Opinion
HHBCR140276041
03-03-2017
State of Connecticut v. Michael Niedzwiecki
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ORAL STATEMENT
Maureen M. Keegan, J.
The defendant seeks to suppress his oral statement to New Britain police officer Yolanda Martinez on the specific ground that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After an evidentiary hearing and argument by the parties, the court finds that the state has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's waiver of rights was made knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily.
The state conceded that at the time of the statement, the defendant was in custody and subject to interrogation.
The court finds credible the following evidence presented at the hearing. New Britain police officer Yolanda Martinez worked the third-shift patrol duty on December 17, 2014. She was in full uniform, and identifiable as a police officer by the patches and badge located on her uniform. In the early morning hours, she followed an ambulance to the Hospital of Central Connecticut (hereinafter, " HoCC"). The ambulance transported a woman who had reported a sexual assault. Martinez stayed with the complainant while evidence was collected. While at HoCC, Martinez learned that the suspect, identified in court as the defendant, had been brought into the emergency department of HoCC. Martinez informed hospital staff to keep the defendant and the complainant apart.
A short time before 5:31 a.m., Martinez approached the defendant who was being held on a stretcher in a " quiet room." Martinez advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, asked him if he would waive those rights and when he indicated he would talk to her, she had him execute a waiver of rights form. Martinez testified that she had a rights card and waiver of rights form with her, as it was her standard practice to carry those items. The form, entered into evidence as an exhibit, indicates the time as 5:31; the uncontroverted testimony established that it was in the morning hours. The form is signed by the defendant, and contains his initials in the section containing the rights that are being waived. The defendant's initials also appear in the section labelled " I can understand English" but not in the sections labelled " I can read" and " I can write." Martinez could not recall why those sections were not initialed but credibly testified that she always ascertains this information before seeking a waiver of rights. The form is signed by Martinez and witnessed by Officer Mark Fitzgerald. Martinez testified that the defendant responded appropriately to her questions regarding his understanding of his rights and his waiver, and he never indicated that he did not understand her. Martinez testified that they spoke in English and that their interaction lasted only a very short time.
Martinez asked the defendant if he would tell her what happened. The defendant responded by asking " Am I going to jail for rape?" Martinez again asked " what happened" whereupon the defendant replied in a narrative form. The defendant stated to Martinez " You know what happened. I lost everything. I'll tell the truth." He then admitted that he had sexual relations with the complainant while she was asleep. He also admitted to his drug use that evening, that he told his cousin (who was the boyfriend of the complainant) what he had done to her, said he deserved the beating his cousin gave him and that he did not want to press charges for that assault. Martinez testified that the narrative by the defendant lasted approximately one minute.
Martinez then stepped out of the quiet room when a nurse entered to administer medications to the defendant. While she did not know what the medications were, the hospital records entered into evidence established that the defendant was given 2 mg. of Ativan and 5 mg. of Haldol intramuscularly. Martinez reentered the room after the defendant received his injection. The defendant asked Martinez about jail, because " he didn't want to be behind bars." The defendant complained about pain to his arm in the injection site, began to slur his words and fell asleep. Martinez then left the room.
The defendant presented evidence in support of his claim that his waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination was involuntary due to his mental status at the time of his admission to HoCC. The defendant argues that he was in the midst of a psychiatric episode and therefore could not knowingly and intentionally waive his rights.
Officer Mark Fitzgerald credibly testified to the following facts. At approximately 3:30 a.m. on December 17, 2014, he was on patrol in the city of New Britain when he received a dispatch to proceed to Sacred Heart cemetery on the report of a man threatening to kill himself. Fitzgerald and another office used flashlights to look around the cemetery property. When he heard a male yelling " you are looking in the wrong direction" and " you are searching the wrong area" they located the defendant, who was standing at a grave. Pills were scattered on the ground and open pill bottles were seen on the headstone. The officers had information that the defendant was possibly armed with a knife so they instructed the defendant to get on the ground. Fitzgerald testified that the defendant did not want to get on the ground and instead offered to put his hands behind his back in order to be handcuffed. The officers approached the defendant, who now put his hands in front of his body, near a pocket in his sweatshirt. A struggle ensued and the defendant was put to the ground.
Fitzgerald requested a police emergency examination request, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-503. That statute provides in pertinent part that " any police officer who has reasonable cause to believe that a person has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to himself . . . or others or gravely disabled, and in need of immediate care and treatment, may take such person into custody and take or cause such person to be taken to a general hospital for emergency examination under this section." Fitzgerald did not see the defendant consume any pills, but he did observe the defendant in an irritated state, being combative with officers and rambling in what appeared to be a different language. Based upon his observations, and the initial call regarding suicidal threats, Fitzgerald requested the emergency examination.
Fitzgerald remained at the hospital for several hours, and was a witness to the defendant's execution of the waiver of rights form by Martinez.
The defendant also presented the testimony of Dr. Andrew Meisler, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Meisler reviewed the records of the defendant from the admission to HoCC on December 17, 2014, which were marked as an exhibit at the hearing. Dr. Meisler also reviewed the defendant's treatment records from Catholic Charities, which records were not offered as an exhibit. Meisler testified that he relied upon both sets of documents in rendering his opinion, as well as his evaluation of the defendant conducted three days prior to the hearing. Meisler noted that the Catholic Charities reports showed the defendant had a long history of major depression with psychosis while the HoCC records noted a past history of schizophrenia. The written observations of hospital staff, as well as Fitzgerald, also figured into his opinion. The defendant was observed by HoCC staff to be agitated, gave bizarre answers to assessment questions, was paranoid and delusional and reported hearing voices " all the time." On the basis of this information, Dr. Meisler opined that on December 17, 2014 at 5:00 a.m. to 5:30 a.m., the defendant was suffering acute impairment and could not, in that state, make reasonable decisions.
" Whether the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda depends in part on the competency of the defendant, or, in other words, on his ability to understand and act upon his constitutional rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004). This requires a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determine whether the defendant knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily waived the right against self-incrimination. Factors which may be considered by this court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant's experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings; his level of intelligence; his age; his level of education; his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given; intoxication; his emotional state; and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation. See State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 580-81, 504 A.2d 1036 (1986).
The court turns to these factors individually. There was no evidence presented regarding the defendant's experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings, or his levels of intelligence or education. The records of HoCC indicate that on the date in question the defendant was 29 years old. Based upon the credible testimony regarding the interactions between the defendant and officers Fitzgerald and Martinez, the court finds that the defendant was able to read, write and speak English. With respect to intoxication, there was no evidence of intoxication, despite the allegation (self-reported) that the defendant ingested pills. The police did not observe him ingest any and the hospital did not run a urine screen that might have shown what, if anything, had been ingested. The defendant's emotional state was one of agitation, as indicated by the hospital records and the testimony of officer Fitzgerald. None of these factors, alone or taken together, weighs against the credible testimony of Martinez that the defendant understood and waived his rights before he gave his narrative explanation as to " what happened."
The final factor in this analysis is the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation. The court finds the following additional credible facts pertinent to this issue in dispute. The defendant said he was suicidal and had consumed a large quantity of pills when he first encountered the New Britain police. The report of the emergency medical technician who transported the defendant to HoCC noted the time of interaction with the defendant as 4:10 a.m. The medic noted in the report that the defendant made suicidal comments and threatened to kill himself by overdosing on medication. The medic also noted that the defendant had no other complaints and denied having any other symptoms. The next documented interaction between the defendant and health care staff is found the report of the emergency department triage. At 4:35 a.m. the defendant was alert, oriented, calm and cooperative and there were no communication barriers noted. At 4:53 a.m. the defendant was given a bedpan; he threatened to throw the bedpan full of diarrhea at staff if they entered the quiet room he was in. At 5:04 a.m. the defendant was given a second bed pan. At this time, the emergency department noted that the defendant was agitated with bizarre behavior. He reported homicidal ideation and denied suicidal ideation. He told staff he hears voices all the time. Also noted is the following: " Paranoid and delusional. Piercing stare. Giving bizarre answers to assessment questions." At 5:10 a.m. the defendant requested and received a third bedpan.
A question exists whether this behavior was observed or simply documented at that time. Morgan Davis, the registered nurse who observed the defendant this night, testified that notations are recorded at the time of the observation or at a later time.
Evidence of mental limitations, without more, is not enough to invalidate a waiver of rights. State v. Linarte, 107 Conn.App. 93, 101, 944 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 901, 957 A.2d 873 (2008). " Even some degree of mental retardation does not by itself prevent a defendant from knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 76 Conn.App. 91, 106, 818 A.2d 824 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 911, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004) (17-year-old with low IQ). See also, State v. DaEria, 51 Conn.App. 149, 168, 721 A.2d 539 (1998) (valid waiver of Miranda rights despite defendant's difficulty reading); State v. Wynter, 19 Conn.App. 654, 660, 564 A.2d 296 (1989) (valid waiver of Miranda rights despite defendant's presence in a hospital while medicated); State v. Usry, 205 Conn. 298, 306-07, 533 A.2d 212 (1987) (valid waiver of Miranda rights despite defendant's young age, low IQ and status as special education student); State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 744, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987) (valid waiver of Miranda rights despite testimony that defendant had low IQ and other deficiencies allegedly rendering him incapable of waiving his rights).
Against this background the court must consider the credible testimony of officer Martinez, and the existence of an executed waiver of rights form. " [A] defendant's express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn.App. 59, 76, 782 A.2d 149, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923, 782 A.2d 1251 (2001). See also, State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn.App. 591, 600, 915 A.2d 327, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903, 919 A.2d 1037 (2007) (" [A]n express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver." (Internal quotation marks omitted.))
Dr. Meisler opined that the defendant could not have voluntarily and intentionally waived his rights because he was suffering acute impairment. The court is not persuaded by that opinion for the following reasons. First, Dr. Meister did not observe or interact with the defendant at the time in question. The court places great weight on the observations of the defendant made by those who did come into contact with him. Second, the records from the hospital, as well as the credible testimony of officer Fitzgerald, demonstrate that the defendant was able to speak to others and to respond appropriately to questions or conversation put to him prior to officer Martinez' interaction with the defendant. Third, the defendant gave a narrative statement to officer Martinez, and not a statement that was the product of a " question and answer" format. Notably, it was the defendant that brought up the subject of rape, not Martinez, when she asked him what happened. This demonstrates that he knew why the officer wanted to speak to him and therefore, his understanding of the situation. There was no evidence of any coercion on the part of officer Martinez. These facts, taken together with the waiver of rights form executed by the defendant, lead the court to conclude in the light of the totality of the circumstances, that the state has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily waived his rights against self-incrimination on December 17, 2104.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to suppress is denied.