Opinion
No. 5-700 / 03-2034
Filed December 21, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza Ovrom, Judge.
Phillip McFarland appeals from the trial court's ruling granting in part and denying in part his petition to strike or modify supplemental restitution orders entered following McFarland's conviction in three separate Polk County criminal cases. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Christopher Kragnes of Kragnes Kragnes, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Steve Foritano and George Karnas, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Phillip McFarland appeals from the trial court's ruling granting in part and denying in part his petition to strike or modify supplemental restitution orders entered following McFarland's conviction in three separate Polk County criminal cases.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In Polk County Case No. SRCR111588, McFarland was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary and false imprisonment. In FECR111646, he was convicted of second-degree burglary. In FECR111876, he was convicted of two counts of impersonating a public official and two counts of false imprisonment. He was sentenced in all three cases on October 23, 1997. The supreme court remanded for resentencing because the court failed to state reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. State v. McFarland, No. 97-2171 (Iowa Jan. 4, 1999). On March 12, 1999, McFarland was resentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed fifteen years. We affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. McFarland, 598 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). He is currently serving the March 12, 1999, sentence.
The trial court sentencing orders in each case required McFarland to pay restitution, including court costs and attorney fees. Because the total amount of McFarland's restitution was unknown at the time of sentencing, the trial court noted in its sentencing orders that supplemental restitution orders would follow. The supplemental restitution orders required McFarland to pay $1,062.49 attorney fees in SCR111588. In FECR111646, he was ordered to pay $2,227.94 attorney fees and $21.13 court costs. He was ordered to pay $1,222.24 attorney fees and $39.23 court costs in FECR111876. The amounts were set after credits for payments made in each case. The Polk County Clerk forwarded copies of each supplemental restitution order to the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC). The clerk, in keeping with standard practice, did not send copies of the supplemental restitution orders to McFarland. After the clerk refused McFarland's request for copies of the supplemental orders, he obtained them from IDOC at a cost of $3.82.
The amounts of restitution ordered were included in IDOC's statutorily required restitution payment plan for McFarland. Under the terms of the plan, IDOC deducted twenty percent of the amount of McFarland's inmate wage deposited in McFarland's inmate account.
On May 7, 2003, McFarland filed a "Petition to Strike or Modify Restitution Plan" in Polk County District Court. McFarland claimed he was entitled to a predeprivation hearing before IDOC deducted any money from his inmate account and the resulting due process violation required restoration of funds to his inmate account. He additionally claimed he should not be required to pay attorney fees in those cases dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain, as well as attorney fees incurred on remand for resentencing. He also claimed court reporter fees and witness fees were improperly assessed to him as court costs. With the exception of McFarland's claim concerning a witness fee in FECR111646, the court rejected all of McFarland's claims and denied the remainder of his requested relief. Specifically, the court rejected McFarland's due process claims because he was not entitled to a predeprivation hearing prior to IDOC's deduction of inmate wages from his inmate account. McFarland's claim concerning attorney fees was denied because the court concluded he was liable for the total cost of legal assistance even if he was acquitted or the charges against him were otherwise dismissed. The trial court, citing contrary provisions of a manual for clerks of district court, rejected McFarland's argument that the clerk should not have taxed a court reporter fee in each separate case when those cases were combined for purposes of a hearing on the same date.
On appeal, McFarland claims the clerk's failure to send him copies of the trial court's supplemental restitution orders violated his due process right to a predeprivation hearing before IDOC deducted any money, including inmate wages, from his inmate account. He also claims that he should not have been ordered to pay attorney fees resulting from the judicial errors necessitating his resentencing or attorney fees relating to four charges against him that were dismissed. Lastly, McFarland claims that the trial court's reliance on the manual for clerks of court was misplaced and the controlling statute does not authorize taxation of multiple court reporter fees in separate cases combined for one hearing.
II. Standard of Review.
Generally, we review matters regarding restitution for an abuse of discretion. State v. Love, 589 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1998). However, our review of constitutional due process challenges is de novo. Id. Additionally, our review of statutory construction issues is for errors of law. Id. (citations omitted).
III. Due Process Violation.
Iowa Code section 904.701(2) authorizes the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections to pay inmates an allowance, which is a "gratuitous payment" and not a wage. Iowa Code § 904.701(2) (2003). This allowance, as well as funds from sources other than the IDOC, may be deposited in an inmate account. Id. § 904.702. IDOC is required to deduct the amount "established by the inmate's restitution plan" from the inmate's account. Id. Iowa Code section 904.702 requires that an inmate receive notice of the deduction of funds from an inmate account. The notice requirement protects an inmate's right to "an informal predeprivation hearing before monies [are] taken from an inmate's private funds towards satisfaction of a restitution debt." Walters v. Grossheim, 554 N.W.2d 530, 530 (Iowa 1996) (hereinafter Walters II) (citing Walters v. Grossheim, 525 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1994) (hereinafter Walters I)). The right to an informal hearing, however, is not implicated unless the account contains funds other than an inmate's allowance. State v. Love, 525 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1998).
The record indicates that the funds deducted from McFarland's account were exclusively inmate wages. McFarland was therefore not entitled to a predeprivation hearing, and there was no due process violation resulting from the clerk's failure to serve him with a copy of the supplemental restitution orders. Id. We affirm on this issue.
IV. Attorney Fees.
Iowa Code section 815.9(3) states:
If a person is granted an appointed attorney, the person shall be required to reimburse the state for the total cost of legal assistance provided to the person. "Legal assistance" as used in this section shall include not only an appointed attorney, but also transcripts, witness fees, expenses, and any other goods or services required by law to be provided to an indigent person entitled to an appointed attorney.
If the indigent defendant is "acquitted or the charges are dismissed," "all costs and fees incurred for legal assistance" are due within thirty days of acquittal or dismissal. This language was added to the statute 1999. 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 135, sec. 37 (codified as Iowa Code § 815.9(3)(2003)). McFarland is expressly liable for attorney's fees under this statute even if he was acquitted or the charges against him were otherwise dismissed. Id. We also affirm on this issue.
V. Court Costs/Court Reporter Fees.
McFarland argues:
Court reporter fees were assessed and compounded as costs against McFarland multiple times. A single $15.00 court report fee for McFarland's May 23, 1997 pre-trial hearing was assessed four times and taxed as a $60.00 fee. There was only one hearing, not four, and the matters were all heard at the same time.
The $15 fee was assessed in each of the four separate criminal cases subject to the May 23rd hearing, in FECR111588, 111646, 111876, 112041. This practice was also instituted against his co-defendant, Edward Green, who was assessed four $15 fees for the same May 23rd hearing. A total of eight $15 court reporter fees was assessed for a total of $120.00 in restitution for McFarland and Green. This appears as though there were eight court hearings; however, this is not the case. In McFarland's situation, all four cases were heard at one time, not individually. The same is true for Green.
Generally, the same fees taxed as court costs in a civil case are taxed as court costs in a criminal case. See, e.g., City of Cedar Rapids v. Linn County, 267 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Iowa 1978). Iowa Code section 625.8(2) states that "the clerk of the district court shall tax as a court cost a fee of fifteen dollars per day for the services of a court reporter." As far as we know, there is no Iowa authority construing section 625.8(2). The trial court adopted the construction of 625.8(2) found in the Manual for Clerk, Iowa District Court, App. B at B-1 (1995), authorizing the clerk to assess a court reporter fee of fifteen dollars per day, per case, even if more than one case was combined for hearing. The court also found assessment of multiple fees was justified because the court reporter prepared a certificate for filing in each case regardless of the number of cases actually attended. We disagree.
Court costs "are taxable only to the extent provided by statute." City of Ottumwa v. Taylor, 251 Iowa 618, 621, 102 N.W.2d 376, 378 (1960). Cost statutes are strictly construed as in derogation of the common law. Id. In construing a statute, we presume that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result. Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (2005). Our obligation is to reach an interpretation that effectuates rather than defeats the purpose of the statute. Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1985).
When the text of the statute is plain and its meaning clear, we do not search for a meaning beyond the statute's express terms or resort to rules of statutory construction. Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Iowa 1995). It is only when there is ambiguity in the statute that we resort to such rules. Stroup v. Reno, 530 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1995). We consider a statute ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of it. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996).
Section 625.8(2) (2003) is unambiguous. It directs the clerk to tax a court reporter fee of fifteen dollars per day. By construing the statute to require the clerk to tax a full fifteen-dollar fee in each of several cases combined for one proceeding, the district court has read something into the statute that is not there. Moreover, we find it unjust and unreasonable to tax multiple court reporter fees when the court reporter is only required to report one proceeding; nor do we believe that the few minutes required for the reporter to complete and sign the required certification form justifies taxation of the full per day court reporter fee.
Our construction of section 625.8(2) finds additional support in cases involving similar taxation of court costs issues. For example, State v. Petrie, 478 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Iowa 1991), held that costs and fees not associated with a particular charge were to be "assessed proportionately" to the defendant who plead guilty to only one of three charges, resulting in dismissal of the other two. In State v. Verwayne, 44 Iowa 621, 621 (1872), the court addressed a related question concerning taxation of a per diem jury fee. There the court held:
Whatever might be the rule as to taxing in each case a pro rata part of the $24.00 where two or more cases are tried in one day, we think the full $24.00 should be taxed if only one case is tried in a day, even if the whole day is not consumed.
Id.
We hold that under these circumstances, the clerk should have taxed only one court reporter fee for a single hearing and that fee should have been assessed proportionately to each case combined for that hearing. The trial court's order taxing a separate fifteen-dollar court reporter fee in each case combined for one hearing is reversed and remanded with instructions that the court costs be taxed in accordance with our opinion.
The trial court's ruling on McFarland's petition to strike or modify restitution plan is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.