Opinion
2021 KA 1490
09-16-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MICHAEL ANTHONY MEADE
Scott M. Perrilloux District Attorney Zachary Daniels Brett Sommer Assistant District Attorneys Livingston, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Mark D. Plaisance Marcus J. Plaisance Prairieville, Louisiana and Steven J. Moore Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant -Appellant Michael Anthony Meade
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LIVINGSTON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NUMBER 38792, DIVISION C HONORABLE ERIKA W. SLEDGE, JUDGE
Scott M. Perrilloux District Attorney Zachary Daniels Brett Sommer Assistant District Attorneys Livingston, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana
Mark D. Plaisance Marcus J. Plaisance Prairieville, Louisiana and Steven J. Moore Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant -Appellant Michael Anthony Meade
BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.
CHUTZ, J.
The defendant, Michael Anthony Meade, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and home invasion, a violation of La. R.S. 14:62.8. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on both counts. The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied. For the second degree murder conviction, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. For the home invasion conviction, he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The defendant now appeals, designating four assignments of error. We affirm the convictions and sentences.
FACTS
The defendant and Laura Meade were married in 2000 and had three children. A fourth child died when he was three years old. In 2013, they separated, but remained married. Laura moved to a trailer on Lotts Lane in Watson, Livingston Parish, where she lived with her father, Wayne Rogers, and Christian, one of her sons. The defendant, who had custody of their other two sons, lived in Ascension Parish. At some point during their separation, the defendant had also lived with Brittani, one of his girlfriends.
In December of 2018, Laura was dating Jeremy Campbell, the victim. While the defendant was dating other women, he continued to see Laura at her trailer to have sexual relations with her. On December 30, 2018, Laura, a nurse, had to work the night-shift from 11:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. Jeremy spent the night at Laura's trailer. Before Laura went to work that day, the defendant texted Laura many times. The defendant was having emotional issues. He texted Laura that he had recently spent the night on their son's grave. Laura texted the defendant that he needed to get some help for his problems. When Laura went to work that night, the defendant continued to text her. Laura got busy at work and could not text the defendant back. The defendant became more and more upset when Laura did not respond to him. When Laura did get a chance to respond, she texted the defendant to calm down. The defendant knew about Jeremy, and Laura testified that the defendant wanted her to choose between him and Jeremy.
Laura got home from work on December 31, 2018, between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. At about 9:30 a.m., the defendant called Laura on her phone. He asked her if Jeremy was at her home. Laura did not answer. The defendant told Laura that he was coming over, and he was going to shoot Jeremy and her and then shoot himself. Laura and Jeremy went out to have breakfast. Laura told Wayne that if the defendant came over to not let him in. When they returned from breakfast, Laura and Jeremy went to lay down in Laura's bedroom.
At around noon that same day, the defendant arrived at Laura's trailer and knocked on the locked front door. Wayne told the defendant that he would check to see if Laura was awake. As Wayne got to Laura's bedroom door and told Laura that the defendant was outside, the defendant kicked open the front door. Armed with a 9mm handgun, the defendant walked to the doorway of Laura's bedroom. Jeremy had gotten out of bed and was trying to put his clothes on. The defendant shot Jeremy in his left shoulder. The bullet exited Jeremy's chest. Jeremy fell to the floor. The defendant then shot Jeremy in the right cheek, causing a perforation to his skull and brain. The defendant left the 9mm handgun in Laura's bedroom. The defendant then left the trailer, retrieved another weapon from his truck, an AK pistol, returned to the trailer, and stood outside of Laura's bedroom. Christian came out of his bedroom and told the defendant to stop. The defendant left and drove to his mother's house. The defendant's mother, who is an East Baton Rouge Sheriff s Office deputy, took the defendant to the police station to turn himself in. Jeremy died from his injuries.
The defendant did not testify at trial.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for second degree murder. Specifically, the defendant contends he is guilty of manslaughter because he found his wife in bed with another man, he was not in control of his person, and he snapped.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; La. Const, art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 20012585 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Guilty of manslaughter is a proper responsive verdict for a charge of second degree murder. La. C.Cr.P. art. 814(A)(3). Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31(A)(1) defines manslaughter as a homicide which would be either first degree murder or second degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the factfinder finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed. The existence of "sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are not elements of the offense but, rather, are factors in the nature of mitigating circumstances that may reduce the grade of homicide. State v. Corkern, 20031393 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So.2d 57, 62-63, writ denied, 2004-2627 (La. 2/18/05), 896 So.2d 29. Manslaughter requires the presence of specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. State v. Hilburn, 512 So.2d 497, 504 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 515 So.2d 444 (La. 1987).
Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. State v. Mickelson, 2012-2539 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 178, 182. The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Jackson, 20180261 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/2/18), 265 So.3d 928, 934, writ denied, 2018-1969 (La. 4/22/19), 268 So.3d 304. Deliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range are circumstances which will support a finding of specific intent to kill. State v. Broaden, 99-2124 (La. 2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 362, cert, denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122 S.Ct. 192, 151 L.Ed.2d 135 (2001).
In his brief, the defendant does not deny that he killed Jeremy. He argues, instead, that he should have been found guilty of manslaughter. According to the defendant, the State failed to prove he had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. The defendant suggests that he was under duress from the loss of a child and a broken marriage and that in shooting and killing Jeremy, he had acted suddenly and in the heat of blood. The defendant contends he was besieged with emotional and psychological issues and that on the day of the shooting, he had lost all control, his behavior affected largely by the text messages between him and Laura. Two days before the shooting, the defendant had slept on the grave of his child who had died nine years earlier, and from that point forward, the defendant suggests, his conduct deteriorated. The defendant notes that he and Laura were still having sexual relations, while Laura had been dating Jeremy for about a month. According to the defendant, when he shot Jeremy, who was nude in Laura's bed, the defendant was "devoid of any cognizant ability to conduct himself as a normal person."
The defendant's assertion the State failed to prove he had the specific intent to kill is baseless. The defendant shot Jeremy once from a few feet away, then approached him while he was lying on the floor and shot him in the face. See Broaden, 780 So.2d at 362. Further, the defendant's claim herein that his killing of Jeremy was caused by provocation sufficient to deprive him of his self-control is unavailing. A reduction of second degree murder to manslaughter requires that the killing be committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). While the defendant in brief suggests that finding his "still legally-married-to wife" in bed with another man caused him to lose his self-control and kill Jeremy, the testimonial and documentary evidence do not support such a claim.
Before Jeremy was shot and killed, the defendant and Laura had been separated and living apart for five years. They both dated other people, and each knew the other was dating. At the time of the shooting, the defendant was dating or in a relationship with two other women. The defendant, in fact, was engaged to Jennifer in 2018, and is the father of her three-year-old daughter. The defendant was aware of Jeremy and knew that Laura was dating him. On the day he shot Jeremy, the defendant knew that Jeremy was with Laura at her home. The shooting took place around noon on December 31, 2018. At about 9: 30 a.m. on that day, the defendant spoke to Laura on the phone and threatened to kill her and Jeremy. On this same day at 11: 47 a.m., prior to the shooting, the defendant texted Brittani, another woman he was dating," Homeboy gets a closed casket." Also on the day of the shooting, prior to arriving at Laura's home, the defendant drove from LaPlace to Gonzales. He then drove from Gonzales to Watson. He then went to Laura's trailer with a gun, kicked open the front door, walked straight to Laura's bedroom and shot Jeremy, thus making good on his previous threat of killing Jeremy.
Based on the foregoing, there was no immediacy involved or some unsuspecting instant recognition by the defendant that Laura was with another man. Furthermore, even had the defendant been truly surprised or angered to find another man in Laura's bedroom, there would still be no merit to a jealousy or "fit of rage" defense to reduce the second degree murder of Jeremy to manslaughter. Given the several years the defendant and Laura had been separated and living apart, and that they had both moved on with their lives and were seeing other people, the jury rationally concluded that it was untenable for the defendant to have chosen this moment in time on December 31, 2018, to be so provoked by Laura's involvement with another man that he lost his self-control.
In State v. Thorne, 93-859 (La.App. 5th Cir. 2/23/94), 633 So.2d 773, the defendant was sitting with friends in a lounge when his estranged wife, Doris Thome, walked in with a man named Bruce Hidalgo. Doris spoke to the defendant, who asked if Bruce was her boyfriend. Doris confirmed he was. Doris and the defendant then went outside so Doris could get some items of hers that the defendant had. Doris returned to the lounge, carrying two bags. A few minutes after that, the defendant entered the lounge and shot and killed both Doris and Bruce. Id., 633 So.2d at 775-76. The defendant testified that when they were outside, he asked his wife if she was sleeping with her boyfriend. According to the defendant, Doris "told me she was graphically and told me that, that he was good and turned and walked in the bar." The defendant testified that he "just lost" his head, felt as though he were "kicked in the stomach," and that he had "never felt anything like that before." The defendant testified that he did not remember anything else until he discovered himself standing in the bar with a gun in his hand and Doris on the floor. He stated that he did not remember walking back into the bar and shooting the victims. When asked, the defendant admitted he was familiar with guns and that his blackout during the shootings was the first he ever experienced. Id., 633 So.2d at 776. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and argued on appeal that the evidence supported the responsive verdict of guilty of manslaughter because he was provoked when his wife "arrived with a new man in tow" and told the defendant that man was "good" in bed. Id., 633 So.2d at 775-76. In finding the mitigatory factors were not established, the fifth circuit explained:
[T]he testimony of the witnesses to the incident is consistent that defendant remained calm throughout the period leading to the
shooting. He never raised his voice or appeared upset. Even after defendant shot Bruce Hidalgo and Doris Thome, he remained in full control as evidenced by the fact he laid the weapon on the bar and told Peggy Smith, who was hiding behind the bar, to call the police.
In this case, the only evidence indicating "sudden passion" or "heat of blood" is defendant's statement to Chief Besson that "his wife would not fuck around on him again and that the [gentleman] would not fuck anybody else's wife." This statement does not indicate defendant's emotional status at the time of the shooting. Furthermore, even if defendant shot the victims in response to a statement by defendant's wife about her sexual relationship with Bruce Hidalgo, this information, in and of itself, is insufficient provocation to deprive a reasonable man of self control to the point that he would commit murder. Notably, defendant had been married twice before and divorced twice. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence.Zd., 633 So.2d at 777.
In State v. Crochet, 96-1666 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So.2d 1300, writ denied, 97-1547 (La. 11/21/97), 703 So.2d 1305, just recently separated, the defendant drove by the house of his wife (with whom the divorce did not become final until five months after the shooting) and saw parked outside the house the pickup truck of Ferris, the man whom the defendant knew his wife was dating. The next morning, the defendant, armed with a shotgun, entered his wife's house through a carport window, went into the bedroom where his wife and Ferris were sleeping, and shot and killed Ferris. The defendant waited at the house until the police came and surrendered without a struggle. Id., 693 So.2d at 1303. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and argued on appeal that the evidence warranted only a conviction of manslaughter. Id., 693 So.2d at 1306. The defendant testified: "I can't believe I did something like that." He indicated that he did not think of himself as "a violent man." Finally, the defendant stated: "I was just-that was a way I've never felt before, just in a rage at a point-I didn't know a person can reach that." Id., 693 So.2d at 1307. In finding the mitigating factors were not established, this court opined:
The guilty verdict in this case demonstrates the jury concluded this was a case of second degree murder and rejected the possibility of a manslaughter verdict. The evidence in this case indicates the defendant and Mrs. Crochet were separated and divorce proceedings were underway. Mrs. Crochet and the victim were having a relationship. Two nights before the shooting, the defendant pushed Mrs. Crochet during an argument. The defendant obviously was upset that the victim was in the house with Mrs. Crochet on that occasion. Before coming to her house at the time of the shooting, the defendant armed himself with a shotgun and some shells. The defendant broke into the home in the early morning hours, confronted Mrs. Crochet and the victim in bed, and shot the unarmed victim three times with the shotgun at close range. Then the defendant forced Mrs. Crochet to engage in oral sex with him. Considering these facts, a rational trier of fact might well have concluded that the defendant acted with deliberation and reflection and not in the heat of passion at the time of the shooting. The jury obviously concluded either: (1) that the argument between the defendant and Mrs. Crochet two nights earlier, and/or the fact that the victim was involved in a sexual relationship with Mrs. Crochet, was not sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection; or (2) that an average person's blood would have cooled by the time the defendant shot the victim. [Citations omitted.]Id.
In State v. Jack, 596 So.2d 323 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d 611 (La. 1992), the defendant, who was engaged in a homosexual relationship with the victim, William, felt sexually betrayed when he learned William had a girlfriend. While William was out with his girlfriend, the defendant approached William and shot him four times, killing him. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and argued he should have been convicted of manslaughter. Id., 596 So.2d at 324-26. Finding that the record did not support a reduction of his conviction to manslaughter, the third circuit pointed out that, while the defendant alluded to William's "sexual betrayal" as sufficient mitigating circumstances, the defendant, by his own account, learned of William's six-month relationship with Patricia earlier that same month and even had approached Patricia's family about their relationship between four to seven days before the shooting. Id., 596 So.2d at 327.
In State v. Hamilton, 99-523 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 11/3/99), 747 So.2d 164, shortly after separating from the defendant, the victim became romantically involved with another man. The defendant went to his estranged wife's home, kicked the door in, grabbed the other man by his neck and said, "What are you doing here? That's my wife. Who are you?" The defendant physically kicked the other man out of the house. Before fleeing the scene in his truck, the other man told the neighbors to call 9-1-1 because the defendant was going to kill the victim. The defendant shot and killed his wife and one of the police officers who responded to the incident. Id., 747 So.2d at 168. The defendant appealed his convictions for two counts of first degree murder, contending he killed his wife and police officer in "sudden passion" or "heat of blood." The defendant argued that he had just found his wife, partially naked, having just engaged in sexual intercourse with another man. Id., 747 So.2d at 169. The third circuit rejected the defendant's argument, finding that the jury's verdict may have reflected that it concluded there was no provocation for the shooting of his estranged wife and that the acts of the defendant, leading up to the shooting of his wife, established that he may have planned to commit a criminal act when he forcibly entered her house. Id. The third circuit concluded that neither the defendant seeing his estranged wife with a boyfriend, nor disputes between spouses over their impending divorce or over-due money payments, are sufficient provocation to reduce first degree murder tomanslaughter. Id.
See also State v. Triggs, 44,178 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 7/1/09), 16 So.3d 482, 491-92; State v. Quinn, 526 So.2d 322, 323-24 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So.2d 586 (La. 1989); State v. Maddox, 522 So.2d 579, 582 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1988).
There was nothing in the hours leading up to the defendant's shooting and killing Jeremy to suggest that either Laura or Jeremy did anything to provoke the defendant. Angry texting between Laura and the defendant, or Laura's not texting the defendant back, which also angered him, is not the type of provocation contemplated by La. R.S. 1431(A)(1). See State v. Ellis, 42,286 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 7/11/07), 961 So.2d 636, 638-40, writ denied, 2007-1641 (La. 1/25/08), 973 So.2d 753. That is, nothing in the moments leading up to the shooting established that the defendant had been provoked by Jeremy such that an average person in the defendant's position would have lost his self-control. See State v. Tran, 98-2812 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/5/99), 743 So.2d 1275, 1292, writ denied, 99-3380 (La. 5/26/00), 762 So.2d 1101. Mere words or gestures will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. State v. Mitchell, 39,202 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 12/15/04), 889 So.2d 1257, 1263, writ denied, 2005-0132 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1063. See State v. Charles, 2000-1611 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 5/9/01), 787 So.2d 516, 519, writ denied, 2001-1554 (La. 4/19/02), 813 So.2d 420 (an argument alone will not be sufficient provocation to reduce murder charge to manslaughter). Thus, the defendant's attempt in brief to establish that all the texting between him and Laura and/or seeing Jeremy in Laura's bedroom, provoked him to the point where he lost his self-control, is without merit.
See also Hamilton. 747 So.2d at 169; Thorne, 633 So.2d at 777-78; Quinn, 526 So.2d at 32324.
Provocation testimony is an issue of credibility. State v. Mellion, 20211116 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 41, 47, writ denied, 2022-00732 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 1186. It was the defendant who had to establish that the mitigating factors of sudden passion or heat of blood were present at the time of the killing which he failed to do. See State ex rel. Lawrence v. Smith, 571 So.2d 133, 136 (La. 1990); State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1138, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158 (applying the rule of Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)).
The defendant did not testify at trial. The sole defense witness was the defendant's mother who testified the defendant was stressed and depressed over the death of his son. She also testified the defendant lived with her, was laid off in October of 2018, and lost his health insurance to pay for his medication. She stated the day before the shooting, the defendant had gotten a new job. After the shooting, according to the defendant's mother, the defendant went to his mother's house; she saw the defendant outside pacing back and forth. She continued, "I mean, he was like something I've never seen with him before, you know, bending down and, you know, like with his hands over his head, oh, my God, oh, my God. And when I walked out, you know, he said, I just killed somebody." To whatever extent this testimony suggested that the defendant was so provoked that he had lost his self-control when he shot Jeremy, it was rationally rejected by the jury.
The factfinder can accept or reject the testimony of any witness. To resolve conflicting testimony relative to factual matters, the factfinder must make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence. State v. Eby, 2017-1456 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/6/16), 248 So.3d 420, 426, writ denied, 2018-0762 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.3d 1153. See State v. Mire, 2014-2295 (La. 1/27/16), 269 So.3d 698, 70001 (per curiam). The Jackson standard of review does not permit a reviewing court to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for the factfinder's, assess the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh evidence. State v. McGhee, 2015-2140 (La. 6/29/17), 223 So.3d 1136, 1137 (per curiam); State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 422 (per curiam). Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the factfinder, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert, denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict based on an exculpatory hypothesis of mitigatory circumstances presented to it, and rationally rejected. Eby, 248 So.3d at 426-27.
It is clear from the guilty verdict that the jury rejected the theory that the defendant was so angry and/or distraught over Laura being with another man that he was deprived of his self-control and cool reflection when he shot and killed Jeremy. Questions of provocation and time for cooling off are for the factfinder to determine under the standard of the average or ordinary person with ordinary selfcontrol. If a man unreasonably permits his impulse and passion to obscure his judgment, he will be fully responsible for the consequences of his act. State v. Leger, 2005-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 171, cert, denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007). The jury's guilty verdict of second degree murder was necessarily a rejection of any of the responsive verdicts, including manslaughter. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 814(A)(3); State v. Leon, 93-2511 (La. 6/3/94), 638 So.2d 220, 222 (per curiam).
After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the guilty verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of the second degree murder of Jeremy Campbell. See Calloway, 1 So.3dat418.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for home invasion. Specifically, the defendant contends he had his own key to the trailer and did not have the intent to harm anyone when he entered.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:62.8(A) defines home invasion as follows:
[T]he unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling, or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by a person, where a person is present, with the intent to use force or violence upon the person of another or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property of another.
To convict the defendant of home invasion, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the defendant entered the trailer without permission or authorization; (2) that the place he entered was an inhabited dwelling or a place used in whole or in part as a home by another person; (3) that a person was present in the home when the defendant made entry; and (4) the defendant had the intent to use force or violence against a person in the trailer or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property. See State v. Smith, 2013-0143 (La.App. 4th Cir. 5/21/14), 141 So.3d 853, 859, writ denied, 2014-1470 (La. 5/15/15), 170 So.3d 155.
The defendant concedes the evidence was sufficient to establish the second and third elements, but asserts that it was insufficient to establish the first and fourth elements. According to the defendant, he could have entered Laura's trailer as he had done before since he had access to a key that Laura left outside the trailer; his entry into the trailer, therefore, was not without permission or authorization. Further, the defendant contends his shooting Jeremy while inside the trailer did not establish that he had the requisite intent to use force or violence when he entered the premises. According to the defendant, he went to the trailer to speak to Laura to learn whether or not she intended to stay with Jeremy.
Laura testified that the defendant visited her sometimes at her trailer, and that the last visit was in mid-December of 2018. According to Laura, the defendant did not have a house key, but the defendant had permission to enter her trailer when he wanted. She also stated that she kept a spare key outside. On the day of the shooting, however, particularly in light of the defendant's recent threat that he was going to kill Laura and Jeremy, the defendant, according to Laura, did not have permission to come over and he was not invited inside. Laura, in fact, told her father that day that if the defendant came over to not let him in. When Laura was asleep in her bedroom, the defendant came over and knocked on the door, which was locked. Laura's father, Wayne, looked out a window, saw it was the defendant, and told him to hold on so he could see if Laura was awake. The defendant told Wayne to open the door or he, the defendant, would open it. As Wayne walked toward the bedroom door, the defendant kicked open the locked front door, walked to Laura's bedroom, and shot Jeremy. Detective Joseph Ballard, with the Livingston Parish Sheriffs Office, testified that the defendant damaged the right side of the doorjamb of the front door.
The foregoing clearly demonstrates that the jury rationally concluded that the defendant, on the day of the shooting, entered Laura's trailer without permission or authorization. The defendant was not invited over that day, he was told to wait outside, and he gained entry into the trailer only by kicking open a locked door, which caused damage to the property. By kicking open the door, the defendant clearly indicated his intent to damage the property.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court failed to inform the defendant at sentencing that he was entitled to credit for time served.
Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 880, the court is to give a defendant credit toward service of his sentence for time spent in actual custody prior to the imposition of sentence. The amendment of Article 880 by 1997 La. Acts No. 788, § 1, effective August 15, 1997, rendered the giving of credit for time served automatic, without the necessity or formality of the trial court having to so state. State v. Arnold, 2007-0362 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/19/07), 970 So.2d 1067, 1074, writ denied, 2007-2088 (La. 3/7/08), 977 So.2d 904. Thus, since the granting of credit for time served has long been self-operating under Article 880, it is no longer necessary for the court of appeal to amend a defendant's sentence to reflect credit for time served. State v. Bradford, 2019-0321 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/27/19), 2019 WL 4731646, *2 (unpublished).
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
In his fourth assignment of error, the defendant argues that this court should not amend his illegally lenient sentence to include the mandatory fine for home invasion.
Whoever commits the crime of home invasion shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars. La. R.S. 14:62.8(B). Where a statute authorizes a fine of "not more than" a certain amount, a fine of $0, or its equivalent of no fine imposed, is necessarily contained within the meaning of "not more than." Accordingly, the failure to impose a fine on count 2 did not result in an illegally lenient sentence. State V. Coleman, 2019-1458 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/12/20), 305 So.3d 878, 883, cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 141 S.Ct. 1739, 209 L.Ed.2d 505 (2021). This assignment of error is without merit.
In its brief, the State responds to the fourth assignment of error as follows: "The appellee concedes that the sentence imposed ignores a mandatory fine. The sentence imposed was illegally lenient. Absent a contemporaneous objection, the State cannot now request a more severe penalty be imposed, including the mandator[y] fine." Thus, both the defendant and the State have incorrectly concluded the defendant's sentence was illegally lenient.
DECREE
For these reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of defendant, Michael Anthony Meade.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.