Opinion
No. 4-403 / 03-1170.
September 29, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Paul R. Huscher and Dale B. Hagen, Judges.
Thomas Newton appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction, following a bench trial, for operating while intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Richard Bartolomei of Bartolomei Lange, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, Wayne Reisetter, County Attorney, and Stacy Ritchie, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Thomas Newton appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction, following a bench trial, for operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Around 10:30 p.m. on July 25, 2002, Iowa State Trooper Tracy Bohlen followed Newton's vehicle on Interstate I-80 for approximately six miles, observing it weaving in its lane and crossing the center and fog lines several times each. He stopped the vehicle, and observed that Newton's eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred and he smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage. Although Newton stated he was headed to his home in Urbandale, he was traveling in the opposite direction on the interstate. Upon questioning, Newton admitted that he had drunk "three beers in the last two hours." Trooper Bohlen then performed three field sobriety tests on Newton and concluded that he performed them poorly. Following the administration of a preliminary breath test (PBT), Trooper Bohlen placed Newton under arrest. A subsequent breath test using the Intoxilyzer model 4011A showed his alcohol concentration was .177.
The district court suppressed the results of the PBT in the probable cause determination after finding the device had not been properly calibrated.
The State charged Newton with OWI, first offense. The court subsequently denied Newton's motions to suppress, dismiss, and in limine challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained during and after the traffic stop. Following a later bench trial, the court found Newton guilty as charged and sentenced him to a thirty day term of incarceration, with all but two days suspended, and imposed a $1000 fine. Newton appeals, challenging the trooper's invocation of implied consent and his arrest. He also challenges the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer test result.
II. Scope of Review.
Because the principal issues involved in this appeal are ones of statutory interpretation, our review is for the correction of errors at law. State v. Stoneking, 379 N.W.2d 352, 353-54 (Iowa 1985).
III. Implied Consent.
Newton first contends Trooper Bohlen lacked reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent and also lacked probable cause to arrest him. Iowa Code section 321J.6 provides that an officer may request a chemical test for purposes of determining alcohol concentration when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the driver was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or when any one of seven enumerated conditions are met. In deciding whether an officer has met the requirements of Iowa Code section 321J.6, we apply a substantial compliance standard. State v. Palmer, 554 N.W.2d 859, 866 (Iowa 1996). The reasonable grounds test is met when the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time action was required would have warranted a prudent person's belief that an offense has been committed. State v. Braun, 495 N.W.2d 735, 738-39 (Iowa 1993).
Here, the evidence establishes that while tailing Newton's vehicle for approximately six miles on the interstate at a late-night hour, the vehicle continually swerved within its lane of traffic, and crossed both the center and fog lines multiple times. Upon making the stop, Trooper Bohlen asked where Newton was going, and Newton replied that he was traveling to Urbandale. However, he was not traveling in a direction which would have led to Urbandale. Trooper Bohlen observed that Newton's eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred and he smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage. Newton admitted that he had drunk "a couple beers." When pressed on what he meant by a couple, Newton responded "three in the last two hours."
Newton counters this wealth of evidence by noting (1) Trooper Bohlen admitted during the suppression hearing that he did not have probable cause, and (2) the field sobriety tests were not properly administered. Regardless of the validity of these observations, they do not alter our conclusions that Trooper Bohlen had reasonable grounds to believe Newton was operating while intoxicated and that he possessed probable cause to arrest him. The constellation of facts outlined in the preceding paragraph clearly supports our conclusions. Moreover, because we apply an objective test, see id., the trooper's beliefs at the time of trial are not conclusive. Finally, we believe that, even without considering any results of the field sobriety tests which Newton contends were flawed, Trooper Bohlen possessed reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent.
IV. Intoxilyzer.
Newton's Intoxilyzer breath test showed an alcohol concentration of .177. At trial, and again on appeal, Newton challenges the admission of this test result on numerous grounds. He generally claims (1) the trooper did not properly follow the operational checklist, (2) the State did not establish the necessary foundation for the admission of the test, and (3) the use of the test result is precluded due to the lack of a properly established margin of error.
The admissibility of breath test results is governed by Iowa Code section 321J.15, which provides, in pertinent part:
If it is established at trial that an analysis of a breath specimen was performed by a certified operator using a device intended to determine alcohol concentration and methods approved by the commissioner of public safety, no further foundation is necessary for introduction of the evidence.
Because this section governs the foundational necessities for the introduction of breath tests, we need not look to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.901( b)(9) (concerning authentication of a process or system) or the Daubert analysis discussed in Leaf v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 534 (Iowa 1999), as Newton urges.
We conclude the State adequately satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission of the breath test. At the time of Newton's arrest, the Intoxilyzer 4011A was an approved device to test alcohol concentration. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 661-7.2(3)(a) (1988). There was no dispute over Trooper Bohlen's certification to administer breath tests using the machine. The commissioner of public safety had approved testing methods of the DCI. See State v. Hornick, 672 N.W.2d 836, 840-41 (Iowa 2003).
Like our supreme court in State v. Stratmeier, 672 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Iowa 2003) (involving the DataMaster testing device), "[w]e are satisfied that the procedures followed in taking the sample of [Newton's] breath fully complied with the directions that had been promulgated pursuant to administrative regulation." Moreover, as that court stated, unless it can be shown the test results are so unreliable as to preclude consideration, the challenges made to the procedures utilized to obtain the results go to the weight of the evidence, rather than to admissibility. Id. at 821. The results here were thus admissible. The district court did not err in denying Newton's motions.
V. Conclusion.
The district court correctly concluded Trooper Bohlen possessed reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent and probable cause to arrest him. It properly admitted and considered the results of the breath test. Whether or not specifically addressed in this opinion, we find Newton's remaining arguments regarding the admissibility of the breath test results to be without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.