Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5879-13T1
04-09-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONNOR MCMENEMY, Defendant-Respondent.
Nicholas D. Norcia, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor; Samuel Marzarella, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Mr. Norcia, on the brief). Herbert I. Ellis argued the cause for respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Maven and Carroll. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Municipal Appeal No. M414. Nicholas D. Norcia, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor; Samuel Marzarella, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Mr. Norcia, on the brief). Herbert I. Ellis argued the cause for respondent. PER CURIAM
By leave granted, the State appeals from the Law Division's order granting defendant Connor McMenemy's motion to suppress evidence seized without a search warrant. For reasons expressed below, we now reverse and remand the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings.
I.
The facts that follow have been derived from an affidavit prepared in support of an application for a search warrant, and reports prepared by the arresting officer. The transcript from the municipal court hearing reveals that the judge and the parties also had a statement of facts made by defense counsel before them; however, that statement was not made part of the record. In any event, no testimony or other evidence was introduced at the hearing in the municipal court or in the Law Division.
On October 11, 2013, defendant was involved in a single-car accident in which his vehicle struck a tree. At approximately 12:10 a.m., Jackson Township police officers arrived on the scene and observed defendant's vehicle had sustained "heavy front-end damage." Officer Ryan Donnelly detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from defendant and noticed his "eyes [were] watery and bloodshot," his face was "flush[ed]," and he was swaying and staggering as he walked around his car. Defendant failed a field sobriety test and admitted to having "a couple of beers." Medical personnel transported defendant to the hospital due to complaints of neck and back pain.
Donnelly went to the hospital to guard defendant. Upon his arrival, Donnelly advised hospital staff of his intention to collect blood samples from defendant and informed them that "a warrant would be faxed over shortly." Donnelly left defendant's hospital room to contact defendant's mother. When he returned, shortly before 2:00 a.m., he was advised that hospital staff had already drawn defendant's blood sample. Donnelly placed defendant under arrest and advised him of his Miranda rights.
The police report does not indicate the time either defendant or Donnelly arrived at the hospital.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Meanwhile, at the police department, Officer Joseph Candido from the traffic safety unit prepared a warrant application for a sample of defendant's blood based upon the officers' on-scene observations of defendant, as well as, defendant's admission that he had been drinking. At 1:45 a.m., Candido received permission from an assistant prosecutor to request a warrant to obtain a blood sample from defendant. At 2:16 a.m., Candido signed the warrant application, and a Law Division judge telephonically issued the warrant. The hospital received the warrant by facsimile at 2:32 a.m. Donnelly took possession of the blood sample from the hospital, although the record does not indicate whether this occurred before or after the issuance of the warrant.
Defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and other motor vehicle offenses. He appeared in Jackson Township Municipal Court and moved to suppress the blood sample obtained without a warrant. The municipal court granted the motion and the State appealed, as of right, to the Law Division.
At the de novo trial before the Law Division, the State argued (1) the officers did not obtain the blood evidence in bad faith; (2) the officers would have inevitably discovered the evidence; and (3) the officers' conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant asserted the warrantless blood draw was presumptively invalid because it violated his constitutional rights.
The trial court determined the case was controlled by Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696, 707 (2013), which held that "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." After reviewing the facts contained in the police report, the court determined that Donnelly's conduct was "objectively unreasonable" because he did not properly inform the hospital staff when to draw defendant's blood, causing the blood to be drawn before the issuance of a warrant. The court found that the State "failed to put forth clear and convincing evidence that [Donnelly] would have telephoned the emergent duty judge to obtain the warrant prior to drawing defendant's blood," and found that "Donnelly did not do everything in his power to ensure that a warrant was obtained prior to obtaining defendant's blood sample." The court concluded "[s]uppressing the blood draw results . . . would serve to deter police misconduct because it would ensure that officers give clear directions when dealing with hospital staff." The court also determined that the State's inevitability argument must fail. The court granted defendant's motion to suppress the blood evidence. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, the State raises the following claims:
POINT I
BECAUSE THE POLICE ACTED REASONABLY IN OBTAINING A WARRANT VALIDLY BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH, THE ORDER SUPPRESSING BLOOD EVIDENCE MUST BE REVERSED.
POINT II
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE POLICE OBTAINED A VALID WARRANT, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFIED A WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW PURSUANT TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES OF SCHMERBER V. CALIFORNIA AND MISSOURI V. MCNEELY, AND THIS COURT'S RECENT DECISION IN STATE V. JONES.
POINT III
THE ORDER SUPPRESSING BLOOD EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM DEFENDANT'S PERSON MUST BE REVERSED, BECAUSE THIS EVIDENCE INEVITABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED PURSUANT TO THE EXECUTION OF THE VALID SEARCH WARRANT BEING INDEPENDENTLY SOUGHT AT THE TIME OF THE BLOOD DRAW.
III.
The appellate court has a limited role in reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress. We ordinarily accord deference to the trial judge's factual findings, so long as they are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record," State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), or where those findings of the trial judge "are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). However, no testimony was taken in this case. Our review is de novo, and we owe no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions or interpretation of the legal consequences flowing from established facts. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
According to the Fourth Amendment, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Unless there is an applicable exception, a police officer must have a warrant based on probable cause to search and seize because "judicially-authorized search warrants are strongly preferred before law enforcement officers conduct a search." State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 742 (1984)); see Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 246.
The basic test to evaluate the constitutionality of police conduct in executing a search warrant is the same under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 441 (2013). While a warrantless search is presumptively invalid, the "presumption of invalidity . . . may be overcome by a showing that a warrantless search was yet reasonable because it 'falls within one of the specific exceptions created by the United States Supreme Court.'" State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 111-12 (2010) (quoting State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173 (1989)). "The State bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular search fits within one of those recognized exceptions." Id. at 112 (citing Hill, supra, 115 N.J. at 174). If the officers' conduct is "objectively reasonable in light of the facts known to [them] at the time of the search," they have committed no constitutional violation of search and seizure protections. Rockford, supra, 213 N.J. at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the outset, we note that the trial court misconstrued critical facts in its consideration of the case. Specifically, the court believed that Donnelly was the officer responsible for procuring the warrant. However, the record is clear that while Donnelly guarded defendant at the hospital, Candido was processing the warrant application at the police station. The court's legal conclusions drawn from the mistaken findings of fact are not supported by credible evidence in the record. Moreover, due to the erroneous factual findings, the court did not consider the State's inevitable discovery argument. Therefore, we consider the State's arguments de novo.
In Point I, the State argues the police acted reasonably in obtaining a valid warrant. We agree.
The validity of the warrant is undisputed. The warrant application contained sufficient facts, derived from the officers' observations and the field sobriety test, to show defendant operated his vehicle after consuming alcoholic beverages. Defendant is not contesting that the police had probable cause to obtain a warrant. Nor is defendant challenging the validity of the issued warrant. Thus, we conclude the warrant was lawfully issued based upon probable cause.
In Point II, the State relies on our recent decision in State v. Jones, 4 37 N.J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 2014), to argue that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. We disagree as the facts of this case do not present exigent circumstances. In Jones, there were concerns over the dissipation of the defendant's blood alcohol level while awaiting an hours-long police investigation into the multiple-car accident. Id. at 81. We reversed and concluded that, under those unique circumstances, it was not necessary for the officers to have incurred "further delay . . . in securing a warrant that would have threatened the destruction of the blood alcohol evidence." Ibid.
In 2011, the existing law "permitted police to obtain a blood sample without first obtaining a warrant, so long as they had probable cause to believe that the driver was intoxicated and the sample was taken 'in a medically acceptable manner at a hospital or other suitable health care facility.'" Id. at 75; (quoting State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 238 (1984) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 920 (1966))).
In this case, the record does not reflect any concern with the duration of the accident investigation. And though the "dissipation of blood alcohol level continues to be an 'essential' factor in analyzing the totality of the circumstances," in a drunk-driving case, id. at 79, there is no evidence in this record that the officers were particularly pressed to obtain defendant's blood sample. Further, the record does not indicate any delays in the warrant application process. The police responded to the scene at 12:10 a.m. and by 1:45 a.m., Candido obtained permission from the duty prosecutor for a telephonic warrant, and received judicial approval for the warrant at 2:16 a.m. Based on this record, we conclude there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless blood draw.
As to Point III, we consider the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine as a basis to uphold the warrantless blood draw. The State contends the blood sample would have been lawfully drawn upon the execution of the validly issued warrant. We agree.
We begin with the well-established principle that "[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served by excluding evidence that, but for the misconduct, the police inevitably would have discovered." State v. Sugar (Sugar II), 100 N.J. 214, 237 (1985). In Sugar III, the Court listed the factors that must be satisfied in order to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine. The State must prove that
(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means.
[State v. Sugar (Sugar III), 108 N.J. 151, 156-57 (1987) (quoting Sugar II, supra, 100 N.J. at 235).]
We dispense quickly with the first factor and conclude the police followed "proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures" to secure a warrant. Ibid. As stated above, this fact is undisputed. The warrant application was based upon a "well-grounded suspicion" that defendant committed a DWI offense. State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 21 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). By following proper procedures, the police obtained a warrant to draw defendant's blood, thus satisfying the first prong under Sugar III.
Under the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that once the warrant was issued, police would have been entitled to authorize the hospital to draw the blood. The blood evidence would have been inevitably and lawfully obtained and seized upon execution of the warrant. Accordingly, the second and third prongs of Sugar III have been satisfied. Because we conclude the elements of inevitable discovery are satisfied in this case, the order suppressing the blood sample is reversed.
Defendant posits that the State should have redrawn his blood after the warrant issued, and faults the State for not doing so. Based upon our review of this matter, we do not consider it necessary to invade defendant a second time after the warrant was issued.
--------
Finally, defendant contends the exclusionary rule should be applied to deter the conduct of the officer who acted unreasonably by failing to provide appropriate instructions to the hospital staff on when to draw the blood sample. Viewed in light of the full factual record, we disagree.
The Court considered the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule in State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 47-48 (2011). In that case, the police dispatcher was found to have negligently and inaccurately informed an officer that there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant. Id. at 42-43. As a result of the dispatcher's actions, the defendant was arrested and a search incident to the arrest yielded contraband. Id. at 42. Upon review, the Court found the dispatcher engaged in misconduct as an active participant in the chain of events leading to the defendant's wrongful arrest and the search that followed. The Court held suppression of the evidence "would have important deterrent value, would underscore the need for training of officers and dispatchers to focus on detail, and would serve to assure that our own constitutional guarantees are given full effect." Id. at 52.
Unlike Handy, this case does not involve unlawful police activity or misconduct. Donnelly did not act unreasonably or engage in any misconduct when he informed the hospital staff that he intended to request a blood sample from defendant and that he was waiting for the warrant. He did not direct the staff to draw the blood, and he was not present in defendant's room when the draw occurred. Unlike the dispatcher in Handy, the hospital staff did not act under the authority of the police department when the blood sample was prematurely extracted. Misconduct cannot be imputed to the police from the hospital's independent actions. Under this confluence of facts, we discern no need to invoke the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule where no police misconduct occurred. See Sugar II, supra, 100 N.J. at 237; see also Adkins, supra, 433 N.J. Super. at 493 ("[A]pplication of the exclusionary rule here would not serve the rule's principal purposes articulated by our Court. It would not deter unlawful police conduct, and it would not meaningfully safeguard the integrity of our judicial process.").
In sum, the officers' conduct was "objectively reasonable in light of the facts known to [them] at the time of the search," and they have committed no constitutional violation of search and seizure protections. Rockford, supra, 213 N.J. at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we reverse the order suppressing the blood evidence and reinstate the indictment.
Finally, we recognize, as did the trial judge, that hospital staff have little to no understanding of search and seizure law, or the ramifications of a warrantless blood draw. Therefore, police officers must ensure that their instructions to medical staff are clear and unequivocal when requesting a blood sample. We leave it to law enforcement to review its policies and procedures in this regard to ensure proper compliance with McNeeley.
Reversed and remanded. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION