Compare United States v. Johnson, 196 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.1999), where the Ninth Circuit held that delivery of the prisoner's request for disposition to the Marshal's Service constituted delivery to the U.S. Attorney, and his public defender's letter to the court seeking appointment to represent defendant was sufficient notice to the court under the IAD.In State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 107, 639 A.2d 352, 372 (App.Div.1994), one of the few New Jersey cases interpreting the IAD after Fez, we affirmed a trial court order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a murder indictment for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the required time period. We found that time was tolled pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a).

Compare United States v. Johnson, 196 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1999), where the Ninth Circuit held that delivery of the prisoner's request for disposition to the Marshal's Service constituted delivery to the U.S. Attorney, and his public defender's letter to the court seeking appointment to represent defendant was sufficient notice to the court under the IAD. In State v. Millett, 272 N.J.Super. 68, 107, 639 A.2d 352, 372 (App.Div. 1994), one of the few New Jersey cases interpreting the IAD after Fex, we affirmed a trial court order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a murder indictment for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the required time period. We found that time was tolled pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a).

Under Miller, defendant consequently was unable to stand trial. See also State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 106 (App. Div. 1994) (stating defendant was unable to stand trial "while he was between attorneys"); 5 LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 18.4(c) at 176-77 (3d ed. 2007) (stating the time period can be extended by "'any period of delay caused by the defendant's request or ordered to accommodate the defendant, as where defense counsel has withdrawn because of a conflict of interest'" (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). Thus, the 180-day period was tolled on October 25, 2010.

State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 593 A.2d 784 (1991.) In State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 639 A.2d 352 (App.Div. 199 4), which did not involve the Rape Shield Law, we expressed the following views on proffers of evidence: We recognize that defense counsel made a rather specific representation and "spread on the record" what he hoped to prove about possible third-party guilt.

The jurors were then excused until the following morning.When the matter resumed the next morning, the judge, out of the jury's presence, summarized for the record what had occurred during the rendering of the verdict the afternoon before, referring to State v. Milton, 178 N.J. 421 (2004); State v. Jenkins, 349 N.J.Super. 464 (App.Div.2002); and State v. Millett, 272 N.J.Super. 68 (App.Div.1994), and said: "As far as the Court's concerned, we received final verdicts on Count 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. We did not receive final verdicts on Counts 6 and 7.

However, the defendant need not show "a probability of a third-party['s] guilt," but only "proof capable of raising a reasonable doubt on the issue of [the] defendant's guilt." State v. Millett, 272 N.J.Super. 68, 100 (App. Div. 1994) (citing State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 299 (1988)).

A trial error occurs when a criminal defendant is "convicted through a judicial process [that] is defective in some fundamental respect[.]" State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 97 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12-13 (1978)). Examples of fundamental defects may include an incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, as occurred here, or incorrect instructions.

In New Jersey, courts have consistently taken a liberal approach on the admission of evidence pertaining to the theory of third-party guilt. See State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 99-10 (App. Div. 1994) (finding evidence of four males sitting in a car across the street from the gas station near the time of the murder relevant because it raised a reasonable doubt on the issue of defendant's guilt); State v. Jorqensen, 241 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 112 N.J. 386 (1990) (holding that the trial court erred by requiring defendant's proffered evidence — that a person who looked like him might have committed the crime — had to have the capacity to establish the probability of another's guilt rather than engender a reasonable doubt about an essential element of the prosecution's case).

R. 3:22-4(a). In State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 107 (App. Div. 1994), we affirmed a trial court order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a murder indictment for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the required time period. We found the time was tolled pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-6(a), relying on State v. Lippolis, 55 N.J. 354 (1970), rev'g on dissent, 107 N.J. Super. 137 (App.

The State's position is that defendant's silence was conduct that was indicative of guilt and that conduct that indicates consciousness of guilt, or is inconsistent with innocence, is admissible. See State v. Mills, 51 N.J. 277, 286, 240 A.2d 1 (holding that it was not error to include evidence about the defendant's visit to the grave side of one of his victims), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832, 89 S.Ct. 105, 21 L.Ed.2d 104 (1968); State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 88, 639 A.2d 352 (App.Div. 1994); see also State v. Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. 266, 283, 592 A.2d 300 (App.Div. 1991) ("[t]he rule applies only to such conduct as is intrinsically indicative of a consciousness of guilt, such as unexplained flight, or an unusual exhibition of remorse for the victim of the crime, or the switching of clothes with a cell mate before a lineup"). In Pindale, supra, we found that the absence of remorse is not necessarily probative of guilt.