This Court has never extended the core Boykin constitutional requirements to include advice with respect to sentencing. State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 104 (La. 1984) (holding that the scope of Boykin has not been expanded to include advising the defendant of the possible consequences of his actions or that his conviction may be used as a basis for the filing of a future multiple offender bill). In fact, this Court has recently specifically held that such advice is not part of this Court's core Boykin constitutional requirements.

If the State produces anything less than a perfect transcript, such as a guilty plea form, minute entry, or imperfect transcript, the trial judge must weigh the evidence to determine whether the defendant's prior plea was both knowing and voluntary. Id. In State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93 (La.1984), the Louisiana Supreme Court made the broad assertion that a valid guilty plea under Boykin requires only that a defendant be informed of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to a trial by jury, and to confront his accusers. “Its scope has not been expanded to include advising the defendant of any other rights which he may have, nor of the possible consequences of his actions.”

The right of the police to conduct a personal effects inventory search at the time of an arrested person's booking is a recognized exception to the search warrant requirement. State v. Wilson, 467 So.2d 503, 517 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 911, 106 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed.2d 246 (1985); State v. Burns, 44,937, p. 12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/2/10), 32 So.3d 261, 270 (citing LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 228; United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974); Wilson, supra; State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93 (La. 1984)). However, the police may not seize any item that they choose.

Louisiana courts have expressly refused to expand the Boykin advisement to encompass all rights the defendant may be waiving or to include all possible consequences of a guilty plea. Id., quoting State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 104 (La. 1984) ( Boykin does not require "advising the defendant of any other rights [besides the fundamental triad] which he may have, nor of the possible consequences of his actions."). When a defendant is represented by counsel, the trial court accepting his guilty plea may presume that counsel has explained the nature of the charge in sufficient detail that the defendant has notice of what his plea asks him to admit.

For the acceptance of an earlier guilty plea as an enhancement predicate, our jurisprudence has not required that a defendant be informed of the future consequences of subsequent offenses. State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93 (La. 1984) (rendered subsequent to State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192 (La. 1981) upon which the majority heavily relies). Indeed, in State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987), this appellate court reversed the granting of a motion to quash founded upon the same premise as now embraced by the majority.

La. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 771 further provides that when a remark prohibited under Article 770 is made by someone other than a judge, district attorney or court official, the court must admonish the jury if either party requests it and, if the defendant so moves, it "may grant a mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the defendant a fair trial." At the time this case was tried, it was per se a substantial violation of a significant right to deny a defendant's motion for mistrial if properly grounded under Article 770. State v. Green, 315 So.2d 763 (La. 1975); see also State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 102 (La. 1984). However, while this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court handed down the opinion in State v. Johnson, 94-1379 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So.2d 94, in which the per se rule was rejected as inconsistently applied.

Again, the supreme court refused to require a trial judge to inform a defendant of the maximum possible sentence in order for his guilty plea to be constitutional. In State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93 (La. 1984), the supreme court dealt with an issue similar to the one before this court in that the defendant in Nuccio claimed the state improperly used an earlier guilty plea as a basis for multiple offender bill when defendant was not informed of the possibility that his guilty plea could later be used in a future multiple offender case. Although Nuccio specifically dealt with the fact that Boykin does not require a trial judge to inform a defendant that his guilty plea can be used as a basis for filing a multiple offender bill against him in the future, the court made the broad assertion that Boykin requires only that a defendant be informed of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to a trial by jury, and to confront his accusers.

The scope of Boykin has not been expanded to require the specific enumeration to defendant of rights other than the trilogy listed. In State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 104 (La. 1984), our supreme court stated: Boykin, furthermore, only requires that a defendant be informed of the three rights enumerated above.

Further, there is no evidence here that Officer Mercadel has made similar comments in previous cases or that his answers show a pattern of unresponsiveness or improper intent, which might elevate him to a higher standard. See State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 101 (La. 1984); State v. Schwartz, 354 So.2d 1332, 1333 n. 2 (La. 1978) [Court questioned wisdom of holding police officer to a lesser standard than a court official where the police officer has routinely gratuitously implicated defendant in other crimes]. Therefore, Article 771 is controlling here.

While the colloquy between the judge and defendant is the preferred method of proof of a free and voluntary waiver, the colloquy is not indispensible when the record contains some other affirmative showing of proper waiver. State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 104 (La. 1984). A trial judge has a duty to determine that the defendant is expressly and knowingly waiving his constitutional rights in entering his plea.