Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 15-0153
04-05-2016
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JOE ALLEN MONROE, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Joseph T. Maziarz Counsel for Appellee The Law Office of Kyle T. Green, PLLC, Mesa By Kyle T. Green Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2014-109790-001
The Honorable Robert E. Miles, Judge Retired
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Joseph T. Maziarz
Counsel for Appellee The Law Office of Kyle T. Green, PLLC, Mesa
By Kyle T. Green
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined. HOWE, Judge:
¶1 This appeal is filed in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Counsel for Joe Allen Monroe asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. Monroe was given an opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. He has not done so. After reviewing the record, we affirm Monroe's conviction and sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's judgment and resolve all reasonable inferences against Monroe. State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998).
¶3 In December 2013, Monroe reported to his probation officer's office to discuss the terms and conditions of his probation ("the 2013 case"). The probation officer explained to Monroe that he was prohibited from "possess[ing] or control[ling] any stun guns, tasers, firearms, ammunition, deadly or prohibited weapons as defined" by statute. Specifically, the probation officer explained that Monroe could not have any weapons in his house, that he could not have any "control" of any weapon, and that if Monroe currently had weapons in his house, the weapons had to be stored in another location where Monroe would not have access to them. Monroe indicated that he understood that condition and also the condition allowing the probation officer "safe, unrestricted access to [his] residence."
¶4 Several months later in February 2014, Monroe's probation officer received a call that an individual with a warrant for his arrest was staying at Monroe's house. The probation officer went to Monroe's house with Phoenix police officers and the Fugitive Apprehension Unit. After the police cleared the house of Monroe, his wife, and their children, the probation officer entered the living room and saw a gun "sitting in an open box on the middle cushion of the [couch] seat."
¶5 After Monroe was read his Miranda rights, Monroe indicated that he understood them and would answer the officer's questions. When asked whether his DNA and fingerprints were going to be on the gun, Monroe responded, "Yes, sir." Monroe explained that he had picked up the gun and removed the manual from the box just before the police arrived. When asked whether he knew that he was a prohibited possessor because he was on probation for a felony conviction, Monroe responded that he knew. Monroe was arrested and charged with misconduct involving weapons.
¶6 The State alleged that Monroe had two historical non-dangerous felony convictions, that he committed the offense with the use, threatened use, or possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, and that he committed the offense while on probation for a felony offense. The State requested a hearing pursuant to Arizona Rule of Evidence 609 to impeach Monroe with his prior felony convictions.
¶7 At trial, two arresting officers made in-court identifications of Monroe, and the court read to the jurors that "the parties stipulate that the defendant is a convicted felon." After the State rested its case-in-chief, Monroe moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, arguing that insufficient evidence supported a finding that Monroe constructively possessed the gun. Finding otherwise, the court denied the motion. The jurors found Monroe guilty of misconduct involving weapons, which required them to find first that Monroe was on probation for conviction of a felony offense.
¶8 The trial court conducted the sentencing hearing in compliance with Monroe's constitutional rights and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 26. The court sentenced Monroe to 4.5 years' imprisonment, the presumptive for a repeat offender with a prior felony conviction, with 55 days of presentence incarceration credit. The court also revoked his probation for the 2013 case and sentenced him to the mitigated term of four months' imprisonment, with 120 days of presentence incarceration credit, to run consecutively to the 4.5-year term. Monroe timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶9 We review Monroe's conviction and sentence for fundamental error. See State v. Flores, 227 Ariz. 509, 512 ¶ 12, 260 P.3d 309, 312 (App. 2011). Counsel for Monroe has advised this Court that after a diligent search of the entire record, he has found no arguable question of law. We have read and considered counsel's brief and fully reviewed the record for reversible error, see Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881, and find none. All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals, Monroe was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings, and the sentence imposed was within the statutory guidelines. We decline to order briefing and affirm Monroe's conviction and sentence.
¶10 Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel shall inform Monroe of the status of his appeal and of his future options. Counsel has no further obligations unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). Monroe shall have 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a pro per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.
CONCLUSION
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).