Opinion
2012-UP-496
08-29-2012
The State, Respondent, v. Zerell McClurkin, Appellant.
Appellate Defender Tristan M. Shaffer, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield, Jr., of Lancaster, for Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Submitted August 1, 2012.
Appeal From Chester County No. 2010-161706, W. Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge.
Appellate Defender Tristan M. Shaffer, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield, Jr., of Lancaster, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Zerell McClurkin appeals his conviction of armed robbery, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to present evidence he intended to permanently deprive the victim of her property. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) (stating an appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State on review of a denial of a directed verdict); id. ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Porter, 389 S.C. 27, 39, 698 S.E.2d 237, 243 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Armed robbery is defined as the felonious or unlawful taking of money, goods, or other personal property of any value from the person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person in fear."); Broom v. State, 351 S.C. 219, 221, 569 S.E.2d 336, 337 (2002) (holding the intent of a person to permanently deprive another of his or her property is implicit in the definition of armed robbery); State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971) ("The question of the intent with which an act is done is one of fact and is ordinarily for jury determination except in extreme cases where there is no evidence thereon. The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind, and can be proved only by expressions or conduct, considered in the light of the given circumstances.").
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C. J., WILLIAMS and PIEPER, JJ., concur.