The general rule that cross-examination must be responsive to testimony given on direct examination or material or relevant thereto applies to cross-examination of an accused in a criminal case as to prior similar offenses. (What was stated in the second paragraph of the syllabus and the corresponding part of the opinion in State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762, relating to cross-examination is disapproved.) Appeal from Johnson district court, division No. 2; CLAYTON BRENNER, judge.

It should not be attempted on cross-examination when the witness is an accused in the criminal proceeding. This prohibition was clearly pointed out in State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677, 438 P.2d 58, when the second paragraph of the syllabus in State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762, was disapproved. The prohibition against testing the credibility of a witness who is the accused in a criminal proceeding was fully explained by Mr. Justice Fontron in the recent case of State v. Harris, 215 Kan. 649, 527 P.2d 949, in which a conviction of this same defendant on a charge of aggravated robbery was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

It should not be attempted on cross-examination when the witness is an accused in the criminal proceeding. This prohibition was clearly pointed out in State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677, 438 P.2d 58, when the second paragraph of the syllabus in State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762, was disapproved. The prohibition against testing the credibility of a witness who is the accused in a criminal proceeding was fully explained by Mr. Justice Fontron in the recent case of State v. Harris, 215 Kan. 649, 527 P.2d 949, in which a conviction of this same defendant on a charge of aggravated robbery was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

In State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677, 438 P.2d 58, this was specifically pointed out. In Roth this court disapproved statements in the case of State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762, and held such was not proper cross-examination since it was not responsive to testimony given on direct examination or relevant thereto and was proscribed by our statutes. For later cases see State v. Cantrell, 201 Kan. 182, 187, 440 P.2d 580, cert. den. 393 U.S. 944, 21 L.Ed.2d 282, 89 S.Ct. 315; State v. DeLespine, 201 Kan. 348, 351, 440 P.2d 572; State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 798, 443 P.2d 279, cert. den. 394 U.S. 908, 22 L.Ed.2d 219, 89 S.Ct. 1019; State v. Wright, 203 Kan. 54, 55, 453 P.2d 1; and State v. Pappan, 206 Kan. 195, 197, 477 P.2d 989.

The state could not attack the credibility of the defendant's testimony until he had taken the stand. Once that issue was raised, it properly could be rebutted. ( State v. McGlade, 165 Kan. 425, 196 P.2d 173; State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762; State v. Bean, 181 Kan. 1044, 317 P.2d 480.) Other points have been raised and briefed by the appellant.

Defendant has only abstracted his requested instruction and the trial court's instruction No. 10; thus the question is not properly presented for our review. ( State v. Kowalec, 205 Kan. 57, 468 P.2d 221; and State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762.) Nevertheless we have examined defendant's contention. As we have noted, the trial court in instruction No. 10 gave the jury the elements of the offense under the terms of the statute.

( State v. Motley, 199 Kan. 335, 430 P.2d 264.) In State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677, 438 P.2d 58, the second paragraph of the syllabus in State v.McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762, was overruled, and it was said: "The statute, passed for the purpose of encouraging the accused to testify, put an end to the promiscuous cross-examination as to previous convictions.

( State v. Wright, 194 Kan. 271, 398 P.2d 339.) Such evidence, if relevant, may be admitted with proper limiting instructions in the state's case in chief ( State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 424 P.2d 612, and cases therein cited) as well as in the cross-examination of the accused himself ( State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762.) The state's argument that the evidence was admissible under one of the exceptions of K.S.A. 60-455 is, in our opinion, patently untenable.

We have always rejected, as prejudicial, evidence of another crime as proof that a person committed a crime upon a specified occasion. But we have always admitted such evidence of prior commission of crime upon proper limiting instructions when relevant to prove some other material fact including intent, plan, knowledge or identity. (K.S.A. 60-455; see also, State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. 194, 428 P.2d 762.) Conceivably, evidence of the prior conviction of defendant for grand larceny could have been admissible upon the instant trial for larceny in connection with the burglary. The foregoing, in view of the record before us, impels us further to the conclusion no prejudice to defendant is shown to have occurred from the joinder, and the burden here remains on him to demonstrate prejudicial error.