Opinion
No. 4-417 / 03-1678
Filed August 11, 2004
Appeal from the District Court for Pottawattamie County, Gary K. Anderson, District Associate Judge.
Gallagher Bail Bonds appeals the denial of its application for return of surety. AFFIRMED.
Bill Bracker, Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorney General, Matt Wilber, County Attorney, and Dawn Eimers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A bonding company claims that the State's efforts to forfeit appearance bonds were untimely. The State counters that the bonding company's appeal is untimely. We are not persuaded by either argument. Instead, we agree with the district court that the bonding company did not assert a factual basis for obtaining relief.
I. Background Proceedings
Gallagher Bail Bonds ("Gallagher") issued appearance bonds on behalf of Timothy Neville after he was arrested for multiple crimes. Neville did not appear for his preliminary hearing and the district court initiated a bond forfeiture action.
Two years elapsed. The case came before the district court for another hearing. Neville again did not appear and the court ordered the bonds forfeited.
On May 1, 2002 the clerk of court notified Neville and Gallagher that the bonds had been forfeited. The clerk scheduled a hearing for May 13, 2002 "to show cause, if any, why judgment should not be rendered . . . on said bond." No one appeared at the hearing and the district court entered judgment for forfeiture of the bond.
Gallagher did not appeal that judgment. Almost a year after its entry, the company filed an "application for return of surety," claiming various procedural irregularities in the bond forfeiture proceedings. The district court denied the application following an evidentiary hearing, at which the State argued the merits of the application. Gallagher appealed.
The court initially issued an order without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Later on motion of Gallagher, the court held an evidentiary hearing, vacated the first order, and issued a new order.
II. Status of Post-Judgment Application
To resolve this appeal, we must decide how to characterize Gallagher's "application for return of surety." As the application was filed within a year of judgment entry and seeks release of the surety, we liberally construe the application as a petition to vacate a judgment. See Iowa R. of Civ. P. 1.1012, 1.1013. See also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(1) (stating pleadings shall be construed "to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of all controversies on their merits"); Kagin's Numismatic Auctions, Inc. v. Criswell, 284 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1979) (stating Iowa courts "look to the substance of a motion and not to its name"). Construed in this fashion, Gallagher's appeal from the denial of the petition was timely. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1013(3) (authorizing right of appeal as in ordinary action).
This, however, does not help Gallagher. Rule 1.1012 allows a judgment to be vacated on the showing of one of six grounds, only one of which is relevant to the present case: "mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk." Id. R. 1.1012(1). In its application, Gallagher alleged that it did not receive a ten-day notice of forfeiture as required by Iowa Code section 811.6 (2003). The district court considered this fact question and found Gallagher did receive notice. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. See In re Trust of Killian, 494 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Iowa 1993). Absent a showing of grounds listed in rule 1.1012, the trial court had no authority to take further action. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Gallagher's application.