Opinion
No. CV 03 0824985 S
February 20, 2004
RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE
The plaintiff has moved to strike four special defenses raised by the defendant. Seriatim:
1. The motion is granted as to the first defense. The defendant claims as a defense that the state is the wrong party; rather, the action should be brought by the Second Injury Fund or the state treasurer, as custodian of the Second Injury Fund. The plaintiff argues that the state has the authority to bring this action, a common-law action to collect an allegedly mistaken payment made by the Second Injury Fund. In context, any irregularity is purely technical: the same deference regarding statute of limitations issues is granted to state agencies. and officers acting in their official capacities as to the state itself:
The plaintiff's argument would have us ignore the legal principle that statutes of limitations do not generally apply to the state. "[A] universal rule in the construction of statutes limiting rights [is] that they are not to be construed to embrace the government or sovereignty unless by express terms or necessary implication such appears to have been the clear intention of the legislature, and the rights of the government are not to be impaired by a statute unless its terms are clear and explicit, and admit of no other construction." Page 486 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Goldfarb, 160 Conn. 320, 323, 278 A.2d 818 (1971), quoting State v. Shelton, 47 Conn. 400, 404 (1879). Furthermore, "a subdivision of the state, acting within its delegated governmental capacity, is not impliedly bound by the ordinary statute of limitations." Dept. of Transportation v. Canevari, 37 Conn. Sup. 899, 900, 442 A.2d 1358 (1992). Thus, the board as an agency of the state is not subject to a statute of limitations unless it is expressly declared by the legislature.
Joyell v. Comissioner of Education, 45 Conn. App. 476, 485 (1997).
2. The motion to strike is granted as to the second special defense. Neither the state nor its agencies are subject to the statute of limitations.
3. The motion to strike is granted as to the third special defense. The state is not subject to ordinary laches defenses. The state's power may be limited by due process considerations, but none have been alleged.
4. The motion to strike is denied as to the fourth special defense. The state's argument is partly factual in this regard, and motions to strike are decided solely on the pleadings. A reading of Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 260 Conn. 21 (2003), however, on which this case is based, makes one wonder whether the entire issue has been previously decided by our Supreme Court. If Shiano was not moot, and the Supreme Court specifically held that it was not, then it is difficult to see how the issue of accord and satisfaction could be relitigated here.
Beach, J.