Opinion
NO. 34,479
06-24-2015
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CODY NOON, Defendant-Appellant.
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Steven J. Forsberg, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
Karen L. Townsend, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender
Steven J. Forsberg, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GARCIA, Judge. {1} Defendant appeals from the district court's de novo denial of the motion to suppress, an issue reserved in the conditional no contest plea entered into in magistrate court. Unpersuaded that Defendant demonstrated that the district court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress, we issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. Defendant has responded to our notice with a memorandum in opposition. We have considered Defendant's response and remain unpersuaded that Defendant has demonstrated error. We affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and its order remanding to the magistrate court for imposition of that court's sentence. {2} On appeal, Defendant raises two arguments: (1) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop into a DWI investigation; and (2) the officer lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant for DWI and subsequently administer chemical testing. [DS 3; RP 99; MIO 1-2] To avoid the duplication of efforts, we do not restate our recitation of the evidence or our entire proposed analysis in this opinion. Instead, we mostly limit this opinion to Defendant's arguments in response to our notice. {3} In Defendant's response to our notice, he does not object to any of the facts upon which our notice relied. [MIO 1] Defendant also does not oppose the manner in which we applied the law to the facts as to either issue. [DS 1-2] Rather, Defendant contends that we should re-examine the amount and type of evidence required to establish reasonable suspicion of DWI, because he maintains that any consumption of alcohol prior to driving may provide reasonable suspicion; and New Mexico law does not prohibit driving after consuming alcohol. [MIO 1] Defendant's response also recognizes, however, that our notice relied almost entirely on New Mexico Supreme Court precedent regarding reasonable suspicion of DWI, by which we are bound. [MIO 1] See, e.g., Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 8-10, 12, 14-15, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (holding that the New Mexico Court of Appeals is bound by New Mexico Supreme Court precedent and may not overrule or deviate from the Supreme Court's precedent). {4} To the extent that Defendant asks us reconsider the amount of evidence that our case law has required to establish probable cause for a DWI arrest, we decline. [MIO 2] We will not, and cannot, reconsider this entire body of case law. {5} For the reasons stated in our notice and in this opinion, we affirm the district court's order denying suppression of the evidence.
{6} IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ _________
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
WE CONCUR:
/s/ _________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
/s/ _________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge