or community supervision, community placement, or community custody that exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime. RCW 9.94A.505(5). When the combined total of a defendant's community custody term and standard range sentence exceeded the statutory maximum term, Division Three of this court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v. Zavala-Reynoso, 127 Wn. App. 119, 124, 110 P.3d 827 (2005). In a similar situation, Division One of this court recommended that when a trial court imposes community custody that could exceed the statutory maximum sentence for an offense, the trial court should set forth the maximum sentence and state that the total of incarceration and community custody cannot exceed that maximum. State v. Sloan, 121 Wn. App. 220, 223-24, 87 P.3d 1214 (2004).
Here, Parks's total combined sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of 60 months. Without a notation on the judgment and sentence stating that the duration of confinement plus the term of community custody shall not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense, the judgment and sentence is facially invalid and not subject to the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.090(1). The trial court abused its discretion when it denied the CrR 7.8 motion and did not address the merits of Parks's complaint.
Parks is entitled to relief. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order that denied Parks's CrR 7.8 motion, and remand for correction of the judgment and sentence to set forth that the total period of confinement and community custody cannot exceed the maximum sentence allowed by law.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HUNT, J. and HOUGHTON, C.J., concur.