Opinion
No. C2-98-1976.
Filed July 6, 1999.
Appeal from the District Court, Becker County, File No. K2971468.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, and
Joseph Evans, Becker County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Assistant State Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subds. 1, 2, 609.245, subd. 1 (1996). On appeal, Bryan Paul Ness challenges the propriety of his conviction and the amount of restitution. We affirm.
DECISION
Ness argues he was denied his constitutional right of confrontation where the trial court would not allow defense counsel to use prior juvenile adjudications to impeach one of the state's witnesses. Although juvenile adjudications are protected from disclosure and may not be used for impeachment purposes, a criminal defendant's constitutional right of confrontation may outweigh the state's interest in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records. Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 319-20, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1112 (1974); see Minn.R.Evid. 609(d) (providing that juvenile adjudication may not be used to impeach witness's credibility unless constitutionally required); see also Minn. Stat. § 260.211, subd. 1(a) (1998) (providing juvenile adjudication not deemed conviction and disposition not admissible against child). But the right of confrontation does not require a court to permit impeachment by juvenile adjudication unless a defendant seeks to use the adjudication for a more specific purpose than "general impeachment of credibility." State v. Spann , 574 N.W.2d 47, 52 (Minn. 1988); State v. Schilling , 270 N.W.2d 769, 772 (Minn. 1978).
At trial, defense counsel argued the witness's juvenile "activities are relevant and go to his credibility regarding a jury." In the absence of a specific challenge to credibility that demonstrates a clear motive to falsify testimony, the interests protected by Rule 609(d) should not be subordinate to Ness's right of confrontation. Spann , 574 N.W.2d at 52. In contrast to his trial position, Ness argues on appeal that the witness's prior juvenile adjudications should have been admitted, not as general impeachment evidence, but as evidence that he had a motive to lie to the police in his interview. But an offer of proof must specify the contents and probative impact of the evidence the proponent seeks to introduce. State v. Anderson , 395 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Minn.App. 1986); see In re Welfare of W.J.R. , 264 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn. 1978) (requiring some specifics in offer of proof beyond conclusory characterization of evidence offered). Ness cannot claim error based on a theory never presented to the trial court. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the witness's juvenile record. See State v. Brouillette , 286 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn. 1979) (applying clear abuse of discretion standard to admission of prior crime for impeachment).
Ness also argues the trial court erred in the manner in which it calculated the amount of restitution. See State v. Keehn , 554 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn.App. 1996) (holding trial court has wide discretion in ordering restitution but award must have factual basis), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1996). But both victims submitted requests for restitution before sentencing, and Ness made no attempt to challenge those amounts at sentencing. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (1998) (stating defendant bears burden of making specific challenge to restitution at sentencing). Under these circumstances, Ness has waived his right to challenge restitution on appeal. See State v. Anderson , 507 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Minn.App. 1993) (holding that defendant waived challenge to restitution by failing to object during sentencing), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1993).