Such "fruit of the poisonous tree" may not support a conviction. Wong Sun v. United States, 1963, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Benefield v. State, Fla. 1964, 160 So.2d 706, 708; State v. Neri, supra, 290 So.2d at 502. Since the evidence forming the basis for Wynn's conviction of possessing counterfeit money was the direct product of his illegal arrest, Wynn's Motion to Suppress that evidence should have been granted.

But there is no need to invoke any such glib formula in condemning the search and seizure in this case as unreasonable. Officer Gates did not make the slightest effort to ascertain who was driving. Of course, there is no requirement that the officer who investigates the accident scene accompany accident victims to the hospital, but the unthinking, overzealous approach this case exemplifies is inconsistent with the requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable. Cf. State v. Neri, 290 So.2d 500 (Fla.App.2d 1974). Courts do not do their duty when they countenance undiscriminating official intrusions into citizens' bodies, in a wholesale fashion. What kept Officer Gates from asking the simple question, "Who was driving?

The evidence became the "fruit of the poisonous tree." See State v. Neri, 290 So.2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). There was no applicable exception to the search warrant requirement. The convictions are reversed. Defendant shall be discharged.

It is apparent both that Harrell did not have anything remotely resembling the reasonable suspicion of R.J.M.'s wrongdoing which is required to justify a search of a student by a school official; A.B. v. State, 440 So.2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and that R.J.M.'s production of the weapon, occurring as it did during the very course of the thus-unlawful search, must be deemed a product of and tainted by that search rather than a voluntary surrender or abandonment of the knife. Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952); State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Earnest v. State, 293 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); State v. Neri, 290 So.2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. dismissed, 302 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1974). Accordingly, the adjudication under review is reversed with directions to discharge the respondent.

Freyre v. State, 362 So.2d 989 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Smith v. State, 333 So.2d 91 (Fla.1st DCA 1976); Riley v. State, 266 So.2d 173 (Fla.4th DCA 1972). Contra: Stanley v. State, 327 So.2d 243 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). Only when the police begin to conduct an illegal search can a subsequent abandonment of property be held involuntary as being tainted by the prior illegal search, Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952); Earnest v. State, 293 So.2d 111 (Fla.1st DCA 1974); State v. Neri, 290 So.2d 500 (Fla.2d DCA 1974), and even that result may vary depending on the facts of the case. Freyre v. State, 362 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla.3d DCA 1978).

Indeed, it has long been held that an illegal arrest or an illegal search presumptively taints and renders involuntary any subsequent confession or admission obtained from the victim of the arrest or search. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Rheiner, 297 So.2d 130 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); State v. Neri, 290 So.2d 500 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); Betancourt v. State, 224 So.2d 378, 381 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); French v. State, 198 So.2d 668 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). The only exception recognized by the cases in which a prior illegal arrest or search would not render a subsequent consent, confession or admission involuntary is where there has been a clear and unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of the prior illegal action.