Opinion
No. 3-741 / 02-2037
Filed November 17, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Ronald H. Schechtman, Judge.
Scotty McNeil appeals his convictions for possession of methamphetamine, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2001), and possession of marijuana, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Timothy Schott, County Attorney, and Ricki Osborn, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Scotty McNeil appeals his convictions of possession of methamphetamine, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2001) (count I), and possession of marijuana, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (count II). McNeil claims: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court applied the incorrect standard when ruling on his motion for new trial. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Officer Dan Steck was patrolling 12th Avenue in Fort Dodge near an auto repair shop known as the old Bianchi Heating and Cooling building. When he noticed a light on in the building, Steck decided to investigate and saw McNeil walking outside the building. McNeil gave his name and told Steck that he worked at the auto repair shop owned by Richard Albright and was in the process of locking up for the night.
Because he believed McNeil's responses were evasive, Steck obtained a records' check and learned McNeil had two outstanding warrants for his arrest. McNeil was arrested, and a search of his person disclosed a package of rolling papers and four lighters.
During a post-arrest interview with investigators, McNeil told Officer Dennis Mernka that any illegal drug paraphernalia found at the auto repair shop was his. He further admitted to smoking marijuana, but declined to indicate when. McNeil's slurred speech and blood-shot eyes led Mernka to believe McNeil was under the influence of marijuana.
Based on this information, investigators obtained a warrant authorizing a search of the auto repair shop. During the search, investigators found a plastic bag containing marijuana, a plastic bag containing methamphetamine, two plastic bags containing a white residue, rolling papers, a syringe, spoon, and other drug paraphernalia.
The State charged McNeil as earlier indicated, and following trial a jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. McNeil filed a motion in arrest of judgment and for new trial claiming the State failed to prove he actually or constructively possessed any of the drugs seized during the search of the auto repair shop. These motions were denied. McNeil subsequently was sentenced to five years imprisonment with a fine of $750 under count I, and two years imprisonment with a fine of $500 under count II.
On appeal, McNeil raises the following issues for review:
I.Whether the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession?
II.Whether the district court failed to apply the correct standard when it ruled on the motion for new trial under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)( b)(6)?
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
McNeil asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show he constructively possessed the marijuana and methamphetamine found at the auto repair shop. We disagree.
We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. A jury's verdict is binding if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence is such evidence as could convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( p).
The State must prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime with evidence that raises a fair inference of guilt. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002). To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must show the defendant either actually or constructively possessed a controlled substance. State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 2003). Actual possession occurs when a defendant has "direct physical control" over the drugs. Id. Constructive possession is found when the State shows the defendant "maintained control or a right to control" the illegal drugs. Webb, 648 N.W.2d at 76 (citation omitted).
[W]here the accused has not been in exclusive possession of the premises but only in joint possession, knowledge of the presence of the [contraband] on the premises and the ability to maintain control over [the contraband] by the accused will not be inferred but must be established by proof. Such proof may consist either of evidence establishing actual knowledge by the accused, or evidence of incriminating statements or circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge by the accused of the presence of the [contraband] on the premises.
Id. at 78-79 (citing State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 23 (Iowa 1973)). Here, the State sought to prove McNeil constructively possessed illegal drugs because the marijuana and methamphetamine were not found on McNeil's person, and the auto repair shop was accessible to others. Based on our review of the record, we find there is substantial evidence from which a jury could infer that McNeil had knowledge of and control over the marijuana and methamphetamine found at the auto repair shop.
As noted earlier, McNeil told Mernka that any drug paraphernalia found at the auto repair shop was his. He further admitted he smoked marijuana. These incriminating statements are proof of his knowledge and control of the drugs. See id.at 78.
Other circumstances from which the jury could infer McNeil's knowledge and control of the seized drugs include the following: Mernka believed McNeil was under the influence of marijuana on the night of his arrest based on his speech and blood-shot eyes. Officer Steck noticed the smell of marijuana when he arrested McNeil. When McNeil was searched, Steck found rolling papers in McNeil's wallet. McNeil stated they were for rolling cigarettes. McNeil was, however, smoking a manufactured cigarette at the time of arrest, and no other tobacco was found on his person or in the auto shop. The bags of marijuana and methamphetamine were found in a desk containing documents bearing McNeil's name. Another desk that appeared to be Albright's was also searched, but it contained no drugs or drug paraphernalia. McNeil's behavior before and after his arrest provides further circumstantial evidence of his knowledge and control over the drugs. See State v. Kirby, 622 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Iowa 2001) (finding defendant's suspicious activities combined with other factors to provide substantial evidence of constructive possession). We accordingly affirm on this issue.
III. New Trial
McNeil also contends the trial court applied the incorrect standard in ruling on his motion for new trial.
We review a denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Iowa 1997). Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)( b)(6), in considering a motion for new trial, a court may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses, and a new trial should be granted if the court concludes that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Iowa 1998). A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence where a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other. Id.
The trial court's ruling on McNeil's motion contained the following:
The place where the controlled substances were found, the incriminating statements, the defendant's presence in the building at the time of his arrest, and other evidence relating to the defendant's use and dominion of the building, and review of the facts in the light most favorable to the State, the Court concluded that there was substantial evidence on the controverted issues to support the verdicts.
Because the trial court erroneously utilized a substantial evidence test in a light most favorable to the State instead of the correct weight of the evidence test set out in Ellis, we reverse and remand the trial court's denial of McNeil's motion for new trial for reconsideration in conformity with our opinion.