In determining these issues, we must examine the relevant statutes. See, e.g.,Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc. , 84 S.W.3d 212, 222–23 (Tex. 2002) ; State v. Novall, Inc. , 770 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied). Statutory construction presents a question of law we review de novo.
The jurisdiction of a competent court in Travis County is exclusive. State v. Novall, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 85 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1935, no writ). This is true for declaratory judgment actions testing a conservation law or Commission order. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bivins, 423 S.W.2d 340, 345-46 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1967, writ ref. n.r.e.). Moreover, when a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County acquires jurisdiction, it may do whatever is necessary for a final determination of the issues involved, 56 Tex. Jur. 3d Oil and Gas § 641 (2004); Humble Oil, 85 S.W.2d at 352-53, including ancillary relief by way of injunction.
Venue provisions in statutes providing for judicial review of the orders and decisions of administrative agencies have also been held to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., Carter, 660 S.W.2d at 869; State v. Novall, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex.App. — Austin 1989, writ denied) (construing Natural Resources Code § 85.241, which provides a cause of action for persons "affected by the conservation laws of this state or orders of the [Railroad Commission] relating to oil or gas" to be jurisdictional). Venue provisions in other statutory causes of action have been held not to be jurisdictional.
It has repeatedly been held that only the specified courts have jurisdiction and actions by other courts are void. See Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Terrell, 122 Tex. 257, 59 S.W.2d 364, 367-68 (1933); Texas Steel Co. v. Fort Worth D.C. Ry. Co., 120 Tex. 597, 40 S.W.2d 78, 82-3 (1931); State v. Novall, 770 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex.App. 1989, writ denied); Carter v. Dean, 660 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.App. 1983, no writ). The class relies on this court's decision in Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206 (Tex.App. 1990, writ denied), arguing that § 8.09(f) is merely a statute of limitations, and is not jurisdictional. Their reliance is misplaced. Whitson involved an appeal of a claim decision by a receiver for an insolvent insurance company. Under statute, that appeal had to be brought within three months in the court in which the receivership was pending.