It is not necessary to inform a defendant that his guilty plea and conviction may be used to enhance the penalty to which he is subjected upon subsequent conviction for the same offense. State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93 (La. 1984); State v. Green, 36,741 (La.App. 2d Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 970, writ denied, 03-0973 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 517; State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987). Because we find that the defendant failed to present affirmative evidence of an infringement of his rights or an irregularity in the proceedings, the state's presentation of certified court minutes showing defendant was represented by counsel in addition to the testimonies of both defendant and his probation officer regarding his conviction, was sufficient to establish defendant's status as second felony offender.
1 indicates that the lack of advice and information to the defendant of enhanced penalties did not impact the voluntariness of the plea to the charged offense. See State v. Green, 36,741 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 970 writ denied 2003-0973 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 517 citing State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987). Nor does the defendant claim he would not have entered the plea had he been advised of enhancement provisions.
The jurisprudence prior to that time indicates that the lack of advice and information to the defendant of enhanced penalties did not impact the voluntariness of the plea to the charged offense. State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987); See discussion in State v. Dennis Johnson, 34,902 (La.App. 2d Cir. 09/26/01), 796 So.2d 201. Further, the failure of the trial judge to inform the defendant of the penalties for subsequent offenses in accordance with Article 556.1(E) has been held not to be reversible error because the advice was not required to be given prior to the plea.
Jurisprudence prior to the time of the enactment of La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(E) indicates that the lack of advice and information to the defendant of enhanced penalties for future offenses does not impact the voluntariness of the plea to the charged offense. Cf., State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987) and State v. Anderson, 98-2977 (La. 3/19/99), 732 So.2d 517. Likewise, to the extent that Article 556.1(E) may be interpreted so broadly as to require the trial court to inform the defendant of the habitual offender law, the ruling on the application of the article in Guzman indicates that only harmless error results. This assignment of error is therefore meritless.
State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93 (La. 1984) (rendered subsequent to State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192 (La. 1981) upon which the majority heavily relies). Indeed, in State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987), this appellate court reversed the granting of a motion to quash founded upon the same premise as now embraced by the majority. Under the majority holding today, all previous DWI guilty pleas within this circuit will be subject to collateral attack if the trial court has failed to explain fully the law on enhancement of penalties for subsequent offenses.
Nor must the trial court inform a defendant that his guilty plea may be used to enhance the penalty for future convictions for the same offense (e.g., DWI). State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987). In the instant case, the defendant's ineligibility for parole and probation may be an immediate, but is not a direct, consequence of his guilty plea.
The scope of Boykin does not mandate that the trial judge advise the defendant that the guilty plea conviction may later serve as a basis for an enhanced penalty upon a subsequent conviction. State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93 (La. 1984); State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987). Nor is the trial court required to inform the defendant of his right to appointed counsel on appeal before accepting a guilty plea.
We further find that our jurisprudence has been unwilling to extend the scope of Boykin "to include advising the defendant of any other rights which he may have, nor of the possible consequences of his actions." State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085, 1086 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987); citing State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 104 (La. 1984). Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
Because the sentencing exposure for the offense to which a defendant pleads guilty is a direct, rather than collateral, consequence of the plea, a defendant should be informed of the exposure before the plea is accepted. See and compare State v. Myers, 503 So.2d 1085 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987); State ex rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly, supra. In this sense, the exposure is an inherent part of the constitutional nature of the offense.