Opinion
A20-1332
07-01-2021
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Clayton Leroy Nukala, Jr., Appellant.
ORDER OPINION
St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI- CR-19-468 Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Clayton Nukala was convicted of being a prohibited person in possession of ammunition and received a downward dispositional departure consisting of a stayed 60-month prison sentence and five years of probation. The conditions of Nukala's probation included the following: (1) follow all institution or program rules; (2) remain law abiding; and (3) serve one year in jail or at the Northeast Regional Corrections Center (NERCC). A probation-violation report was later filed alleging that Nukala violated the terms of his probation. A contested probation-violation hearing was held at which the state presented evidence that, on November 18, 2019, Nukala entered a restroom at NERCC and destroyed a bathroom stall door and ripped off a toilet seat. The state also presented evidence that, on June 15, 2020, while he was an inmate at the county jail, Nukala attacked a corrections officer, knocking him to the ground. The district court then revoked Nukala's probation and executed his 60-month prison sentence. This appeal follows.
The state did not file a brief in this appeal, and this court ordered that the appeal proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
2. Nukala challenges the district court's order revoking his probation. "The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). A district court "abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
3. Before a district court revokes a defendant's probation, it must (1) "designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated"; (2) "find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable"; and (3) "find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation." Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. This court reviews de novo whether a district court made the required Austin findings. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
4. Nukala does not challenge the district court's findings with respect to the first two Austin factors; instead, he argues that the district court's findings with respect to the third Austin factor are insufficient because the "court did not make any substantive findings related to [Nukala] and his conduct that would support the court's conclusions that incarceration was necessary and that reinstating [Nukala] on probation would depreciate the seriousness of the violations." We disagree. The supreme court has stated that when addressing the third Austin factor, the district court "must balance the probationer's interest in freedom and the state's interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety." Id. at 606-07 (quotation omitted). The district court must bear in mind that "the purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed." Id. at 606 (quotation omitted). In deciding whether to revoke probation, a district court should determine whether "confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender," "the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined," or "it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked." Id. at 607 (quotation omitted).
5. Here, the district court made detailed findings addressing the seriousness of the violations, which included damaging property at NERCC and assaulting a corrections officer. The district court's findings indicate that, if Nukala cannot follow institutional rules, he cannot follow the rules of probation. And the district court specifically found that Nukala failed to receive mental-health treatment because he was placed into medium security as a result of his actions. The district court then found: "The public policy considerations of the State of Minnesota which favor probation are outweighed for a need for incarceration. In particular, [Nukala's] violations of probation were very serious and would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violations if probation was not revoked." The district court's findings squarely address the third Austin factor. The district court, therefore, made sufficient findings addressing the third Austin factor.
6. Nukala also contends that if this court determines that the district court's findings on the third Austin factor are sufficient, the revocation of his probation should be reversed because the "need for confinement did not outweigh the policies favoring probation." We disagree. A district court may revoke probation if the probationer violates any of the probation conditions. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a) (2020). But its decision must not be "a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations." Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted). Technical violations are "any violation of a court order of probation, except an allegation of a subsequent criminal act that is alleged in a formal complaint, citation, or petition." Minn. Stat. § 244.196, subd. 6 (2020).
7. Here, Nukala's probation violations were not technical violations. Instead, Nukala violated the terms of his probation by failing to remain law abiding. Specifically, the state presented evidence that Nukala assaulted a corrections officer and damaged NERCC property. And Nukala's actions resulted in formal charges; he was charged with fifth-degree assault for the assault of the corrections officer, and first-degree criminal damage to property, a felony, for damaging NERCC property. As the district court found, Nukala's violations were "serious," and demonstrate that he is unable to follow the rules of either the NERCC or the county jail.
8. Nukala argues that the district court's decision to revoke his probation was "a reflexive reaction to the violations," and that the district court failed to "balance the need for confinement with [his] interest in receiving mental health treatment in the community." Indeed, the record reflects that Nukala has mental-health needs for which he has yet to receive treatment. But as the district court found, the lack of treatment was the result of his placement into medium security due to his violation of institutional rules. The district court made detailed findings depicting the seriousness of Nukala's probation violations, and Nukala's violations demonstrate that he is unable to follow institutional rules. Nukala's inability to follow institutional rules directly contributed to his inability to receive mental-health treatment and demonstrate that the policy considerations favoring probation are outweighed by the need for incarceration. Accordingly, on this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Nukala's probation.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: July 1, 2021
BY THE COURT
/s/_________
Judge Francis J. Connolly