Opinion
I.D. 0002007667
Submitted: March 20, 2001
Decided: April 5, 2001
On Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Denied.
Peter W. Veith, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
John P. Deckers, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On February 11, 2000, Wilmington Police officers arrested Defendant, Terrell Mobley, and charged Defendant with Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Use of a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, Criminal Impersonation, Hindering Prosecution, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress, asking that the Court suppress any and all evidence seized during the police search of Defendant and all statements Defendant made to police during and after his search and arrest. The Court held a hearing to consider Defendant's Motion on February 26, 2001. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court asked the parties to submit memoranda on certain issues involved in the motion.
The facts surrounding Defendant's arrest, as established by testimony provided during the February 26, 2001 hearing, are as follows. On February 11, 2000, Detective Michael Rodriguez of the Wilmington Police, while conducting undercover drug surveillance in the area of 4th Street and Delmore Place, a known drug area, noticed Defendant standing on the southeast corner of the intersection. Det. Rodriguez testified that Defendant wore a black down jacket and a bright red knit cap. Det. Rodriguez observed an unknown female approach Defendant and hand him what appeared to be money. Both subjects looked up and down the street nervously and then entered a nearby store. Both subjects exited the store in less than a minute, looked around nervously again, and departed separately. It did not appear that they had purchased anything from the store.
Det. Rodriguez testified that Defendant began walking down 4th Street with his head down and that it appeared Defendant was attempting to "blend in." At this point, Det. Rodriguez called in for assistance to stop Defendant. Officers in a marked patrol car responded to Rodriguez' call and spotted Defendant walking down the street. Officer Matthew Hall of the Wilmington Police testified that he was in the patrol car and witnessed Defendant go into a laundromat. Hall parked his patrol car and entered the laundromat. Rodriguez followed.
Upon entering the laundromat, officers observed a person they believed to be Defendant standing inside. Defendant was no longer wearing the jacket or knit cap. Rodriguez approached Defendant and asked his name and why he was in the area. Defendant provided a name which police knew to be false, prompting his arrest for criminal impersonation. Rodriguez then discovered Defendant's cap and jacket stuffed between two laundry machines nearby. Rodriguez searched the jacket and discovered a razor blade covered with what appeared to be cocaine residue.
As he placed handcuffs on Defendant, Det. Rodriguez ordered the other officers to search the laundromat for additional drugs. Defendant stated, "You didn't find cocaine on me, so how can you arrest me?" Det. Rodriguez testified that Defendant's statement was not in response to questioning by police. Det. Rodriguez confirmed that he read Defendant his Miranda rights and asked if Defendant understood his rights. Defendant answered that he did.
Police patted down Defendant incident to his arrest and found a car key in Defendant's pants pocket. Det. Rodriguez testified, "I asked him where did he get the key. He stated he got it from his uncle, whose name is Derrick Mobley. I asked him where was the vehicle. He said, "Oh, it's not in the area. It's not around here at all." Det. Rodriguez reiterated, "He had stated he was given a key from his uncle, and just his uncle told him to hold on to the key." Det. Rodriguez testified that Defendant never told him that he was the owner of the vehicle or that he had the right to drive the vehicle.
Rodriguez testified that he went outside and saw a gold Nissan Maxima parked in a bus stop area m front of the laundromat. Det. Rodriguez looked inside and saw a rental VCR tape box inside with white residue on it. Det. Rodriguez tried the key in the car door and the key unlocked the door. Det. Rodriguez stated that he did not attempt to actually open the car door. Det. Rodriguez called in the Nissan's license plate number and was told that the vehicle was registered to Rafael Colozzo. Det. Rodriguez attempted to locate Colozzo, also a Wilmington Police officer, but was unable to contact him.
Rodriguez then asked Defendant for permission to search the car. Defendant responded, "No. If you search that vehicle, you are violating my rights." Police took the car into custody and eventually impounded it. Colozzo later informed Rodriguez that he had sold the car to Renicia Johnson. However, attempts to locate Johnson were also unsuccessful.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the Court ruled that Defendant's initial stop inside the laundromat and his subsequent arrest were lawful. However, the Court questioned whether Defendant had standing to challenge the search of the Nissan Maxima. The Court requested memoranda from counsel on the remaining issues involved in the motion to suppress, including the issue of Defendant's standing and the search of the vehicle.
It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate standing to challenge a search or seizure. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1980). In order to do so, Defendant must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property that was searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
Defendant asserts that he has met the necessary burden to demonstrate standing to challenge the search of the Nissan Maxima. Defendant argues that he had substantial control over the vehicle because he had borrowed the car from his uncle and because Defendant carried the car key with him into the laundromat, having previously locked the car. Defendant states that there is no evidence in the record to show that the car was stolen or that Defendant knowingly possessed a stolen car. Defendant also argues that his denial to the police that the car matching the key in his pocket was in the area does not constitute an abandonment of property so as to defeat his standing to challenge the search.
The State responds that Defendant has no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle in the instant case. The State argues that Defendant has denied any possessary interest in the car. Nor has he shown that he had permission from the owner to drive the car. The State points out that Defendant has presented no evidence to show that he had permission to drive the car or that he had ever, in fact, driven the car.
Both Defendant and the State cite United States v. Baker, 3rd Cir., 221 F.3d 438 (2000), in support of their arguments. Baker considered the issue of whether a person who borrows a car, and has control over it, has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car. Id. at 442. Baker noted that whether the driver of a car has a reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to show Fourth Amendment standing is "a fact-bound question dependant on the strength of his interest in the car and the nature of his control over it; ownership is not necessary." Id.
In Baker, the defendant drove a borrowed car to a scheduled visit with his parole officer. As a condition of his parole, the defendant had agreed not to drive without a license. During his appointment, the parole officer asked the defendant if he had a driver's license. The defendant responded that he did not. When the defendant attempted to drive away from the appointment, he was arrested for violating the conditions of his parole. Id. at 440.
Baker concluded that the defendant at issue had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The court explained;
Baker is asserting his own, not a third party's, expectation of privacy. He came alone in the car to the parole office. Although he did not own the car, he had substantial control over it insofar as he had borrowed it from a friend and had been driving it for four to six weeks. He carried the keys to the car with him into the parole office. Although the defendant and his associates were somewhat vague about who owned the car, there is no evidence in the record that the car was stolen or that Baker knowingly possessed a stolen car. All of these factors lead to the conclusion that Baker had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.Id. at 443. Baker also concluded that a discrepancy between a person's statement regarding the owner of the car he is driving and the owner of the car as reflected by the title and registration is not enough, by itself, to destroy the driver's reasonable expectation of privacy when "there is clear evidence of continuing possession and control, as well as no evidence that the driver obtained the car illegitimately." Id.
The Court finds, as the State contends, that the facts of the instant case can be distinguished from those of Baker. The only evidence presented at the suppression hearing was Det. Rodriguez's testimony that Defendant stated that his uncle had asked him to "hold onto" the car key. Defendant presented no evidence that his uncle had given him permission to drive the car or that he had ever actually driven it. Defendant did not explain the discrepancy between his statement that Derrick Mobley owned the car and the name of the owner as reflected by the car's registration. Although there is insufficient information from which the Court could conclude that the Nissan was stolen or that Defendant knew it was stolen, neither is there sufficient information for the Court to conclude that Derrick Mobley owned the car or that he had given Defendant permission to drive it.
As a result, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to show "clear evidence of continuing possession and control" over the Nissan Maxima so as to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant does not have standing to challenge the search of the Nissan.
Defendant also argues that the statements he made to police at the scene both before and after his arrest were in violation of his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights. Defendant argues that, prior to his arrest, his movements were restricted and that he was not free to leave the laundromat. Defendant was stopped by uniformed and undercover police officers and eventually placed in handcuffs. Therefore, Defendant argues, that because he was "seized," the police were required to give him Miranda rights prior to interrogating him.
Miranda warnings are designed to protect a defendant from interrogation which takes place in a "police dominated atmosphere," containing "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). Warnings must be given when "questioning [has been] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id at 444. In order to determine whether a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation, the Court must make two discrete inquiries. First, the Court must assess whether a suspect was in custody. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). Second, the Court must determine whether the police interrogated the suspect while he was in custody. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
The Court ruled at the conclusion of the suppression hearing that Defendant's initial stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. Defendant seemingly argues that the police interrogation prior to Defendant's arrest and the reading of his rights exceeded the scope of a Terry stop, and was therefore a custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes.
Terry v. Ohio held that the range of police activity permitted during an investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the detention. 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). A brief but complete restriction of a defendant's liberty is valid under Terry. Id. "The perception . . . that one is not free to leave is insufficient to convert a Teny stop into an arrest." State v. Hicks, Del. Super., No. 9704012145, Cooch, J., (May 18, 1998), Mem. Op. at 3 (quoting United States v. Moore, 4th Cir., 817 F.2d 1105, 1108, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987)). Such stops are, rather, distinguished from custodial interrogations by the requirement that they cannot last longer than necessary to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion. Id. (citing United States v. Leshuk, 4th Cir., 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 (1995)). This requirement has been interpreted as meaning that, "an officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicion." Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984)).
The Court finds that Det. Rodriguez did not exceed the permissible scope of a Terry stop during his initial questioning of Defendant. Det. Rodriguez testified that he asked Defendant his name, why he had come into the laundromat, and about the transaction they had witnessed between Defendant and the female. When Defendant provided a false name, he was arrested. Thus, Defendant was not in "custody" for Miranda purposes prior to his arrest.
Defendant also contends that State has failed to show that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when police advised him of his Miranda rights. Defendant points out that Det. Rodriguez did not ask Defendant if he wished to waive his Miranda rights before questioning him, but simply began questioning Defendant after ascertaining that Defendant understood his rights.
As Defendant concedes, "the absence of an express waiver does not necessarily render a confession inadmissible; other surrounding circumstances can show that a defendant knew of his rights and intelligently waived them." Hooks v. State, Del. Supr., 416 A.2d 189, 200 (1980) (citations omitted). Defendant argues that the surrounding circumstances in the instant case do not support at finding that Defendant intelligently waived his rights. Defendant submits in support of this argument that he "was detained in a fairly confined locale; an overwhelming police presence enveloped the defendant shortly after he entered the laundromat; it appears that the defendant had little or no time for reflection of his Miranda rights, since the police initiated questions were direct, deliberate, and confrontational."
In order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, a defendant must have, "a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal., the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (citations omitted). There is no constitutional requirement that the police "supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights." Id. (citations omitted).
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in the instant case support a finding that Defendant knew of his rights and intelligently waived them. Det. Rodriguez testified that he read Defendant his Miranda rights and asked if Defendant understood those rights. Defendant responded, "Yes." There is no evidence in the record to suggest that police coerced Defendant. There is no also no evidence in the record to suggest that Defendant did not understand the rights he was waiving. As a result, the Court finds that Defendant's statements to police at the laundromat are admissible as evidence against him.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
IT IS SO ORDERED.