¶ 18. The legal question here is whether defendant's convictions result in more than one punishment for the same offense and thus violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...."); State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 11, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597 (stating that Fifth Amendment of United States Constitution applies to states through Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and summarizing that "Double Jeopardy Clause safeguards a criminal defendant from facing multiple punishments for the same offense"). A. Legal Frameworks

¶ 18. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, "No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...." U.S. Const. amend. V ; see also State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 11, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597 ("This guarantee is made applicable to Vermont through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."). This constitutional protection "safeguards a criminal defendant from facing multiple punishments for the same offense."

Because legislative bodies are empowered to define crimes and fix punishments, but courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense, “the Clause is best understood ... as limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization.” State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112 , ¶ 11, 189 Vt. 160 , 16 A.3d 597 (quotation omitted). The Clause does not preclude the Legislature from imposing multiple punishments, “but its intent to do so must be clear.”

We have consistently defined "hinder" in this context as "to slow down or to make more difficult someone's progress towards accomplishing an objective; to delay, or impede or interfere with that person's progress"—exactly the definition the trial court used in this case. See State v. Berard, 2019 VT 65, ¶ 9, ___ Vt. ___, 220 A.3d 759; State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 20, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597; State v. Stone, 170 Vt. 496, 499, 756 A.2d 785, 788 (2000); State v. Dion, 154 Vt. 420, 423, 578 A.2d 101, 103 (1990). It is true that we have required that a defendant's conduct actually hinder or impede an officer in order to qualify as hindering under § 3001.

In prior impeding-officer cases, the unlawful hindering action was a substantial interference. See State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 21, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597 (upholding impeding-officer conviction where defendant's actions "significantly impeded" officer); State v. Oren, 162 Vt. 331, 336, 647 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1994) (holding that when defendant blocked officer's vehicle with her car, ran toward officer's car while shouting obscenities, tried to grab officer's badge, and pounded on officer's car, resulting in officer's inability to leave until local police arrived to help half an hour later, she "far exceeded a reasonable response to the circumstances" and violated impeding-officer statute); State v. Dion, 154 Vt. 420, 425, 578 A.2d 101, 104 (1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brooks, 163 Vt. 245, 658 A.2d 22 (1995) (upholding impeding-officer conviction where defendant threatened game warden and pulled boy that warden was attempting to arrest from officer's grasp). ¶ 10.

In applying the Blockburger test, "our focus is not on the evidence offered at trial but on the elements of crimes as they were charged." State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 12, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597. Multiple charges "are considered the same offense for double jeopardy purposes unless each . . . requires proof of a fact that the other does not." Ritter, 167 Vt. 632, 632-33, 714 A.2d 624, 625 (quotation omitted).

State v. O'Dell, 2007 VT 34, ¶ 4, 181 Vt. 475, 924 A.2d 87. This is a highly deferential standard, which recognizes that neither trial nor appellate courts can place themselves in the jury's position. State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 18, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597. A jury is in the best position to weigh facts and deliver a verdict, particularly in close fact-dependent cases. State v. Carlin, 2010 VT 79, ¶ 10, 188 Vt. 602, 9 A.3d 312 (mem.).

“A reasonable understanding of the charge is not based solely on the precise wording of the information but draws upon the additional facts found in the accompanying affidavit.” State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112 , ¶ 27, 189 Vt. 160 , 16 A.3d 597 . ¶ 30. Defendant’s charged conduct under Count One spanned a period when two different aggravated sexual assault statutes controlled.

“The Clause is best understood ... as limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization.” State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112 , ¶ 11, 189 Vt. 160 , 16 A.3d 597 (quotation omitted). The Clause does not preclude the Legislature from imposing multiple punishments for the same conduct, provided the intent to do so is made clear.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that a criminal defendant shall not be subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 11, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597; see U.S. Const, amend. V (stating that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause applies to states through Fourteenth Amendment). "Among other things, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State from dividing a single criminal act into multiple counts of the same offense."